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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The idea for thi s study derived from a question
about the difference between labor’s acceptance of 
ca.pi tal i sm in the United States versus that of Europe in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Comparing 
European and U.S. labor unrest in this period, the continued 
radical opposition of the European worker toward industrial 
capitalism contrasts with American labor’s increasing 
accommodation to the basic structure of capitalist society. 
In both societies, the emergence and maturing of industrial 
capitalism set a pattern of underlying class conflict. As 
they developed a sense of their own exploitation, great 
numbers of workers on both continents cried out against 
abuses. European labor long supported labor, socialist, and 
communist political parties as well as independent, radical 
unions whose doctrines invoked the eventual destruction of 
the capitalist order and a subsequent restructuring of 
society and redistribution of property. Likewise, in the
U.S., widespread labor unrest after 1877 focused, in part, 
upon an overturn of the existing economic structure.
In contrast to the continued militance of European 
labor throughout the nineteenth century, the main elements 
of U.S. labor abandoned early radical unionism in favor of 
trade union structures advocating acceptance of labor’s 
place within capitalist society. By the Second World War, 
craft unionism, as well as almost all other social groups in 
the U.S. harbored positive ideas about capitalism and 
consequently offered it few challenges. Although intense 
labor unrest existed in the period 1830-1910, the results of 
collective labor activity were meagre: business, aided by
more often than not, the press, won in most of the disputes. 
Radical unions were marginalised, nullified or destroyed.
The American Federation of Labor, general successor of early 
unions, abandoned the unskilled for pure trade unionism and 
identified its well being with that of industry. The A F of 
L ’s refusal to organize the unskilled meant that only about 
2.5 million, or 8 per cent of the workforce were unionized.1 
Although eventual 1 y acknowledging labor’s separate and 
seemingly permanent class identity, the A F of L neither 
believed nor acted in a class conscious manner. It made 
mild, "bread and butter" demands upon owners to mitigate the 
worst apects of the industrial system, but it did not 
challenge the system. As George Bernard Shaw put it, trade
uni oni sm was the capitalism of the prolstariat.2 Clearly, 
this role remains unchanged to the present; witness a 
historian of U.S. labor’s relations with socialism, William 
Dick writing in 1972:
Today, not only do American trade unions 
assert their sole function as a pressure group, 
but their members are among the principal 
upholders of the capitalist system. In the 
ferment of recent years they have been the most 
stalwart defenders of the status quo.
Unapologetical1 y , they offer nothing to the 
urgent needs of the society of which they are a 
part.3
George Meany, AFL-CIO President expressed this 
succinctly in an address to the National Association of 
Manufacturers in 1956: "I never went on strike in mv life,
never ran a strike in my life, never ordered anyone else to 
run a strike in my life, never had anything to do with a 
picket line....In the final analysis, there is not a great 
difference between the things I stand for and the things 
that NAM leaders stand for. “4
There was a time in U.S. labor history when this was 
not the case. Beginning in 1877, the first great strike 
period, widespread labor unrest gave rise to various labor 
organizations calling for the restructuring of society in 
accordance with precepts which at the time were viewed as 
radical. The Socialist Labor Party, formed in the labor 
troubles of 1877, became the main vehicle for U.S. socialism 
until 1900, constituting a "broadly based, deeply rooted, 
self conscious movement for soci ali sm...."5 An
4anarchist-syndicalist movement appeared in New York and 
Chicago composed largely of radical emigres from Germany.
The largest national labor organization in this period, the 
Knights of Labor, rejected in principle the system of 
private ownership and wage labor as it stood. Holding a 
nostalgic view of labor and posing a naive remedy for its 
ills, the leading spokesmen for the Knights nonetheless 
understood that a permanent condition of wage servitude 
should be avoided. To escape such a fate, the Knights 
believed that workers must achieve a large measure of 
sociD-economic equality with owners by becoming cooperative 
owners themselves. The Knights were the onlv large national 
union to organize both sl:i 11 ed and unskilled workers until 
the 1930s. Most trade unions of the time accepted such an 
emphasis on labor solidarity which included the unskilled.
Promotion of a series of strikes after 1884 boosted 
the membership of the Knights to a high of 700,000 in 1886. 
Nonetheless, the Knights suffered various problems: a weak
admini strative structure, few strike funds, internal 
jurisdictional disputes with trade unions, which led to the 
formation of the A F of L in 1886, and most important, 
severe setbacks due to the strike breaking tactics of Jay 
Gould in the Great Southwest Railroad Strike of 1336. By 
1892, Knights’ membership had failed to 100,000.
In 1886, the Haymarket bomb caused mass hysteria and 
adverse public opinion, destroyed the amarchist movement and
cemented the resolve of businessmen to crack down on 
subversive elements within labor organizations, in many 
cases by destroying unions themselves. Thus, while the years 
1877 to 1886 had witnessed a growth in the incidence and 
size of strikes, approximately half of which had union 
sanction or aid, the twelve years after 1886 marked a 
reversal of those i ncreases.6
Despite this overall decline in number of strikes, 
defiance remained alive. In 1894, Eugene Debs described the 
Pullman boycott as an open struggle between the working 
class and a social order which sanctified selfishness.7 The
D-f the battles between the power of or g an i zed capital and 
labor, and indicated the fate of many radical leaders.
With the decline of the Knights of Labor, many 
workers placed their hopes with the AF of L. Organized in 
1886 by workers with Marxist ideas, the union couched its 
early rhetoric in radical terms. Although Samuel Gompers, 
Adolph Strasser and other early leaders were sincere in 
their beliefs, the experience of the union constituted a 
betrayal of that radicalism. This was partly due to the 
formation of the AF of L expressly to defend craft workers 
against the weakness of the Knights of Labor.3 An even more 
important reason was that Gompers" "pure and simple 
unionism" gradually divorced him from Marx ism.9 Formally 
rejecting socialism in the 1390s, the Federation committed
6itself to craft organizaton, consolidating its gains within 
the existing system. This constituted unionism's neglect of 
unskilled workers for the next fifty years and abandonment 
of independent political activity.
As the AF of L achieved primacy among U.S. unions, 
radical organizations faltered. In 1889, the Socialist Labor 
Party split into the SLP and the Socialist Party, after 
which the SLP remained, in the words of historian James 
Weinstein, "static, isolated, and marginal" to the 
experience of labor.10 Warfare between the SLP and the AF 
of L caused most of the SLF" s problems. Gompers counseled AF 
of L members to avoid political involvement advocated by the 
SLP. In reteliatlon, the SLP attacked the AF of L, which In 
a boomerang effect, almost caused the fermer's 
destruction.il By the end of World War I, the SLP claimed 
only a small group of radicals and was ignored by maj or 
labor groups.12 In contrast, no significant splits occurred 
between socialists and trade unionists in England, France or 
Germany.
The greater ire of the AF of L fell upon the 
Socialist Party. This revisionist socialist group formed to 
protest the SLP's trade union attacks. It supported unions, 
including the AF of L, and advocated political and 
legislative action. By 1912, the S P ’s 112,000 members marked 
the high point of socialism in the U.S. The Socialist Party 
criticized Gompers Tor his conci1i atory stance toward
7capital ism and his membership in the National Civic 
Federation which proclaimed the identity of interests of 
capital and labor. Put off by harsh criticism from Eugene 
Debs and William D. Haywood, and by attacks of the Socialist 
Labor Party, Gompers reversed his former conciliatory 
position, turned paranoid about socialists, and insisted 
that irreconcilable differences existed between socialists 
and trade unionists.14 In a similar manner to his reaction 
to differences with the SLP, Gompers resisted the SP's aims 
of making labor politically conscious.
With such an sxtreme anti-socialist and
uiffsred fnarksdlv from Europaan labor 1 aadar s . 15 Laadarship 
was crucial. The failure of the SP to gain broad trade union 
support furnished, to William Dick, the "fundamental reason 
for the failure of Socialism in the U.S."16 Unlike British 
trade union leaders who advocated political activity and 
democratic socialism, U.S. labor leaders informed their 
constituents that the goals of the Socialist Party were not 
only unrealistic but subversive of trade union principles.17 
Although socialist elements remained strong in many AF of L 
affiliated unions until World War I, Gompers’ leadership 
policies marginalized the socialists and their position 
deteriorated in the main union body. The AF of L's stance 
toward the socialists allowed the union to ignore a large 
body of support from unskilled and non-industrial workers, a
Bgroup which to Dick, "might have supprted separate political 
acti o n ."18
By 1900, manufacturer5 organized to push the open 
shop, withhold union recognition, and aided by the courts 
and the Sherman Antitrust Act, to carry the attack to labor. 
Major trade unions retreated. By 1392, the defeat of the 
Homestead strikers had all but eliminated from the steel 
industry the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel 
Workers, once the most powerful trade union in the U.S.19 
By 1909, U.S. Steel had totally eliminated all unions within 
its province. International Harvester and the meat packing 
i ndustr V both destroyed their workers-’ unions In 1904.
Outsi da of urban areas, according to David Montgomery, ail 
unions but those of miners were on the defensive or had been 
destroyed after the turn of the century.20
The pattern of employer destruction of some unions 
fitted with the increasing docility and outright 
col 1aboration of others. This condition furnished the 
impetus for the formation in 1905 of the most radical of 
U.S. unions, the International Workers of the World. 
Announcing a new militancy and willingness to strike, the 
IWW condemned the paternal relations between capital and 
organized labor. The IWW, nevertheless, remsiinsd on the 
margin of U.S. labor, never gaining effective national 
membership or influence. The anti-radical persecutions of 
WWI finally destroyed the IWW. After that, with the
9exception of a resurgence of labor radicalism in the 1930s, 
U.S. unions survived insofar as they were business unions.21
With radical unions small, major ones conservative,
92 per cent of labor unorganized, and the socialist movement 
dying by the 1920s, the U.S. lacked any expression of a 
radical class nature. By 1935, the liistorian of U.S. labor, 
John R. Commons, could remark upon the capitulation of labor 
to American culture and the death of a formerly significant 
socialist movement.22 The U.S. had a trade union movement, 
but no labor movement.
In accepting the capitalist order, did labor 
internalize capitalist labor ideology? Does a direct 
connection exist beti-jaen the soci o-cul tural primacy of 
business and growing labor docility in this period? To what 
degree did elite ideological dominance constitute a 
significant social force in the determination of the 
assumptions and self image of labor, i.e., their reality?
Did labor acquiesce in definitions of itself that were 
contrary to radical labor ideas? If so, how did employers 
substitute their ideology for that of radical labor? Did 
capitalist ideology dilute what might have become radical 
social consciousness? If, as Herbert Gutman and E.P.
Thompson insist, labor strove in vain to resist its 
acculturation, then how did owners diffuse resistance? Was 
the outcome of this struggle a reflection of the imposition 
of owners values upon labor? And ultimately, how is power
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divided in society? What are the long range consequences of 
that division for a majority of its members? What is the 
role of ideology in blocking the emergent collective power 
of labor, when the latter seeks to transform society?
The topic of this study is the ideology of 
capitalism expressed by businessmen in the period 1880-1910. 
It seeks to isolate, systematize and describe business 
attitudes toward labor and their method of application to 
society and to the workforce. Through increasing direct, 
on-the-job manipulation, overt imposition of ideology, and 
selective governance of the province of ideological debate, 
busi nessmen and their ideologues created a dominant ideology 
uhich ini-luenced the discourse, consci ousness and ideas that 
in parc determined 1ab or 's social stock of knowledge, and, 
by implication, labor's self definition. Businessmen 
perceived labor in a certain manner and attempted to 
socialize workers to this perception, thereby constituting a 
significant factor in the formative period of modern working 
class consciousness. This inquiry seeks to describe that 
perception within the dominant ideology and the mechanism of 
its dissemination.
The scope of this study is confined to the ideas of 
Northern businessmen and manufacturers between 1830 and 1910 
as expressed in published writing, public statements, 
correspondence and testimony to governmental boards of 
inquiry. As the North was the locus for business activity,
11
itç businessmen set the ideological pattern for the rest of 
the commercial and industrial sector.
Two analytical modes are appropriate for an inquiry 
into elite control of the formation of social consciousness. 
The sociology of knowledge offers an explanation derived 
from Karl Mannheim, and in turn, from Karl Marx, of the 
interplay of ideas and consciousness in a social dialectic.
In addition, Marxist hegemonic theory offers insight into 
the complex mechanism by which the social process is 
governed by a dominant set of meanings and values.
The sociology of knowledge asks two questions 
rslavant to this study. How do certain notions come to be 
taken for gr-arrtsd in a society'? An d, how is the reality of 
those notions maintained? Marxist soci oloqy of knowledge 
holds that social being determined consciousness. Members of 
different social groups hold different beliefs. In a class 
society, a particular class adopts certain beliefs to 
promote its own interests. Dominant ideas reflect dominant 
modes of production, and in this way are the ideas of the 
dominant class. Class interests skew or distort beliefs to 
their own ends, and thus promote false consciousness. In 
Marx's words,
The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force of soci et/, 
is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force. The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, 
so that thereby..,, the ideas of those who lack
12
the means of mental production are subject to 
it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the 
ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas.... Insofar, 
therefore, as...(the individuals of the ruling 
class) rule as a class and determine the extent 
and compass of an epoch.., they do this in its 
whole range, hence among other things rule also 
as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate 
the production and distribution of the ideas of 
their age.23
Contemporary Marxists have modified Marx’s
definition of ideology as false consciousness. Louis
Althusser argues that ideology does describe reality, for it
constitutes a “lived relation" with the world. He defined
ideology as a practice, not merely an idea about the world 
arising from modes of p;-oducti on Economic rsl ati. onsni os, he 
maintains, constitute the main factor of capitalist 
existence, but they do not. exist separate from ideological 
or political conditions of existence.24
In The Soci_ai Ë9 Q§tcyçtion of Real^ty , authors 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann posit an analytical 
framework which demonstrates the manner in which knowledge 
is inextricably bound up with the organisation of society.25 
Berger and Luckmann do not assign a deterministic 
relationship between ideas and underlying economic 
conditions. Rather, they hold that the "relationship between 
ideas and their sustaining social processes is always a 
dialectical one.26 The process by which humans creaite and 
sustain social groupings furnishes the structure by which 
they selectively order the world into coherent "reality" and
lo
transmit that to newcomers. Therefore, the social and 
individual consciousness most humans take for objective 
reality are products of collective endeavor and vary between 
different societies. Humans cannot be understood apart from 
their social context. Consciousness cannot be separated from 
society. Knowledge, which the authors define as the 
"certainty that phenomena are real and have certain 
characteristics," is always knowledge from a certain, 
socially grounded position.27 Since individual 
consciousness is socially constructed and reflects social 
hierarchies, this works to the advantage of groups and 
institutions whose dominance provides the power to 
manufacturs and control knowledge in tneir own interests.
All human social interaction, to the authors, occurs 
within a highly structured body of cognitive determi nants, 
the "social stock of knowledge," which constitutes "reality" 
to the individual. This reality carries the massive and 
coercive weight of parental and general social authority. It 
is a reality of ordinary, common sense consciousness, and as 
such, exists as the dominant reality for every member of 
society. The social stock of knowledge prescribes for the 
individual an identity by which he places himself in 
reference to the institutions, beliefs and individuals of 
soci ety.
Social structures known as institutions function 
both to maintain the social stock of knowledge and to
14
provide definition, direction and stability to what would 
otherwise be chaos in human interaction. Society, in one 
sense, constitutes an agglomeration of institutions which 
control "collectively relevant conduct" by establishing 
clear, rigid, predefined norms of thought and behavior.28 
"To say that a segment of human activity has been 
institutionalized," Berger and Luckmann maintain, is to say 
that this activity has been "subsumed under social 
control".29 Institutional orders can be understood only in 
relationship to the "knowledge" its participants have of it, 
knowledge which, in turn, prescribes norms of conduct.
As individuals are born into and perceive 
institutions, the notion of reality o? an institution 
becomes "cryscal 1 ized" or experienced as having an a orior 
existence, apart from the individuals which compose it. 
Through this cognitive process, individuals experience 
institutions as "possessing a reality of their own, a 
reality that confronts the individuals as an external and 
coercive fact."30 In this manner, institutional reality 
comes to have a "sense of comprehensi ve and given 
reality...analogous to the reality of the natural world.
Only in this way, as an objective world, can the social 
formations be transmitted to a new generation."31 
Institutionalization guarantees patterned, habitual, 
repetitive behavior. Social control is the function of 
institutionalization, itself the basis of the social
IS
construction of reality.
For example, individuals accumulate a body of 
knowledge defining the special province of labor. This 
knowledge functions as a "channeling, controlling force.., 
indispensable to the institutional 'programming' " of worker 
activity. It provides a vocabulary and consciousness 
designating workers' relationships to specific tools, 
usages, payments, and the larger institutional framework of 
shop, factory, industry, society and the economic system 
itself. This body of knowledge serves as an objective 
description of the institution of labor.32 Workers adopt 
this body of knowledge as it is "1 earned as objective truth 
in the course of socialication and thus internalized as 
subjective rsaility."33 The same example works with other 
modern institutions: the state, property, law, education or
reli gi on .
The coercive power of institutions over individual 
thought and behavior derives from the "sheer force of their 
facticit y ," as they exercise direct and indirect forms of 
control. The more conduct is institutionalized,
the more predictable and thus the more 
controlled it becomes. If socialization into the 
institutions has been effective, outright 
coercive measures can be applied economically 
and selectively. Most of the time, conduct will 
occur "3pontaneouse1 y " within the 
institutional 1 y set channels. The more, on the 
level of meaning, conduct is taken for granted, 
the more possible alternatives to the 
institutional "programs" will recede, and the 
more predictable and controlled conduct will
16
be.34
Institutions do not have an automatically guaranteed 
existence. They require continual reaffirmation by living 
individuals through the process of legitimation. Since 
explanations of legitimacy are inherent in the process of 
defining, language itself is the first level of 
legitimation. Thus, to name another person cousin 
legitimates behavior appropriate to cousinhood. Other forms 
of legitimation range from aphorisms, morali sms, and 
definitions of "how things are done," to sophisticated and 
specialized bodies of theory. Ideologues simplify
msiiior i i ng . Ritual affirmation of 1 eg 111 mati cns are 
accomplished by techniques such as fetishism, ritualization, 
and symbolization.
On its highest and most abstract level, legitimation 
integrates all the various institutional realities into a 
coherent, cosmological whole. At this level, all the lesser 
legitimating theories combine into related elements of a 
symbolic universe. This universe, Berger and Luckmann hold, 
"transcends and includes the institutional order."35 The 
whole social construct now "makes sense." The example of the 
body of labor ideology represents a small portion of a grand 
theory of the universe and of man. Therefore, to legitimate 
is to locate all institutional norms within a comprehensive, 
meaningful, symbolic universe which, in the West, has
17
various designations: divine will, natural law, and 
science.36 The lesser, lower level legitimating theories 
link with the grand intellectual constructions on the 
universal level.
The operation of a socially constructed ideological 
universe rests on the underlying social structure which 
"permits the definers to do the defining."37 Historically, 
the social division of labor allowed the emergence of bodies 
of personnel responsible for the administration of special 
bodies of knowledge. The ideological monopoly of these 
1 sgi ti .Tiûtcrs derived from the established social structure. 
The 1egi ti maters served the interests of elites. Berger and 
Luckmann reserve the term "ideoioqy" to refer specifically 
to a "particular definition of real ity... attached to a 
concrete power interest."33 They would not use the term 
ideology' to refer to Christianity in the Middle ages, for 
that symbolic universe engulfed the entire society from lord 
to serf. After the industrial revolution, however, 
Christianity became a bourgeois ideology. "The bourgeoisie 
used the Christian tradition and its personnel in its 
struggle against the new working class," the authors 
explain, "which in most European countries could no longer 
be regarded as ’inhabiting' the Christian universe.“39
Since objectivation and legitimation function to 
portray knowledge as a body of universally valid truth about 
reality, any deviation from institutional norms constitutes
13
a threat to the maintenance of the social status quo, for it 
threatens the authority of the 1egi ti mators. Order is the 
prime requirement of human existence. The institutional 
order is continually "faced with the ongoing necessity of 
keeping chaos at bay. All societies are constructions in the 
face of chaos."40 It follows that those with the most to 
fear from social disruptions and the most to lose in the 
transformation or collapse of the social order will be those 
investing most energy in legitimation. The converse is the 
seed of revolution.
For the purpose of mai ntai ni ng the s y m b o l i c  
univerEe, vai" i ous individualE and groups within a society 
function as fuil 1 1 ms 1 eg i t ;i mator e; of the i nsti tuti cnal 
order : priests, professors, editors, judges, politicians, 
and businessmen. The 1egitimators’ task is to impress 
institutional meanings "powerfully and unforgettably on the 
consciousness of the individual" by various means.41 
Definitions of reality may be enforced by the police, and 
remain "no less convincing than those accepted 
’ voluntari1 y ’...."42 Even if the individual is innocent of 
institutional functions, neither the objective reality of 
the institution nor its power to coerce are diminished. 
Neither the reluctant, the unwilling nor the naive escape 
institutional control.
Historically, deviant ideas challenged the dominant 
symbolic universe and the institutional order which it
19
legitimates. Such challenges require both repression of the 
alternative ideas and legitimation of the means of 
repression.43 The success of the repressive machinery and 
its legitimation depends upon the power of those who operate 
it. As Berger and Luckmann explain, "he who has the bigger 
stick has the better chance of imposing his definitions of 
reali t y ."44
Legitimation sustains the reality of the socially 
constructed universe. Ni hi 1 ati on, its opposite, denies the 
reality of deviant ideas. Ni hi 1ati on is a specific form of 
repressive machinery which discredits or destroys
opposi ti onal forms of thought or b ehavior by danving the
Legi 1 1 mators designate any de\'i an ce from i nsc i tuci onal 1 y 
approved conduct or thought as moral depravity, lawlessness, 
mental disease, ignorance, folly, madness or downright- 
evil. 45 They sometimes ni hi late deviant concepts by 
destroying those who hold them.
The authors define socialization as the 
"comprehesive and consistent induction of an individual into 
the objective world of a society."46 Socialization achieves 
success when a large degree of symmetry is obtained between 
objective and subjective reality.47 Individuals never 
totally internalize objective reality, rather they are 
socialized in varying degrees, depending on the relative 
complexity of the society in question. Since socialization
20
is imbedded in social structure, Berger and Luckmann 
explain, the greatest degree of socialization
is likely to occur in societies with 
very simple division of labor and minimal 
distribution of knowledge. Socialization under 
such conditions produces identities that are 
socially predefined and profiled to a high 
degree. Since every individual is confronted 
with essentially the same institutional program 
for his life in the society, the total force of 
the institutional order is brought to bear with 
more or less equal weight on each individual, 
producing a compelling massivity for the 
objective reality to be internalized.48
Modern industrial societies with a high division of 
labor, high economic surplus, greatly differentiated social
not offer el i tes the means o-f ma:i ntai ning effective monopoly 
over §1,1 competing definitions of real itv at all times.
Modern societies generally have a common core ideology which 
members take for granted and which exists superimposed above 
various lesser ideologies. Put another way, different 
classes have different realities.49 However, hegemonic 
theory offers a hypothesis to explain how the "reality" of 
the most powerful class ultimately overwhelms all others. 
"Coexistence",, in Berger and Luckmann ' s definition, operates 
only to a point. Between 1880 and 1910, for example, the 
existence of working clc;ss ideology demonstrates that the 
dominant ideology was not absolute. Mi 1 ton Cantor indicates 
the presence of oppositional working class ideology, but 
points out that these ideas were in the process of being
21
subordinated within the dominant culture.50
Constant tension exists between dominant 
legitimators and alternative ideas, but the latter are 
eventually subsumed under the larger ideology, or 
incorporated into it as oppositional but contained and 
controlled, ideologies. Thus, Stuart Hall explains how, 
despite the seemingly oppositional ideological stance of 
labor, dominant elites utilize the institutional oppositions 
of the working class as instruments of domination:
The dominated classes which have their 
own objective basis in the system of productive 
relations, their own distinctive -i^ orms of social 
life and class practice remain...a corporate 
class cuitLira which is never thel ass COriTAitiED.
When these subordinated classes are not strong 
or sufficiently organized to represent a 
'counter-hegemonic' force to the existing order, 
their own corporate structures and institutions 
can be used by the dominant structure as a means 
of enforcing their continued subordinations. The 
trade unions, which arise as a defensive set of 
institutions in the working class, can 
nevertheless be used to provide a structure 
which perpetuates the CORPORATENESS of that 
class, confining its opposition within limits 
which the system can contain.... 51
In addition to the sociology of knowledge, the
Marxian theory of hegemony offers an explanation of the
social function of elite ideology. The concept of hegemony
originated with the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci.52
Gramsci studied the lack of class consciousness of the
Italian proletariat of 1915-1930 and the seeming ease with
which it was controlled by elites. Ruling elites, he wrote,
generate among themselves desires for hegemonic control as
authorities...have lost credit.53
The formation of ideology is a response to the 
"newly problematic nature of social reality in 
post-traditional society."54 As traditionalism wanes, a 
marketplace of ideas arises in modern society and a struggle 
over ideas commences. This struggle centers around wtat 
forms and definitions of reality are to predominate and 
constitutes a central element of class struggle in 
industrial society. The control of social definitions of 
reality becomes a political question in that it allows 
elites to determine and 1eoi ti mate the distribution of oower
Fornsing on tn= machinery of slits domination of chs 
working class and other subordinate groups, Sramsci found 
that hegemoni c control occurs when the particular ideology 
of one class "tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to 
propagate itself throughout society - bringing about not 
only a unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity...."56 This dominance is 
achieved through the active, objective attempts of ruling 
elites to organ!ze and command the ideas, sentiments, and 
consci Dusness of subordinsite classes. In Stuart Hsill's 
expianati on.
Gramsci argued that ’hegemony’ ex i sts 
when a ruling c 1 ass...is able not only to coerce 
a subordi rate class to conform to its interests, 
but exerts a ’total social authoritv' over those
they aspire to general social and cultural leadership.
Elites realize that social authority and ideological 
dominance are central to maintenance of the established 
order. The structural relationships of power in that order, 
Gramsci assumed, were those of centralized, monopolized, 
private capitalism and its political arm, the modern nation 
state.
Hegemonic ideology depends upon the historical 
development of what Alvin Bouldner calls a post-traditional 
society, that is, a society having attained a sufficient 
degree of urban!zati o n , centralization and technologi cal
q r owtii to foster the a sc en dan c v  of dominant bourgeois
class: control of urban labor at ti point when tradicionai 
modes of control have disappeared. At this juncture, the 
need for ideology as social control and the means for its 
implementation arise. Elites develop a doctrine of public 
discourse among literate, urban populations that assumes the 
function of traditional forms of social control. As Gauldner 
explains:
Ordinarily, in a traditionalistic 
setting, the established consensual validation 
of the group’s beliefs suppresses questions of 
their validity, and questions that do arise may 
be settled by the decision of a commonly 
accepted authority. Failing consensual 
validation, as the new industrialism succeeds 
and replaces the old traditionalistic 
arrangements, beliefs do indeed become 
problematic and must be given some justification 
- a new kind of justification, in reason and 
evidence, precisely because the older
classes and the social formation as a whole.
'Hegemony' is in operation when the dominant 
class fractions not only dominate but direct - 
lead: when they not only posses the power to 
coerce but actively organize so as to command 
and win the consent of the subordinated classes 
to their continuing sway.57
The key concept is that dominant elites acquire and 
maintain power directly and indirectly by imposing their 
concepts and definitions of the Way Things Are, and by 
controlling the framework of discussion and thought.
As Hall suggests, hegemonic power is more than the 
imposition of a formal system of elite ideology. An ideology 
is a conscious, formal, articulated system of beliefs held
Ideology. The heqeiTiornc process constitutes, in Hall's 
words, the "whole lived social process as practically 
organized by specific and dominant meanings and values."58 
Consciousness is controlled by more than the objective 
system represented by ideology. Its formulation occurs in 
all relationships which involve dominators and dominated, 
over every range of political control, economic coercion sind 
social deference. Hegemonic control penetrates consciousness 
and becomes the natural or the unquestionable.
Elite definitions of social reality carry great 
social weight because of built in deference to prestige and 
power. These deferences enhance the hegemonic system. The 
relationship between social deference to elites and the
legitimation of elite ideology exists is symbiotic form. 
Although contending in a marketplace of ideas which include 
those which seek to deny its legitimacy and overturn its 
power, the ideology of captialist elites has the advantage 
of reinforcement by their social antecedents: prestige, 
religious and moral force, and visible display of wealth.
To Raymond Williams, hegemony "supposes the 
existence of something which is truly total.., which is 
lived at such depth, which saturates society to such an 
extent" that it "constitutes the limit of common sense for 
most people under its sway."59 Williams explains,
upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of 
control only those ordinarily seen as 
’manipulation' or ’indoctrination.’ It is a 
whole body of practices and expectation, over 
the whole of living: our senses and assignments 
of energy, our shaping perceptions or ourselves 
and our world. It is a lived system of meanings 
and values - constitutive and constituting - 
which as they are experienced as practices 
appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus 
constitutes a sense of reality for most people 
in the society, a sense of absolute because 
experienced reality beyond which it is very 
difficult for most members of the society to 
move, in most areas of their lives. It is...in 
the strongest sense a ’culture’, but a culture 
which has also to be seen as the lived dominance 
and subordination of particular classes.60
To Gramsci hegemony operates through two mechanisms: 
voluntary consent to the social authority of private elite 
society and the use of force by the state. Hegemonic power 
rests on the interplay between these two levels, state 
coercion and elite social authority,. The hegemonic power of
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ruling elites rests upon the coercive power of the state, 
and use of this power, in turn, reinforces general consent 
to private elite authority. In this manner, hegemonic power 
is at once the initiating factor and the beneficiary of the 
use of state force. Gramsci maintained that elites perceive 
voluntary consent to be a more powerful form of social 
control than the use of state force. In liberal capitalist 
states, the former predomi nates.
Hegemonic domination creates several conditions in 
the ideological realm. It obscures class bias in an 
ideology, by presenting its ideas as derivative of and 
beneficial to the whole of society, and bv posing the
universal rather than a corporate plane. Ai though, to 
Gramsci, the state exists as the political arm of one class, 
that class, nevertheless, is able to present its interests 
as coordinate with the interests of all other classes, and 
to portray its power as the progressive force which develops 
national energies.61 The concept of general interests 
allows political activity to conceal from elite 
practitioners any class motives. Elites, Alvin Gouldner 
explains, define their power in terms of group benefits.
Their claim is that when they seek 
office, power, livings, tenures, or income, they 
do not seek them as private enjoyments but only 
because they advance collective interests.
Ideology thus serves, on the one hand, to permit 
ruth 1essness to others in the name of high 
values, and, on the other, to present oneself as 
having a selfless ambition, that nonpartisanship
which legitimates any claim to power. Ideology 
thereby permits the mobilization of power and, 
at the same time, allows its full and 
unrestrained discharge.62
The universalizing of class into general interests 
occurs in part because of the manner in which political 
society fragments members of a class, representing them as 
individual citizens or voters, and then reunites them into 
what Hall terms class neutral "ideological totalities" - the 
community, the nation, public opinion, consensus, the 
general interest, the popular will, society, or consumers.63 
This process of fragmentation and recombination enables 
dominant elites to reshape individual wills into a form more 
sasiiv manipulated toi-jard their class requi rements. Cloaked 
in such liberal bourgeois notions as tradition, liberty, 
freedom, or moral rightness, such ideological totalities 
generate imaginary unity and consent.
Class interests also disguise themselves as general 
interests through a process Williams calls the selective 
tradition. This involves promoting a body of ideas as the 
actual, significant, most meaningful past. Selective 
tradition selects from historical experience certain facts 
which are emphasized and others which are actively 
excluded.64 The power of ruling elites rests on history, 
tradition, and the moral values of an earlier age which are 
claimed to have universal validity. This general history, 
although selectively compiled by ruling elites, passes for 
truth in society and prescribes the bounds of what
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discussions are tolerated. By the process of selective 
tradition, dissent is institutionalized, and for all 
practical purposes, diffused. Dominant elites. Hall 
suggests, frame "competing definitions of reality wi_thin 
the^r range , bringing all alternatives within their horizon 
of thought." Thus, subordinated classes "make sense of their 
subordination in such a way as to sustain the dominance of 
those ruling over them."65
Since the goal of hegemony is to create mass 
allegiance to the established order, it emphasizes certain 
meanings and values over others. This occurs not just while 
selecting ideas from the past, but while confronting 
chal1 enging ideologies of other classes. Dominant ideology 
cannot allow too great a degree of experience outside 
itself, without risk. In its nascent period, bourgeois 
society tolerated certain spheres of religious, artistic or 
private life without significant concern. By the twentieth 
century, Williams explains, because of changes in the social 
character of labor, of communication, and of decision, the 
definition of deviant or oppositional ideas or practices is 
made within a much narrower scope.66 The emergence of mass 
society extends the "necessary area of effective dominance," 
and reduces the level of elite tolerance of idsclcgical 
d i versi ty.
In summary, certain social mechanisms function in 
the interest of dominant groups to impose ideology on those
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with few corresponding means of constructing and maintaining 
alternatives. This is the structure of hegemony. Thinking 
and cognition are grounded in and function through the class 
system. Thus, the dominant culture is self defined and sways 
the remainder of society to share its values.67
When operations of hegemony and the selective 
construction of social reality are interwoven with the vast 
increase of forms of direct control of industrial labor, the 
expanded use of state coercion in labor disputes, and the 
increases in forms of media influence over urban 
populations, then the ability of one class to impose its 
ideology over other classes becomes clear. These factors 
operate etfectivalv in an industrial capitalist context 
where class antagonism produces deviant behavior and 
opposition ideology. In this context, the significance of 
elite ideology bears on the issue of the social power of 
business in the period 1880-1910. Through hegemony, business 
elites influenced individual "knowledge," and behavior, and 
established for themselves a crucial and fundamental 
cultural leadership. Through three case studies, this study 
describes the content of that ideology as it defined the 
industrial world, and the respective place of owner and 
worker.
It is necessary, first, to describe U.S. society 
after 1377 with respect to elites and their opportunities 
for social control, and the working class and its social and
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ideological vulnerability.
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CHAPTER II 
THE SETTING
From the period o-f early colonization to the Civil 
War, most U.S. inhabitants carried the cultural and 
ideological baggage of Western Europe which re-flected the 
results of class struggle in Europe. The ancestors of most 
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century population of 
the U.S. had undergone the commercial revolution marking the 
appearance of capitalism, the Protestant revolution against 
the central ecclesiastical and oolitical authority of the
These revolutions initiated the transfer of the 
intellectual, political, economic and social power of 
Western Europe’s feudal aristocracy to a middle class of 
merchants, financiers and agriculturalists who promoted 
economic individualism and private property. In Europe, this 
emergent middle class clashed with the aristocracy's 
cultural and intellectual power. This tempered the most 
blatant cultural and political expressions of the new money 
power. Few such restraints existed in the U.S. With no 
feudal background and a Protestant religious orientation, 
U.S. society offered a clean seed bed for the growth of 
bourgeois society.
The American R(5volutian did not constitute a genuine
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revolution in the sense of others of its age which 
overturned one class of governing elites by another, more 
representative of the people. Rather, the American 
Revolution represented the defeat of bourgeois elites of one 
country by those of another. From early on, commercial and 
landed elites governed U.S. life and their bourgeois values 
concerning status, property and society - legacies from 
Europe - pervaded the life of the nation. U.S. elites 
exerei sed no such centralised or organized social power as 
those after 1875, but such social power as did exist rested 
almost entirelv with the bourgeoisie.
sh .1 pbui 1 dar s , 1 aw vers, financisrs and owners of landed
estates made and administered the laws, enjoyed social 
prestige, held the economic power and served as creditors to 
much of the remainder of the population, the small 
landowners, tradesmen, artisans, laborers, tenant farmers 
and slaves. The bulk of the population consisted of small 
landowners who lived a near marginal existence.
From the beginnings of national life in 1783, 
bourgeois elites defined government as the protector of 
property and guarantor of liberty through republican 
leadership by upstanding men of property. Through the 
Constitution, such men affirmed private enterprise, limited 
government and individual liberty. Representative of the 
economic power of the nation. Constitutional authors formed
a minority of educated, wealthy owners who created a 
document reflective of their interests. The Constitution was 
ratified through the double effect of the skilfull 
politicking of its proponents on one hand and, on the other, 
the poverty, lack of organization and political naivete of 
its opponents. As the states fixed voting qualifications, 
the white, male, properties flavor of the government 
reflected the founding fathers’ fear of both democracy and 
the masses of the potentially disrespectful.
Bourgeois power continued into the antebellum period 
without suffer!no substantive threats, althouoh a transfer
While reorssenting ’the people.’ Jeffersonians referred to 
those whose virtues derived from ownership of land. The same 
Jefferson who sought to avoid aristocratic power also feared 
that of the unproperti ed. To him, only the institution of 
private land ownership guaranteed republican virtue. 
Jeffersonian ascendancy signalled the exchange of power from 
one set of propertied interests for that of another.
Jacksonian democracy likewise did little to alter 
the assumptions or power of U.S. capitalist interests. The 
Jacksoni ans’ goal was to challenge the power of financial 
and industrial monopolists bv increased popular movement 
into favored political and economic positions. The policies 
and class orientation of Jacksoni ans in public affairs,
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however, differed little from the Jeffersonians or 
Federalists. Basic notions of bourgeois virtue survived 
intact the Jacksoni an's radical rhetoric of economic 
levelling. Thus, in the period 1733-1860, bourgeois 
political orientation aimed at the protection of property 
and guarantee of social order. Battles within ruling circles 
over the bank and tariff belie the reality of an underlying 
unity of interests.
The Southern secession in 1861 ended the period of 
agrarian domination and allowed Northern business interests 
to dominate the government. Except for the Emancipation 
Pi'-oc I amat i on and Radi cal Republican proposals for land
property in tiie period of the Civil War. Rather, Norrnern 
businessmen passed a federal tariff, monetary and subsidy 
legislation designed to protect and enhance their economic 
interests. After the war, a new alignment of Northern and 
Southern men of property converged in the Compromise of 
1377. Whig elements in the Republican Party traded 
commercial opportunities and federal troop withdrawal to 
Southern Whig elements for a presidency which was to protect 
and extend wartime legislation favorable to business.
At this point in U.S. history, historian Barrington 
Moore observes, "what Northern capitalism needed from any 
government was the protection and legitimation of private 
property," With Radical Republican influence dying and Whig
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elements ascendant in both parties, businessmen came to 
dominate U.S. government. In time, Moore continues, the 
government became a "series of ramparts around property, 
mainly big property, and an agency to execute the biblical 
pronouncement, 'To him that hath shall be given.’ "1
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, 
the fortunes of industrial capitalism grew exponentially, 
protected and encouraged bv a government providing sound 
monetaj-y policy favoring creditors, a central banking 
svstem, promoting internal transportaition, creation of large 
holdings from resources on and of federal land, the highest
labor,, 3;. 190Ü, the U.S. surpassed Great Sri tain i n
industrial production.
Since the social a,nd cultural power of busi nessmian 
derived from property ownership, the growth of economic 
power necessarily magnified that of the owning class, 
enlarging its opportunity for social control. A comparison 
of both the general social milieu and factory work 
environments in pre-industrial and industrial settings 
points up profound increases in the possibility of owner 
input into worker consciousness.
While the beginnings of factory life appeared by the 
1820s, the U.S. remained pre-factory and pre-industrial 
until about 1850. The antebellum agrarian economic base was
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overlaid by a small but rapidly growing stratum of 
industrial, commercial and financial activity. Rich 
merchants, bankers and landowners existed at the top of a 
loosely deferential social hierarchy determined by honor, 
status, virtue, service and wealth. Beneath these fell the 
middle income farmers, small shopkeepers, skilled artisans, 
professionals, and beneath them, subsistence farmers, 
unskilled laborers, servants, Native Americans, free Negroes 
and slaves. Social life for the bourgeoisie adhered to 
traditional patterns of family and church. The white, 
i'-ino 1 o--3ax on element o i- the population can' i ed r'r otestan t
work, sobriety, thrift, and appearance at church. Communi tv 
members attributed one another’s relative wealth and 
standing to their degree of adherance to such norms.
In the decades before 1850, social power did not 
depend entirely on material factors. The gap between rich 
and poor was narrower among descendants of Europeans that at 
any other time in U.S. history. Within a seemingly 
democratic atmosphere, subtle gradations determined social 
standing, distinctions that, as Robert Wiebe notes, "would 
have eluded an outsider - the precise location of a house, 
the amount of hired help, the quality of a buggy or dress - 
held great importance in an otherwise undifferentiated 
socetv."2
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In this relatively traditional, stable setting 
before 1350, general ideological consensus precluded large 
scale, fundamental social criticism. Questions that did 
arise usually remained within general ideological bounds and 
were easily answered or defused by accepted social 
authorities. Free from the later strains of industrialism, 
antebellum society witnessed few threats to its social or 
economic arrangements or ideological definitions of reality. 
The existence of socioeconomic classes did not preclude near 
ideological uniformity, if one excepts Negroes and Native 
Americans. Jacksonian historians, for example, general 1v
class. In place of rigid classes, historian I'larvin Meyers 
sees only a "relatively loose class structure," heavily 
weighted in the middle orders: farmers, mechanics, 
shop keepers and laborers. Social mobility, availability of 
land and economic expansion gave antebellum society a 
multiplicity and flexibility' of careers and a variety of 
interests which made social differences "shaded and 
unstab le."3
In discussing prefactory antebellum working class 
structure, Milton Cantor notes that "the perceptions and 
ideology spawned in a working-class community [were] not 
automatically those of class, and class consciousness was 
not the automatic and unvoluntary' product of those having a
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strong sense of vocational cohesion."4 While not positing 
the total absence of class antagonism, Cantor holds that 
paternalism diffused class militancy and produced deference 
to the social power of owners. To Cantor, the
relations of both dependence and 
reciprocity evolving out of paternalism produced 
complex but usually inarticulated views, and a 
generally muted class consciousness mingled with 
a belief in the importance of loyalty to the 
legitimacy of managerial authori ty.5
Similarly, Tocquevilie commented on the lack of 
class solidarity on the wealthier end of the social 
spectrum. The rich were not "completely united amongst
feelinq oi- purpose in common, no mutual traditions, or 
mutual hopes; there are individuals, therefore, but no 
definite class."o He thought that individuals of the 
business community of the 13405 held neither political nor 
ideological power, rather, the "common opinion" controlled 
them.7
This condition of relative socioeconomic 
homogeneity, together with a great degree of demographic and 
cultural uniformity, pointed to what Marvin Meyers called a 
"uniformity of economic attitudes throughout the 
population."S This uniformity. Cantor suggests, pointed 
upward toward dependence and loyalty to the authority of 
paternal owners. Important excepti ons existed, but in 
general , the po oui at i on adhered to an ideology of praise for
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the small independent landowner or worker. Since most of the 
antebellum population was self employed and could foresee 
economic betterment in their lifetime, budding 
entrepreneural values served to reinforce existing norms of 
bourgeois activity.
Antebellum social tensions reflected less those of 
class than a rapidly changing society realizing the 
implications inherent in the unrestricted pursuit of gain.
As more people entered the quickly expanding marketplace, 
the moral anxiety produced by comparing its values to those 
of the Puritans fostered a nostalgic aff i rmat i on of the
seêininglv con cr ac'l ct or v behavior constituted the p a r a d o x  of 
the acie of Jacksonian politics:
the fact that the movement which helped 
to clear the path for laissez-faire capitalism 
and its culture in America, and the public which 
in its daily life eagerly entered on that path, 
held nevertheless in their political conscience 
an ideal of a chaste, republican order, 
resisting the seductions of risk and novelty, 
greed and extravagance, rapid motion and complex 
deal inqs.. 9
Such nostalgic adherance to increasingly obsolete 
values caused Americans' evaluations of one another to 
depend less on economic factors than on a moral orientation 
which respected honest work, and praised, in Meyers' words, 
"simplicity and stability, self reliance and independence, 
economy and useful toil, honesty and plain dealing." 10
A second antebellum political notion, that of the
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Repub.I i cans after 1850, centered around a rhetoric of praise 
for yeoman labor. Expressive of a long standing facet of 
U.S. culture, praise of free labor became central to 
Republican ideology- Republicans touted the superiority of 
Northern society, which to historian Eric Foner, represented 
a "dynamic, expanding, capitalist society whose achievements 
and destiny were...the result of the dignity and 
opportunities which it offered the average laboring man."11 
Republican ideology expressed the dignity of free 
labor, its importance as the source of all moral and 
temporal value, and the basis for the North’s prosperity.
observed, represented a classless definition encompassing 
the small businessman, farmers and craftsmen as well as 
ordinary laborers.12 Workers were often owners, and the 
goal of those without property was to accumulate enough 
capital to obtain businesses for themselves, not for the 
purpose of achieving wealth, but for economic independence. 
The Republican free laborer reflected a social ideal of a 
middle class society of independent small owners, vying on a 
nearly equal basis in an economic system where social 
distinctions did not produce social antagonisms. Foner 
surmised, "the interests of capital and labor were identical 
because equality of opportunity in American society 
generated a social mobilitv whih assured that todav’s
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laborer could be tomorrow's capi tali s t ."13
Relative economic harmony and social consensus in 
this period obscured or diffused the disparity of those 
interests. Evidence of that disparity comes from early 
attempts at organizing trade unions in the Jacksonian 
period. Yet these unions declined after the Panic of 1837, 
not to reappear after the Civil War. Apparent harmony 
pervaded factories and shops, where artisans, handcrafters 
and unskilled cottage industrialists constituted a growing 
part of society. Employers such as mill owners or self 
employed craftsmen often created a wor!-; environment free
relative lack of class antagonisms in antebellum industry. 
Most shops were small, employed few workers and centered 
around a home or small workshop. Cantor character i zed 
workers as living within a relatively homogeneous peer group 
societv with high residential stability, and having daily, 
face to face social and economic interaction with owners.14 
Frequent contact and paternalism served to ensure allegiance 
of workers to owners and enhance the mutuality of their 
efforts. Owners and workers knew one another by name, often 
ate or lived together and recognized one another's skill. 
Deference existed between owners and workers, but it was not 
the acquiescence to naked economic power characteristic of 
later industrial society.
Control of labor seldom arose as an issue in the
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workplace, due in part to employer pater n al s m which 
combined the roles of owner and authoritarian father. Given 
the apparent coincidence of interests on the job and the 
lack of wide social gaps beween employers and workers, such 
paternalism sufficed to guarantee the latter’s dependency 
and compliance. Since most workers lived with or near 
owners, their behavior came under close watch. Job 
discipline was casual since the productivity was not 
entirely geared to profit maximisation, cost efficiency or 
the time clock. Work included periods of rest, eating and 
conversation, reflecting social as well as economic needs.
producers controlled many aspects of work. The shoemaker or 
cottage weaver icirgely set his own work time, method of 
operation and on-the-job social activity. Control and 
discipline existed as facets of a larger social deference 
required by the age. Labor unrest that did arise was largely 
a contention over details, and did not cause a direct clash. 
Thus, before 1350, owners did not feel the need to impose 
standards of thought or behavior on an already docile and 
deferential population.
When all participants believe in the system and 
ensure its survival by fulfilling their economic and social 
roles, this guarantees the smooth operation of social 
control. Tocqueville observed that widespread property 
ownership and U.S. economic viability ensured social order:
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Not only are men o-f democracies not 
desirous of revolutions, but they are afraid of 
them. All revolutions more or less threaten the 
tenure of property: but most of those who live 
in democratic countries are possessed of 
property...Cand3 live in the condition where men 
set the greatest store upon their property.15
After the Civil War, industrialization destroyed 
this social stability by creating at once a large class of 
unpropertied workers and a class of owners with great stakes 
in property. In the social and economic relations of small 
U.S. manuf acturi ng towns, Tocqueville saw "monstrous 
e;:ceptions" to the equaity he observed in U.S. society.
mall ar:stccrati
like oast ar i stocraci ss , contai ned "some men who are very 
opulent, and a ,nulti tude who are wretchedly poor."16 This 
rnanufacturing aristocracy "first impoverishes and debases 
the men who serve it, and then abandons them to be supported 
by the charity of the public."17 Such an aristocracy bore 
close watch by the "friends of democracy," for "if ever a 
permanent inequality of conditions and aristocracy again 
penetrate into the world.., this is the gate by which they 
wi 11 enter."13
By 1900, the U.S. had developed a mature industial 
society. Sophisticated methods of economic organization 
generated rapid urbanization. Demographic, social and 
economic transformations forced by industrialization, 
technological revolutions in transportation, and the influx 
of great numbers of i mmi gr ant I aborers crsated a radi ca11 y
48
different world. The new method of organizing production, 
the large factory, became the most important economic fact 
of life. Rapid change and growth disrupted the stable 
antebellum social structure by creating a new class of 
wealthy manufacturers and businessmen and a larger class of 
more or less permanent wage earners. The Republican hope of 
individual economic independence no longer applied to the 
new society.
The social changes accompanying industrialization 
saw the corresponding rise of mass culture, mass society and
mass politics. The culturally centralized, urban setting
ii'vtc bote tne oenerai intellsctual iniliau and wor!;:ar 
consciousness.19 Such changes transformed social and 
economic life and restructured class relations, separating 
workers from traditional forms of social control, 
illuminating and deepening class antagonisms, and creating 
organizational problems for manufacturers that forced them 
to search for means of social control in the factory and 
society. As the centralized economic system touched the 
lives of ail 1 but an isolated few, industrial reality came to 
dominate almost every aspect of a worker's life.
The factory system forced the labor process to 
undergo immense structural changes. For workers, the very 
complexity of industrialism entailed what historian E. P. 
Thompson described as a "severe restructuring of work
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habits, new disciplines, new incentives and a new human 
nature."20 As workers moved from household oriented centers 
of production into large factories, they were faced with 
faster paced and more routinized demands of rational 
production, which rendered obsolete both the irregular labor 
rhythms and the direct, paternal character of owner-worker 
relati onshi ps. The workplace lost its function as a center 
of social activity and became geared exclusively to profit.
As the structure of the workplace changed, so did its 
framework of authority. Work was gradually removed from the 
control of workers as owners of production assumed direction
penalties. Workers became more dependent upon owners as tney 
assumed owner controlled patterns of work discipiine.21 At 
the same time, distance inceased as owners' interests became 
more financial and commercial than industrial and 
managerial.
The emergence of class consciousness among workers 
was the most important result of these changes. To Harry 
Braverman, "a class cannot exist in society without in some 
degree manifesting a consciousness of itself as a group with 
common oroblems, interests and prospects - although this 
manifestâtion may for long periods be weak, confused, and 
subject to manipulation by other classes."22
Industrialization provided the experience that crystallized
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class consciousness among U.S. workers.
Growing class consciousness was partly due to the 
establishment of urban working class neighborhoods. Socially 
distanced from paternal employers, workers formed their own 
cultural institutions which offered solidarity and identity, 
especially when centered around ethnic bonds. As Cantor 
observes, however, "industrializatIon severely tested and 
frequently overwhelmed such traditions and institutions," 
which could not offer sufficient insulation against the 
dislocations of industrial life or the immense increase in 
the hegemonic power of industrial elites.23
favor of those wnose power resulted entirely from the 
industrializing economy. The businessman rose to a position 
of general social and cultural prestige theretofore unknown 
in U.S. history. Differences between new entrepreneural 
values extol ling acquisitiveness and display and those of 
antebellum elites did not escape Mark Twain, who, in 1371, 
presented this dialogue:
Q. What is the chief end of man?
A. To get rich.
Q. In what wav?
A. Dishonestly if we can, honestly if we must.
Q . Who is God, the only one and True?
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A. Money is God. Gold and greenbacks and stocks - 
■father, son and the ghost of the same - 
three persons in one; these are the true 
and only God, mighty and supreme: and 
William Tweed is his prophet....
Q. Who were the models the young were taught to 
emulate in former days?
A. Washington and Franklin.
Q. Whom do thev and should they emulate now in 
this era of enlightenment?
A. Tweed; Hall, Connely, Camochan. Fisk, Gould,
t?. What works were ohia-fiv orized for the training 
of the young in farmer days?
A. Poor Richard's Almanac, the Pilgim-’s Progress,
and The Declaration of Independence.
Q. What are the best prized Sunday-school books in
this more enlightened age?
A. St. Hall’s Garbled Reports, St. Fish's Ingenious 
Robberies, St. Camochan's Guide to Corruption,
St. Gould on the Watering of Stock, St. Barnard's 
Ir; iunctions, St. Tweed's Handbook of Morals, and 
the Court-House edition of the Holy Crusade of 
the Forty Thieves.
Q. Do we progress?
A. You bet your life. 24
The general application of Victorian notions of 
rational order and the efficiency demands of mass production 
combined to generate new needs for and more absolute forms 
of social control. Businessmen and manufacturers recognized 
the need for predictabi1ity and control of labor, capital, 
raw materials and markets. Because of their investment in 
property and their fear of the masses, employers sought to 
ensure the predictable working of society and the orderly 
behavior of the lower orders.
Although businessmen's power functioned as one 
element in the orocess of modernization, it was the single
a labor ideology and use it as a means of labor control. The 
emergence of the entrepreneur as the most admired social 
type, coupled with new forms of owner socialization of 
workers, assured the cultural primacy of capitalist 
i deology.
Any elite, upon coming to power, suggests Laiwrence 
Goodwin, seeks to consolidate its authority and create a 
situation that, precludes further social change.25 Though 
the business elite did not shrink from direct use of both 
state and private police force, it generally sought an 
easier method to prevent direct assault on its authority, 
and found this method in mass soci ali zati o n . Thus, to 
Gooriwvn, business elites understood that cultural control
offered a more permanent and desirable means of ensuring 
domestic tranquility. They resorted to cultural control and 
"the creation of mass modes of thought that literally make 
the need for major ^.dditional social change difficult for 
the mass of the population to i magi n e."26 This new ideology 
emerged constituting a "new culture in itself," as the 
working population was forced to "define all conceivable 
political activity within the limits of existing custom." A 
society which has achieved this limitation on the activity 
of its most volatile elements can "genuinelv be described as 
'stable’." and in the future. Eoodwvn exolains.
should thev be successful, the resulting 
■'reforms" will not alter si gni f i cant 1 y the 
Inherited modes of power and privilege. Protest 
under such conditions of cultural narrowness is, 
therefore, not only permissible in the eyes of 
those who rule, but is...positivel y desirable 
because it fortifies the popular understanding 
that the society is functioning 
"democrat ically."27
For this reason, the political consequences of mass 
deference to received culture cannot be overstated, 
especially in this, the period when the industrial 
proletariat was so large, its exploitation so acute and 
European radicalism so instructive. In other words, the mass 
socialization of labor occurred during a time when 
captialisin existed in a r otenti al 1 y threateni ng context. But 
labor offered , -, o viable political al terna'ti ves to the
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dominant culture.
Democracy suffers when large groups of citizens 
defer to prevailing truths. It is only opposition and 
criticism which serve to make democracy viable. To observers 
such as Goodwyn, "individual self respect and collective 
self confidence constitute the cultural building blocks of 
mass democratic politics. Their development permits people 
to act in self-generated democratic ways - as distinct from 
passively participating in various hierarchical modes 
bequeathed by the received culture."28 When this individual 
consci ousness is thwarted bv a oervasive ideologv.
elites uf the Glided Age set the stage for the creation of a 
mass deference that eliminated true oppositional politics on 
the part of labor. This study describes the ideology of 
business elites and the methods of its imposition.
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CHAPTER III 
VICTORIAN LABOR IDEOLOGY 
As stated earlier, one of the functions of ideology 
as social control is to define the dominant symbolic 
universe through which society presents a coherent 
definition of the way things are in a manner which 
legitimates its powerful elements. The period 1870-1900 
witnessed the emergence of a class conscious entrepreneural 
ideology toward labor which was of major significance in the 
cultural development of U.S. industrial society and of 
labor's consciousness within that society. This chapter 
describes the content of that "given” cr received 
consci ousness in this period by Sinalycing the dominant 
symbolic universe as it defined the general relationship 
between capital and labor, the proper station and role of 
all participants and the reasons for their success or 
fai lure.
The social rationality of capitalism found 
particular expression in late nineteenth century Victorian 
culture. Victorians constituted a bourgeois, Protestant, 
middle class, for the most part a product of the industrial 
revolution. The ownership of productive wealth furnished 
the material basis for their social and intellectual power. 
Yet, most historians of Victorian culture understand it in 
terms of its emphasis on values and morals, in particular, 
rational order and efficiency, and, furthermore, in terms of
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its overwhelming dedication to persuasion as a means of 
propagating them.1 The Victorians were serious people to 
whom moral considerations were uppermost. Daniel Howe 
characterized their speech as "laden with words like 'duty’,
’urgency’, and ’virtue’." The earnestness with which these 
values were promoted was "rooted in the assumption of the 
objectivity and universality of moral principles."2 The 
Victorians followed a prescription for personal behavior 
which included sexual repressiveness, narrowly defined and 
usually deferred gratification, emphasis on personal self 
control, punctuality, hard work, niggardliness, 
sal f-i iTiprovaiTiant, compet i t i on and acqui si t i vaness.
Victorians hoped that these personal 
charac teri sti os, when translated into the social realm, 
would produce a society where collective security and order 
were guaranteed by Individual adherence to tenets of 
rational behavior. In part, the high value placed on 
rational order resulted from the tensions and strain of 
rapid change and modernization which intensified the psychic 
needs of elites to maintain visible signs of social 
stability. Attracting a large working class population to 
urban areas, U.S. elites of the gilded age enjoyed cheap,, 
readily available, overly plentiful labor, but at the same 
time, generating among themselves a fear of possible threats 
to their power. Social fear was evident in the anxious 
hostility with which Victorians viewed drunkenness and the
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idleness of social goupings of the working class, as well as 
in their nostalgia for the "old days" of order and 
obedience.
Historians placed an important source of the reform 
impulse of this period in elite attempts to deal with social 
disruptions.3 Since Victorians viewed social instability as 
coming from the workers, their fears coalesced in a general 
assault on working class ideology, behavior and culture. 
Discipline and repression constituted constant themes in 
this assault as elites sought to impose order on the 
laboring class in schools, churches, asylums, prisons, 
settlement houses, with devices such as prohibition and blue 
laws, and at wjcrk, with labor efficiency, time thrift, 
punctuality, obedience and temperance. In short, by 
imparting bourgeois values, Victorian elites sought to 
create disciplined, moral and respectable workers.
Victorian ideology combined eighteenth century 
classicism, the work ethic, liberalism, and Social 
Darwinism.4 Both classical liberalism and seventeenth 
century Puritanism relied on natural law, rationality and 
individual ism. Both assumed the "naturalness", and thus the 
objectivity, immutability and universality of moral laws 
that were not human constructs. Both assumed an immutable, 
abstract "human nature" in which rational man possessed 
enlightened free will which made him both reasonable and 
responsible for his actions. And the ideal Protestant, a
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■frugal, hardworking, sober man, merged with "economic man" 
of the classicists and the "fittest" of the Social 
Darwinists. Although rational man represented an ideal, and 
men could and did act rationally at times, Hobbsean,
Lockean, and Puritan views, posited a fallen condition for 
some, where disorder and unrationality reigned. This idea 
of unequal 1 y distributed rationality allowed elites to 
exclude certain social elements: women, children, the 
insane, the immoral - all unrational or imperfectly 
constituted groups. When confronted with the social 
realities of industrial society, Victorian elites enlarged 
■earlier de-f i ni ti ans of unrational al amants to include those 
who practiced social disruptions in the form o-f labor 
'■/i ol anca oi- who of fared -unsettling definitions of the way 
things ought to be. Thus, the central problem for elites in 
the late nineteenth century was control of elements in 
society whose behavior and ideas threatened the maintenance 
of the captaiist order and its rational social whole. 
Victorians viewed themselves as special carriers of 
civilization, entrusted with the moral responsibility of 
preserving correct economic theory and social wholesomeness.
The social promotion of "correct" behavior was at 
once an exhortation to -follow the Victorian code of personal 
conduct and a definition of morally marginal groups and the 
reasons for their inferior station, generally their 
unwillingness to adhere to correct behavioral norms. This
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helps explain the Victorian emphasis on ideologies which 
justified the unequal distribution of wealth: individualism, 
natural law and Social Darwinism.
When Darwinian ideas first entered the United 
States, Victorian elites siezed upon them as a scientific 
addition to prevailing thought which defended unfettered 
competition, rampant individualism, limited government, 
resistance to social reform, and the unequal distribution of 
wealth - in short, a mode of thought which gave scientific 
justification to the status quo and accepted only limited 
change. Applying the biological dictum of natural selection 
to human society. Social Darwinism posited a vision of life 
that dovetailed with the I aissez-faire economic ethic of the 
i ndustri aliz i ng period. In the struggle for economic 
survival, those with favorable character i sti cs such as 
frugality and diligence were naturally elevated upward, and 
the lazy, shiftless and inefficient were duly punished. In 
this manner, Social Darwinism gave a biological legitimacy 
to competition and the unrestrained pursuit of self 
interest.
Because it was supposedly grounded in science,
Social Darwinism furnished legitimacy to notions of 
laissez-faire and natural law. Human society was an 
organism which should grow naturally, unfettered by outside 
coercion. Society would progress toward higher forms of 
civilization only if it were free. Thus, the state should
adopt a negative role, not promote reform. It should 
guarantee each i ndi vi dual ■’s absolute freedom to develop 
naturally, including freedom to pursue business enterprise, 
subject to the rule that one not harm the freedom of others. 
Thus, the natural law of evolution prescribed the natural 
rights of each individual, rights to a free and equal chance 
to compete, rights to an equal protection of the law, and 
these became proper ethical standards within Victorian 
society. Those who succeeded in the game did so by dint of 
their natural superiority, those who failed, failed because 
of natural inferiority.
Not only did Social Darwinism legitimate 
1 aissez-faira and individualism, out William Graham Sumner, 
its most active and popular proponent, even ascribed a role 
to capital in the struggle for existence.5 Within the 
struggle for existence, it is the production and 
accumulation of capital, he maintained, which augments the 
productivity of labor and ensures human progress. Those who 
acquire capital are possessors and transmitters of superior 
characteri sti cs and talents and their wealth is a legitimate 
payment for their services to civilization. This placed a 
special social responsibility on the guardians of capital to 
protect and promote the values and virtues necessary for its 
correct organization, utilization and preservation.
Drawing on the vogue of Social Darwinism, Victorian 
philosophers of success seized on the idea of the freely
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competing individual to explain the increasing gap between 
those in rags and those in riches.6 Late nineteenth success 
literature such as Horatio Alger novels had transformed 
antebellum notions of success and success-producing 
qualities to accommodate the new economic relationships of 
industrial society. The old antebellum emphasis on self 
discipline and character had balanced economic virtues with 
moral and religious values, guaranteeing that hard work 
would enable the individual to achieve a measure of 
security. But in the Victorian period, ideas of ethical 
conduct leading to self improvement shifted away from this 
earlier balance toward an almost naked emphasis on the 
pursuit of '.-jealth. Mor eover, to account ;-cr the obvious fact 
that economic advancement was not available to all in a 
monopolistic industrial setting, philosophers of success 
added a new element, competition, to traditional concepts of 
self improvement. Self help literature increasingly 
stressed the efficacy of competition in a free marketplace 
in improving the individual and guaranteeing social 
progress. Society provided a competitive arena wherein all 
should strive for advancement and prosperity, and where 
success devolved upon those with the requisite virtues.
Those who failed could blame only their own unwi111ingness 
to compete or failure to embody these virtues.
In Victorian society, the concept of rags to riches 
served less to encourage those in rags than to justify those
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with riches. If wealth were there for the taking, then 
those who availed themselves of the opportunity must possess 
certain characteri sties that set them apart from their 
fellows, enabling them to capitalize on their natural 
advantages. Conversely, those who failed to grasp 
opportunity deserved their fate. That was the way things 
were supposed to be by both divine and material design. In 
this manner, the victims of industrialisation were blamed 
for their plight while elites and society itself escaped 
responsibility.
Successful businessmen of the gilded age seldom rose 
from poverty, but began their careers on one of the higher 
rungs of the ladder./' Andrew Carnegie was an e;; caption, 
but his e;;ample became the rule for millions on both sides 
of the property line. It was necessary to justify their 
high positon by insisting on the superior merit of those who 
sat there. Although they believed it for different reasons, 
businessmen, knowing that most laborers could never rise to 
ownership positions, still used the example of the few who 
did to affirm that the system was fluid, open, rewarding a 
certain kind of virtue and providing individual freedom. But 
the expression was more important in ideological terms than 
the actuality. "Give me your tired, your poor", and society 
provided the setting where the virtues of such people were 
tested.
The prevailing economic theory in the Victorian
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period derived from seventeenth century English political 
economy.8 Classical economics interpreted economic 
processes within the competitive arena of private property 
and individual enterprise. It posited the existence of an 
impersonally functioning economic system whose absolute laws 
were prescribed by nature. Within that system, unrestrained 
competition reigned in all spheres of the economy, providing 
a beneficial force that generated progress. The laws of the 
marketplace reflected the natural order of things, governing 
such economic phenomena as supply and demand, wages, the 
1abor pool, and the distribution of wealth.
Classical economics considered all elements in the 
economic sphere as cogs in the economic machine which worI:ed 
smoothly as long as nothing interfered with the free use and 
exchange of any of its parts: capital, raw materials, 
technology and especially labor. The whole economy was a 
market, governed by fluctuating prices and conditions, and 
to the businessman, labor was no different from any other 
commodity or service, suffering the common fate of 
oversupply, price competition and impersonalization, 
carrying no more obligation than any other materials. This 
market mentality precluded any acknowledgement that labor 
was a collective term for humans, over whom owners had 
direct control.
Businessmen did not believe that they exercised any 
control over the market or could successfully defy its laws.
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Railroad owners, Thomas Cochran notes, assumed that no 
business could pay labor more than subsistence wages and 
survive. Owners saw themselves as "simply marshals of the 
force of economic law."9 Economics textbooks of 
professionals such as Arthur L. Perry held that wages and 
profits bore an inverse relationship. High wages were 
incompatible with high profits. Businessmen promoted the 
idea that wages were determined by law and that strikes were 
therefore powerless to benefit the working class. "Strikes," 
asserted Perry, were an "irrelevant remedy for low wages."
And these orinciples were in keeping with the "same old laws 
of 3od laid down at once in the Constitution of things and 
in the Constitution of man." 10
Social Darwinism reinforced the impersonal nature of 
the workings of this system, maintaining that some were 
rightly more fit to play its game than others and deserved 
unequal rewards based on unequal degrees of fitness.
Moreover, the eighteenth century had idealised and 
rationalized individualism, believing that the pursuit of 
self interest was a law of nature, classical economics 
included a doctrine of social selection that once antedated 
the nineteenth century and anticipated exactly the 
archetypical entrepreneur of the gilded age. From the 
seventeenth century, classical economics had described 
"economic man", who, while completely absorbed in his own 
self interest and completely motivated by gain,
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unconsciously acted in the best interests of society as a 
whole. As man pursued individual self interest, mainly the 
maximization of profits, his activity directly benefited the 
whole of society. Self interest was therefore identical 
with the rational interests of the social whole. As the 
indiviual efforts of one individual paled in the face of 
corporate organization and monopoly capitalism, Victorian 
business elites insisted that corporations acted as 
individuals and their activity was also a means to progress. 
What benefited the company benefited the nation.
Government intervention was both unnecessary and unwise. 
Unnecessary since societv under freedom was already 
psrfectlv consti tuted ", unvii se since any violation of 
nacLir e' s law would upset the delicate balance, punishing 
society with chaos. Progress occurred only when man 
subjected himself to natural economic law; conversely, it 
was interrupted or reversed when these laws were disobeyed.
In addition, any increase in state activity caused a direct 
and corresponding decrease in the freedom of its 
individuals. The state assumed a negative role.
The nineteenth century concept of economic man 
included the notion that some men were naturally more suited 
than others to deal in the economic sphere. Certain, more 
acute people had better notions of market opportunity and 
capacities to exploit, and thus "natural 1 y " took advantage 
of the impersonal workings of the system. This idea
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produced an atmosphere where there was a sort of Gresham's 
law of behavior in which certain kinds of more "modern" 
competitive behavior drove out more "honorable" forms, 
better suited to earlier times.
Because Victorians assumed the identity of self and 
social interests, because they assumed that man inherited 
instincts for acquisitiveness, there was no problem with a 
separate social morality with respect to business activity. 
Economics, with its own legitimating morality, was a 
separate sphere from ordinary morality. Businessmen 
divorced economics and reformers, business and ethics.
Success was the onlv moral indicator,, Victorian political 
economy elevated the successful businessman to a position of 
role model , extol 1 i ng his successes, his coiTipet i t i ve drive, 
and his accumulation of property, all of which assured his 
social and cultural authority.il
The classical idea of natural law also embodied 
notions of natural rights, especially those that promised 
individual liberty and the right to property.12 The rights 
of property must be respected by all, including the right of 
owners to manage property as they saw fit. Within this 
context, propertyless employees had no legal basis for 
arguing about wages or conditions. Thus, employers 
discharged leaders, blacklisted workers and killed unions 
based on the right to manage property.
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The fundamental concept underlying Social Darwinism, 
classical economics, natural law and laissez faire was the 
cult of the free and self sufficient individual. With roots 
in Protestantism, especially evangelical protestantism, the 
enlightenment and English political economy, this idea 
reached full fruition in the open economic free for all in 
late nineteenth century U.S. Individualism received a 
special boost after the advent of industrialization, for it 
was a philosophy which reflected the dominant mode of 
privately owned productive enterprise. Capitalism treated 
people as autonomous economic units that functioned as 
individual, equal and separate buyers and sellers in the
being undermined by the realities of industrial life, it was 
nevertheless ingrained in native U.S. workers.
Individualism was a less easily promoted value among 
immigrants, however, from non-urban, non-industrial, and 
often non-Western contexts where modern socioeconomic 
transformations had not yet dulled traditional communal 
values.13 Individualism was a more congenial value to urban 
German and Jewish immigrants.
Within this general ideological context, Victorians 
defined the capitalist-entrepreneur and the laborer, 
ascribing various class characteri sti cs to each group.
After 1880, traditional beliefs in the cultural importance 
and social worth of the individual worker reflected new
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concepts of labor more in keeping with the changed 
conditions of industrial society. To the businessman, the 
worker was no longer an admired social type, but an 
impersonal economic element to be utilised. Although 
businessmen still offered rhetoric in praise of work, 
workers and self improvement, their actions were guided by 
the knowledge that the chances for advancement were small 
and that the great majority of workers would die in 
occupational categories not far removed from where they were 
born.
Since most workers were also poor, definitions of 
" vjDr k sr “ and "poor " became intertwined in Vi ctor i an 
ideology. Criticisms of poverty offered by elites often 
involved criticisms of one's work station and work habits.
In p r e - b O L i r  geoi 5 Christian society, poverty was thought to 
be due to forces outside human control. God determined rich 
and poor and obedience to him involved accepting one’s lot 
as permanent. Poverty was a burden, but not a sin.
Something that, while it could not be overcome, need not be 
atoned for. After the rise of industrial capitalism and 
its legitimating ideologies, society viewed poverty less as 
a result of one's fate than of one's personal unwillingness 
to exert oneself, one's improper habits, and even one's 
active, willing sin. "The general truth will stand," Henry 
Ward Beecher noted to his congregation, "that no man in this 
land suffers from poverty unless it be more than his fault -
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unless it be his sin."14 Poverty was not permanent; by 
one’s efforts one could improve. The rich were 
demonstration of this, the poor an example of the failure to 
try. Thus businessmen and their clergy preached the 
doctrine of success and the dominant symbolic universe held 
out to the ordinary laborer a world of glittering successand 
wealth that served both as an incentive to rise and a 
blistering reminder of his own inadequacy and unworthiness.
Businessmens' attitudes toward charity are 
instructive. Aid to the poor, they maintained, not only 
disrupted the natural workings of the marketplace, but was 
undeserved bv the recipients and actualiv harmed them by
sympathized with is very small," observed the Reverend 
Fïussel 1 Conwell; "to sympathize with a man whom God has 
punished for his sins, thus to help him when Bod will still 
continue a just punishment, is to do wrong, no doubt about 
it." Most businessmen in the gilded aige were convinced that 
poverty functioned to make people austere, and to stimulate 
them to hard work. The limited social responsibility that 
elites assumed toward the working class was always couched 
within this context of individualism and the utility of 
poverty. Elites specified the reason for working class 
poverty: personal habits. Workers would not save money: 
businessmen were savers and their wealth was the result,. The 
poor had the nower of saving if they only would.
7:
Thus workers in the late nineteenth century 
experienced the increasing poverty of their material 
surround!ngs and at the same time a new ideological assault 
which identified them as the active cause of their own 
misfortune. These ideas impressed upon workers the reality 
of their second class, abhorrent nature, of which they were 
the guilty architects, and on which basis they were denied a 
legitimate place in society. This placed a stigma on the 
workers, undermining self respect. It is difficult to 
determine the degree to which labor internalized such 
definitions, but it is clear that in this period, such an
ui B u i  :i. n= and the disruDZion of cr adi ti c lai culture 
furnished critical elements in the socialization of the 
workforce to dominant bourgeois culture.
businessmen in Victorian society popularized such 
ideas for various reasons. First, they shifted the value 
S', stem to a new level of materialism. Nineteenth century 
society became organized around the assumption that material 
values could be universalized. It is for this reason, to 
économie historian Karl F'olanyi, that one can "allow a 
comparatively wide scope to the play of economic motives 
when analyzing that society."15 Second, these ideas gave 
universal legitimation to Victorian businessmen's economic 
and social behavior, allowing them to defend the status quo 
and justif'/ their superior position while attacking labor.
7 4
But they were more than just an excuse for explaining and 
absolving responsibility for the fate of the industrial 
workers. It was morally assuaging for elites to picture 
competition as a reflection of biological necessity. And 
their specific labor ideology was designed to bring the 
entire capital-labor dialogue within the ideological arena 
already prescribed by Protestantism, classical economics and 
social Darwinism, in short, to reduce the debate on the 
relationship between capital and labor to a series of 
affirmations of received ideas. That was the heart of the 
matter. For it was from this ideological orientation that 
businessman undertook to educate, orosletyzs, oropagandize
element most in need of education - labor.
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPLOYER IDEOLOGY IN THE PULLMAN STRIKE 
The Great Chicago Strike of 1894 furnished a context 
which demonstrated the labor ideology of the owners and 
managers of the Pullman Palace Car Company, and through the 
General Managers' Association that of the owners and 
managers of the 23 railroads with a terminus in Chicago. In 
addition, George Pullman's creation of the model factory 
town of Pullman fourteen years before the strike offered an 
example of an employer’s social ideals in practice, a 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  w h a t  t v p e  o f  social e n v i roniTient he, a n d  b y  
i iTipl i cati on , manv manuf acturers woul d have if the'.' could
strike and boycott declared by the Ameri can Railway Union 
against Pullman car carriers, and the use of federal force 
in an industrial dispute generated a body of employer 
rhetoric concerning relations of capital and labor and 
workingmen's rights to organize, strike and boycott. In the 
course of these events, employer ideology legitimated 
capitalist social and economic structures and worked to 
obstruct workers' organization, defuse their resistance, 
discredit them publicly, and prevent the propagation of 
their ideology. The Pullman Strike constituted a major 
defeat for railroad labor, a defeat brought on in part by 
the propagation of the labor ideology of George Pullman and 
t h e r a i 1 r o a cl owners.
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.L-. EyllüîêO. Town 
George Pullman estab1i shed the Pullman Palace Car 
Company in 1867 with a capital investment of 41,000,000. By 
1880, prosperity and patent protection enabled him to 
acquire a monopoly of railroad sleeping car manufacture and 
service on three-fourths of the nation's rail mileage. The 
fiscal year ending in July, 1893 found the Company 
capitalized at $36,000,000, having a $25,000,000 surplus of 
undivided profits, paying yearly dividends to stockholders 
of 8 to 12 per cent including $2,520,000 in 1893, and 
distributing i-ianss of 37,233,000. The Panic of 1393 forced a 
reduction in wags payments in fiscal 1394 be 34,47!.,000, but 
produced no correspondi ng reduction in dividends; the latter 
rose to $2,330,000.2
Prosperity in 1880 allowed Pullman to construct a 
new car plant and alongside it, the planned community of 
Pullman. Pullman’s town became the material manifestation of 
his principles of economy and social control, and in 
particular, his labor ideology. Pullman's ideas reflected 
both the greater ideological milieu of late nineteenth 
century American society, and, in particular, the 
socioeconomic reality of boomtown Chicago. Between 1870 and 
1880, Chicago's population almost doubled to one half 
million, and it became the nation's busiest railway center. 
Between 1880 and 1890, the city's population tripled to one
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and one half million. Rapidly built, overcrowded, dirty and 
disease infested, working class housing districts 
constituted, in the opinion of many business leaders, 
breeding grounds for the social unrest that plagued the 
city. Labor disturbances hit the city many times during the 
decade of the 1870s. In the great nationwide railroad 
uprisings of 1877, Chicago witnessed four days of rioting 
which left more than 40 dead and scores injured.3 Chicago 
newspapers predicted "Civil War", "Horrid Social 
Convulsion," and "Red War."4 In 1886, events near Haymaket 
Square generated a national outcrv among businessmen and the
labor elements.5
These and other disorders alarmed some businessmen 
such as George Pullman to the dangers of industrial society 
and made them fearful of a great social revolution.
Determined to avert a catastrophe, many business leaders 
became concerned with the living conditions of working 
people as they searched for new institutions to bring order 
to the urban social structure. Pullman had early become 
involved in Chicago's social and civic life: education 
through the Y.M.C.A. and the Chicago Manual Training School, 
youth temperance through the Citizens' Law and Order League, 
and civic improvement through commercial clubs. Welfare work 
began in his own plants in 1873 with the charter of the
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Pullman Mutual Benefit Association, and Pullman expressed 
the desire to provide future eating, bathing, reading, and 
social facilities for workers.6
Pullman's desire to prevent social disorder was 
matched only by his eagerness to promote habits of 
efficiency and economy among workers. The impetus for the 
model town combined economic efficiency and return on 
investment with social control. "Whatever tends to make the 
[company'si headquarters attractive to the employee has the 
effect to make [sic] them more useful," Pullman argued in 
1872. 7 He maintained that the city was constructed as
relacions within the town remain on the business level of 
employer to employee, landlord to tenant.9 As a business 
venture, the town was expected to return 6 per cent annually 
on the original investment. High rents ensured such a 
return, and a coercive collection procedure guaranteed 
prompt rent payment. Each worker received two paychecks, 
one for rent which he signed over to Pullman town's bank, 
and one for the balance due for wages.10 Thus the costs of 
utopia and beauty were borne by residents and subsidized by 
their rents.
To George Pullman, the cultural habits of Chicago's 
working people precluded good business practice. The 
temptati ons of urban society —  drinking, idleness,
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unhealth-fni living, transience —  all -fostered poor work 
performance. The social and moral evils of working class 
neighborhoods, however, could be eradicated by imposing upon 
workers his notions of social order and community, forcing 
them to live in a clean, orderly, stable, moral environment.
A direct aittempt to change and control the cultural habits 
of workers, Pullman City offered the material benefits of 
pleasant, healthful, uplifting physical surroundings, free 
from disorder and corruption, an environment which would 
produce better workers. Pullman wished to "attract the best 
class of mechanic", to exclude "baneful influences,," and to
CQiTiiTierc i, al motives and social goals olandsd into a utopian 
projecc in which material beneficence provided the oasis for 
moral uplift and guided working class thought and behavior 
toward Pullman's desired ends.
In one sense, Pullman City was an attempt to resist 
the social reality of i ndu'-..ri al i zat i on by recreating 
between employer and employee the stable, paternal, 
hierarchical social relations of an earlier age. It followed 
the pattern of antebellum model factory towns such as 
Lowell, Massachusetts, which, along with asylums, schools, 
orphanages, prisons and reformatori es served as communities 
providing order. control .and super'vi si on „ Such institutions 
were designed to contain the first indications of the 
disruptive social forces of urban and industrial society.12
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While Pullman sought to recreate the past on one hand, on 
the other his city anticipated the welfare work and other 
paternalistic reforms of the early twentieth century.
Pullman employed artists and engineers to design a 
town with sewers, paving, and greenery, combining the 
aesthetic with the useful. Constructed entirely of red 
brick, the town was laid out in a 1/2 by 2 mile grid between 
Lake Calumet and the Illinois Central tracks. Shops and 
offices of the Pullman Palace Car Company, set at one end of 
town, included a foundry, wheel manufactory, brickyard, 
lumberyard, gas works, wood and machine shops, tool shop, 
eux i1i arv buildings and a 190 foot water tower, in addition 
to the car rnanu :■ as t u n  ng shops. The thirty- acre oar shop 
area was clomi na ted by a main constructi on shop and office 
building, 700 feet long, the center office section of which 
rose to 140 feet above its two wings and housed a large 
1ighted clock,
The town of Pullman consisted of park, residential, 
and commercial areas. Bordering Lake Calumet, the park 
offered spacious greens, seating areas, sports fields and 
tennis courts. From it bridge led to an island on which 
were situated a lavishly constructed boathouse and race 
tracks which doubled as skating rinks in winter.
The Arcade housed the main commercial and community 
activities. A block long and 90 feet tall, this building 
contained shops, theatre, kindergarten, library, meeting
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rooms and a second floor observation gallery. Four of the 
library's five rooms, clearly intended for the clean and 
well dressed, were richly upholstered and decorated. The 
fifth, the austerely furnished Men's Reading Room, had a 
separate outside entrance allowing workers to enter without 
passing through the more richly appointed library. In the 
opinion of Reverend W.H. Carwardi ne, Pullman town's 
Methodist minister, the library appeared too luxurious to 
the average worker, creating "a spirit of caste in the 
little town."
The library was designed to promote the community's 
moral and i n tel 1 sctuaii development. Onlv 31 per cent of its 
pool's ware f i o ci o n . the remainder being devoted to what the 
librarian termed moi-e serious education. Librsiry patrons 
paid an annual fee of $3.00, equal to a day and a half's 
work for an ordinary laborer, and this, coupled with the 
intimidation of its luxuriousness, kept annual membership 
under 200. Like the library, the richly appointed theatre 
separated those who paid 35, 50, and 75 cents a seat from 
those who occupied the boxes in the balcony. The town's 
other public buildings included a free school for children 
of Pullman, a casino, and a stable. The latter housed both 
the town's work and the wealthy citizen's pleasure horses. A 
carriage and horse could be rented for $3.00 a day for
excursions.
The Florence Hotel, a huge, two story, elaborately
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constructed and decorated "gingerbread" building, rented 
rooms from $3.00 to $4.00 a day. The hotel offered 75 cent 
meals in its restaurant and contained banquet rooms to let 
for weddings and parties. The hotel housed Pullman's only 
bar, clearly intended by its location and appointments for 
management only. One worker reported that he "looked but 
dared not enter Pullman's hotel with its private bar."13 In 
an interview published in the Ottawa Dai.l_y Free Press on 
September 9, 1882, George Pullman explained:
We allow no liquor in the city; now take 
strong drink away from men who have been 
accustomed to it, and not furnish something to 
fill the gap is all wrong - there is a want 
felt,, a vacuum created and it must be tilled; to 
do this we nave provided a theatre, a reading 
room, billiard room, and all sorts o 1 cutdoor 
sports, and by this means our people soon forget 
ail about drink, they find they are better off 
without it, and we have an assurance of our work 
being done with greater accuracy and skill.14
City planners also located groceries and shops in Market
Hall, which like the Arcade provided areas for soci ali z ati on
and relaxation.
Pullman City had a total of 1799 dwelling units. The 
average rent in Pullman was $13.50 per month, approximately 
20 to 25 percent higher than in neighboring Kensington or 
Rosedale.15 Many families sublet to individual boarders in 
order to survive. Although Pullman denied any connection 
between rental and employment, job preference in slack times 
went to town residents.16 Workers testified to the United 
States Strike Commission in 1894 that Pullman comoelled
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workers to reside in town when space was available.17 
Worker residence areas were situated on paved, landscaped 
streets arranged in a gridiron pattern and constructed with 
rows of identical two-to-five family dwellings built of red 
brick. These adjoined like buildings on each side, with 
narrow strips of front lawn and narrow lots of open ground 
in back. All families in the tenement shared the back lot, 
which was barely large enough to accomodate a clothesline 
and certainly insufficient for a garden. Lowest rents were 
in tenements which let for eight to nine dollars per month. 
Each apartment had a cooking stove, gas lighting, sink and 
water tap and shared a watercl oset with other apai-tmen ts on 
that floor. Tenement apartments housed both laborers s,nd 
carbuiiders. Skilled workers usually resided in the more 
comfortable, single family, five room houses which occupied 
separate plots of ground and rented for $15 to $25 per 
month. Houses of Pullman's company officers, merchants and 
professionals were individually constructed with lawns 
bordering on the wide Florence Boulevard. Considerably 
larger, these had up to 12 rooms, and rented for up to $75 
per month.
Pullman advertised his model town as a public 
demonstration of his notions of economic efficiency and 
social control. He encouraged visitors, travellers, the 
press, and other businessmen to view the plant site, the 
town, and its workers to see how a company could
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simultaneously promote its own interests and those of its 
employees.18
"The building of Pullman," a company official 
reported to the press, "is very likely to be the beginning 
of a new era for labor."19 The physical and social 
arrangement of the town was designed to support and 
encourage the establishment of an obedient, moral community 
by providing a closely monitored, centralized setting in 
which worker interaction took place in an atmosphere free 
from liquor and what Pullman considered to be "bad 
influences". The citv was designed to produce "habits of 
r ssp set ab i 1 i ty , making workers punctual , mannerly, 
respactful of superiors, moral, saving, educated, and 
uplifted.20 The ideal worker went directly home from work 
and spent his time and money on his family rather than at a 
saloon. During the strike, Pullman wrote to a friend that no 
violence or destruction of property occurred at Pullman city 
because of the company's having provided "various sources of 
elevation of character."21
The town promoted and, where it could, enforced 
order, efficiency, and discipline, in part through the 
visible examipl e of its orderly layout and construction, and 
in part through its daily dealings with workers and their 
families. George Pullman "simply cannot endure litter and 
confusion," reported the New York Wgrl.d ; "the love of order 
is the keynote to a great system."22 Reverend Carwardi ne of
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Fui 1 man’s Methodist Church found, however, that "the 
monotony and regularity of the buildings gives one the 
impression that he is living in soldiers’ barracks."23 
Social goals determined Pullman City’s physical setting. The 
town was intended to shape attitudes as well as meet its 
residents’ needs, and it provided workers with visual models 
of hierarchical class differences in income, housing, 
leisure, and recreation.24
Pullman’s labor ideology was expressed in implicit 
and explicit messages to workers who lived and worked in the 
town: the company’s interests and those of its workers were 
the same, and the comoany was competent to ascertain both: 
order and hierarchy were of pri/ne i moortance: wor hers should
stay in their proper place: the company rightfully watched
and controlled where it could. Pullman did not allow labor 
unions in town and forbade labor organizers to hold meetings 
or give speeches. Federal Strike Commissioners later 
assessed the significance of the system at Pullman City:
The conditions created at Pullman enable 
the management at all times to assert with great 
vigor its assumed right to fix wages and rents 
absolutely, and to repress that sort of 
independence which leads to labor organizations 
and their attempts at mediation, arbitration, 
strikes, etc.25
Command amd administrative problems as well as
employee criticisms pointed to the difficulty involved in
effecting at Pullman what leaders of the age called social
engineering. Workers charged that no redress or grievance
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system existed to deal with inequities in the shops, 
especially the gradual reduction of piecework rates over the 
five years previous to the strike. "They had come to feel 
they could get no justice," charged Carwardine. The parson 
noted that Company spies practiced a system of surveillance 
and espionage, and that the president received weekly 
reports concerning workmen's attitudes and conversations. He 
cited instances where workers had rebelled against Pullman's 
"absolutism" and left the Company's employ rather than 
endure it. Carwardine observed of Pullman’s authority:
it seems to me that imperialism on the
part of a gentleman so powerful in influence as 
Mr. Pullman is unpleasant to say the least, and 
capable of producing harm whether intentional or 
not toward those in authority under hi m.26
Charges that Mr. Pullman influenced his employees' 
voting in the presidential campaign of 1892 were reported in 
an August 1894 article in American industries , the 
publication of the National Association of Manufacturers.
This article reprinted part of a July 10, 1983 interview in 
the New York Herald between the newspaper's editor and 
George Pullman. In this interview, Pullman expressed anger 
and disgust over the election of Grover Cleveland, whose 
policies Pullman considered directly responsible for the 
Panic of 1983. Pullman claimed that Pullman town usually 
returned a Republican majority of 2,000 to 25,000 votes. He 
had confidently expected the same for Benjamin Harrison in 
1982 and had fought against Cleveland's election "with all
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my power" including the delivery of a warning speech to his 
employees late in the campaign. In this speech, Pullman 
stated that he did not wish to “unduly" influence his 
workers' votes, and that he hoped that no worker would 
regard his speech as an "attempt to coerce you into voting 
any way against your convictions."27 However, Pullman 
attested,
this is a business campaign. If 
Cleveland is elected it means an end to the 
protective tariff...and the biggest financial 
disaster which this country has ever seen. If 
Cleveland is elected business in this country 
will come to a standstill. Pullman will have to 
shut down or to run along on half pay. In other 
words, the cold fact is just this: That anv man 
in Pullman who votes the Democratic ticket is 
simply voting bread and butter out of his mouth 
and out of the mouths of his wife and children.
If you want to do that go ahead and do it. But I 
appeal to you not to commit such a folly.23
Reprinted in Chicago newspapers, this speech stirred 
up the workingmen of Chicago and, in the opinion of the 
Herald editor, contributed to the unexpected vote Cleveland 
received in that city. American Industries reported that "a 
more impolitic speech could hardly have been delivered" and 
that the Chicago Republican party organisation had tried 
unsuccessfully to counteract its "boomerang effect." Pullman 
admitted surprise when Pullman town returned a majority of 
more than 2,000 votes for Cleveland. "The workingmen were 
simply crazy," he fumed. Claiming that he had done as much 
for labor as any man alive, he felt betrayed and lashed out 
in a vindictive fury. "I made up my mind," he told the
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editor, "that that was the last of my sympathy for the 
workingman." He decided that he would cut wages since his 
employees had voted "against their own interests and against 
my interests," and were no longer worth caring for. "Now, 
let us see how they like it," Pullman said.
Workers themselves complained that the Company 
interfered with their political activities. In addition, 
they charged that the Pullman bank collected overdue bills 
and rent and that the company guaranteed full occupancy by 
requiring workers to live in town. In addition, they charged 
that the company practically refused accident liability.29 
The company hired "spotters" to spy on the town’s residents. 
Criticism had n o  official channels and its unofficial 
expression remained difficult. "Owing to the peculiarity of 
the paternalistic government of Pullman," Carwardine 
concluded, "no one feels like openly criticising the 
Company.“30 When wage cuts occurred, Pullman’s workers 
resorted to union organi zati o n , arguing that there was no 
other way to get the company to talk to them except through 
orgai nzation.
In the decade of the 1380s, the press largely 
favored the Pullman experiment. The main criticism centered 
around the question of paternalism.31 This issue received a 
national airing in an 1885 Harger^s Monthly article by 
Richard Ely.32 An assistant professor of economics at Johns 
Hopkins University, Ely rejected the "dogmatic assumptions
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of classical political economy," and criticized Pullman Town 
from a Christian and "scientific" standpoint. He praised the 
use of scientific principles to provide a rational social 
setting with substantial material benefits. He approved of 
Pullman’s goals of reapportioning wealth and providing the 
individual worker a share in the benefits of civilization. 
Pullman town "is social experimentaton of a vast scale," he 
concluded, "and this is its significance." And it worked,
Ely maintained, to the extent that the "wholesome, cheerful 
surroundings enable the men to work more constantly and more 
efficient1 y ."33 Yet, Elv condemned the experiment for 
creating a dependence and paternali sm which subverted the 
workmen’s personal liberty and i nd 1 vi ual i srn. He cited 
conditions which produced inis effect, in particular the 
company’s exercise of an all pervading, absolute power. The 
town’s design and physical setting, to Ely, was distressing 
in its monotony and "mechanical regularity" which suggested 
"machine made," and reinforced regular habits among the 
residents. The city existed as an extension of the Pullman 
Company, where "every municipal act is here the act of a 
private corporation."34 He likened Pullman’s authority to 
royal absolutism in which "the citizen is surrounded by 
constant restraint and restriction, and everything is done 
for him, nothing by him."35 Not only were strikes regarded 
as the "chief of social sins," Ely observed, but "individual 
i ni ti ti ve, even in affairs which concern the residents
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alone, i s repressed." He concluded that the exercise of such 
power resulted in a "dependent, servile population."
Pullman's experiment "desires the happiness of the people, 
but in such a way as shall please the authorities."36
l l j L  Ibe Strike and Boycott 
The great increase in organization of botn owners 
and workmen in the railroad industry during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century made the 1894 strike a test case 
between capital and labor. Between the great strikes of 1877 
and 1894, the railroads experienced seventeen years of 
struggle with their labor farces. The formation of the 
General Managers' Association on a national basis in 1336 
furnished railroad leaders ivit'n the most powerful employers' 
organization in the United States. Composed of 23 railroads 
centering or terminating in Chicago, it represented 
$2,108,552,617 in capital, 52,038 stockholders, net earnings 
of $102,710,917 and control of 221,097 employees. The 
Association received dues from members for the purpose of 
recruiting strikebreakers during labor disturbances, 
maintaining blacklists, deflecting employee grievances, and 
fixing among its members standardized rates for service and 
wages.37
Investigators of the United States Strike Commission 
reported that, because it represented an illegal 
organization to fix rates, the General Managers' Association
is an illustration of the persistent and 
shrewdly devised plans of corporations to
overreach their limitations and to usurp 
indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in 
their charters and not obtainable from the 
people or their legislators. An extension of 
this association...and the proposed legalization 
of "pooling" would result in an aggregation of 
power and capital dangerous to the people and 
their liberties as well as to employees and 
their rights.38
American Railway Union members had no such
corresponding power; they had only their collective labor to
give or withhold. Before 1893, railroad labor organizations,
represented mainly by the conservative railroad
brotherhoods, lacked central control. The brotherhoods
functioned a,s craft unions, which secured contracts with the
railroads through collective bargaining. While Eugene Debs
was an official in the Brotherhood of Locomotive F i remen, he
observed that railroad owners successfully exploited the
brotherhood's rivalries, reluctance to act, and willingness
to work as strikebreakers against one another. The United
States Strike Commission noted that until the railroads
organized, their employees never attempted a general union
of railroad workingmen.39
The American Railway Union formed at Chicago in
1893. It represented the only attempt to unite all railroad
labor in a nationwide industrial union designed to transcend
the brotherhoods' self interest and protect labor against
the rapid concentration of railroad capital and management.
Early success in the Great Northern Railroad Strike of 1933
boosted ARU membership to 150,000 by spring of 1894, out of
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approximately 350,000 railroad workers nationally. This 
compares to a combined railroad brotherhood membership of 
140,000, an AF of L membership of 500,000 and a Knights of 
Labor membership of 150,000.40
The depression of 1893 brought wage reductions in 
most U.S. industries and railroads. Wage reductions began at 
Pullman in August and the Company reduced its workforce from 
4500 to 1100 between July and November. By April, 1894, the 
employment level had reached 3100, the average monthly 
salary had been reduced by 28 per cent. Despite wage 
reductions and layoffs, the Company offered no correspondino 
reduction in rents and did not reduce salaries of officials. 
Resentment among workers grew as they suffered during the 
winter of 1293. In March and April of 1894, Pul 1 man's 
workers formed ARU locals. By May 7, a workers' committee 
asked Pullman's Vice President Thomas Wickes for either a 
return to the June, 1393 wage scale or a reduction in rent.
On May 10, the Company fired three of the committeemen 
despite George Pullman's assurances that their jobs were 
secure. The next day most of the workforce struck and 
Pullman closed the plant. The strike continued peacefully 
for over a month with Pullman refusing to give in to pubic 
pressure for negotiation or arbitration.
In an atmosphere of strikes and violence associated 
with the depression, the national convention of the American 
Railway Union met in Chicago and considered the Pullman
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worker's case. On June 21, 1984, the ARU voted to boycott 
Pullman cars after the 26th if Pullman refused to arbitrate 
his workers' grievances. The Pullman company again refused 
arbitration and turned the matter over to the General
Managers' Association. The nationwide boycott began June 26.
ARU President Eugene Debs threatened a general rail strike 
if the roads attempted to replace the boycotters. The 
General Managers' Association met on the 29th and resolved 
to uphold the Pullman Company's stand against its employees, 
to move Pullman cars, and to "act unitedly" to crush the 
ARU. It announced that no striking worker would ever secure 
wor I: on the road whose emplov he forfaited.41 The boycott 
began on the 26th, and by the end of June almost 25,000 rail 
workers had severely restricted the nation's rail movement 
and all but isolated Chicago. Violence and sabotage alarmed 
officials and lost for the strikers the press sympathy they
had in most of Chicago and the nation. Rumors abounded and
many people feared general insurrection. Large groups of 
strikers and strike sympathisers assembled at the Rock 
Island yard, forcing the railroad to ask for protection.
On June 28, U.S. Attorned General Richard Olney 
appointed Edwin Walker as special U.S. Attorney in Chicago 
and instructed him to break the strike. On June 30, the 
Managers gained from Olney the right to import private 
detectives, and to deputize a private army of U.S. marshals 
for rail owners' use in the strike. They recruited, armed,
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paid, and directed this army during the strike. To isolate 
and paralyze ARU leadership, Walker obtained from the 
Circuit Court of Chicago blanket injunctions effective July 
2. Although the ARU offered special crews to move mail 
trains, the railroads attached mail cars to regular trains 
which also carried Pullman cars. Since the injunction 
forbade the Union to obstruct the movement of mail, this 
tactic furnished the federal government with a reason to 
intervene. The federal injunction also prohibited Union 
officials from sending telegrams or communicating with each 
other or with strikers. "The result," charged Debs, "was to 
reduce our incluence to nothing."42 Federal courts issued 
similar injunctions in 13 other states under the strike.
On July 2, Walker informed Qlney that neither the 
passage of mail trains nor the court injunctions could be 
enforced without aid from the Regular Army. Qlney agreed and 
on 3 July, against the protests of Illinois Governor 
Altgeld, an entire federal garrison entered Chicago and 
began clearing tracks, guarding trains, and resisting mobs. 
Federal military intervention increased mob violence which, 
in turn, resulted in the enlargement of the federal garrison 
and the calling out of the state militia.
John Egan, acting manager of the General Managers 
Association announced that the railroads were no longer 
party to the dispute which now involved only the ARU and the 
federal government. The Managers held that the strike arose
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from the railroads' unwillingness to tolerate the ARU's 
attempt to dictate to them. On July 5, Debs promised an end
to the strike in return for Pullman’s agreeing to 
arbitration. On July 10, the Chicago Circuit Court issued an 
arrest warrant for Debs and three other ARU leaders for 
disobeying the court injunction. On July 12, Debs appealed 
to Samuel Gompers, President of the AF of L to declare a 
general nationwide strike in support of the rapidly failing 
boycott. Gompers declared that his union would neither join 
a sympathetic strike nor support the ARU boycott. He advised 
strikers to return to work. On Julv 17, Debs and ARU 
leaders ’.-.era jailed for a week. These events and the refusal 
of the roads to reemploy active union members effectivelv 
killed the strike and crippled the ARU. Mob violence abated
by the middle of July and most troops were withdrawn by July
19. On la  July, Pullman announced the resumption of work in 
its shops. By August 24, 1984, it had employed 1773 former
workers and 559 new ones.
It'S Issues
During the course of the strike, Pullman and the 
General Managers Association publicly mounted an ideological 
assault which promoted their assessment of the situation. 
Their strongest assertions held that a) owners of property 
had the right to control it, b) their interest was guided 
by the principle of safeguarding capital, and c) their hands 
were tied at certain points by economic law. Together, these
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assumptions constituted a basic reference point from which 
other arguments and practices flowed.
In a Pullman Company statement in the Chicago Herald 
, June 26, 1894, Vice President Thomas Wickes held that the
main issue in the strike was Pullman's and the railroads’ 
right to govern themselves.43 The American Railway Union, 
charged Pullman, "seeks to dictate to the railway systems of 
this country what cars they shall use."44 In defending to 
the Strike Commission the company's refusal to arbitrate, 
Wickes reiterated the same contention:
There was a principle involved...that 
the comoanv felt in justice to itself it was
bound to maintain; that was the control of its 
own business. If the company had allowed its 
employees to dictate upon what terms it should 
do its business.., the putting out of its own 
power the control of its business would have 
been a very serious matter for years to come.45
To the Pullman company, the right of control meant that 
employees should have no voice in "dictating" or entering 
into negotiations concerning wages, rents, or work 
condi ti ons.
Strike Commissioners' questions raised the issue of 
Pullman's loyalties and duties to his employees, suggesting 
that a profitable company such as his should have borne some 
losses, shared some profits, and carried workers through the 
depression. This prompted two responses. First, Pullman 
vehemently insisted that his loyalty belonged exclusively to 
Company stockholders. Those who invested in stocks years
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ago, he maintained, made wise decisions. The company itself 
had been prudent in creating profits and accumulating a 
surplus. Thus, just because the company "happened to be 
prosperous," Pullman saw no reason why he should take 
profits rightfully belonging to the 4,200 shareholders and 
turn them over to the Pullman workers. "The Pullman company 
divides its profits with the people who own the property," 
Pullman attested. Paying profits to workers would be giving 
them a "contribution," which would reduce their self 
respect.46
Ownership of propertv likewise carried with it a 
license for control over renters. Pullman justified his 
attempts to control town residents by citing its beneficial 
effects. For example, he maintained that his refusal to sell 
land to commercial interests or individual workers prevented 
the introduction of "baneful elements which it was the chief 
purpose to exclude."47 Likewise, he refused to rent 
property for any purpose the company deemed unsavory.
Pullman claimed "very satisfactory success" in excluding 
undesirable elements: "there are no saloons in Pullman;
there are no brothels or other objectionable houses; no such 
places of resort."48 Pullman saw the beneficial results of 
his paternalistic control in visits to employees homes, "as 
I had occasion to do often", and from their appearance in 
the streets. He estimated that employees and their families 
lived "about 40 percent better than people in ordinary
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manufacturing towns...that did not have the advantages of 
cleanliness and order and the elimination of bad 
influences."49 He conluded that "the general expression of 
people was in the direction of a higher class."50
The amount of debate and controversy over wages 
generated during the strike placed that issue at the 
forefront of the ideological struggle. Pullman, supported by 
the General Managers, identified labor costs as the elastic 
factor in cost accounting, blamed the strike on high wages 
or demands for high wages, and saw wage reductions as easily 
the most Justifiable method of cost cutting in hard times.
The Chicago press raised the issue of wage cuts 
which prompted Pul 1 man to include in his public statement of 
14 July a discussion of the factors which determined wage 
rates. During the depression, he declared, the company 
operated at a loss in order to share with workers the costs 
of hard times by providing work, even at reduced wages. 
Realizing that the depression would mean only scattered, 
small contracts from hard pressed railroads, Pullman told 
his managers: "Our bids will be based on the lowest possible 
estimates, eliminating the guestion of profit and the 
interest on investment, and if the workmen will contribute 
some help in the way of accepting some reduction of 
wages...we can hope to keep running."51 Even the reduced 
wages, Pullman argued, did not permit a shop profit on work 
contracted after spring of 1394. For his part in meeting the
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economic crisis, Pullman contributed a "business loss", 
although management salaries were not reduced, and he 
expected the workers to "work a little harder" and be 
"willing to do their work at a less price" rather than close 
the shop. They should "show proper appreciation by helping 
themselves over hard times," Pullman announced to the 
press.52 In the absence of any information to the contrary, 
company officers assumed that wage reductions were 
"acceptable to the employees under the circumstances."53 
The wage question, Wickes testified to the Strike 
Commission, "is settled by the law of supply and demand. We 
were obliged to reduce wages...in order to compete with 
other people in the same business, that were doing the same 
thing. I suppose the wages we were paying were practically 
the same wages they were paying." Wickes further defended 
the company position: “we go into the market for men, just
as we go into the market for anything else...." To pay more 
than the law of the market allowed, was to give a "gift of 
money."54 If high wages kept costs too large to remain 
competitive, the plant must close. "The economic law is 
inexorable," he insisted.55
Pressed by the commissioners, Pullman admitted that 
operating at a loss was cheaper than shutting down entirely. 
Considerations of avoiding costs arising from fixed 
overhead, shutting down the plant, and scattering the 
workforce also influenced the decision to operate the plant
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at a loss.56 The Strike Commission -found that the company 
kept the plant running
mainly for its own benefit as a 
manufacturer, that its plant might not rust, 
that its competitors might not invade its 
territory, that it might keep its cars in 
repair, that it might be ready for resumption 
when business revived with a live plant and 
competent help, and that its revenue from its 
tenements might continue-57
Although the Pullman company insisted that fixed 
economic laws governed its practices, officials used other 
factors to determine daily piece rate payments. The company 
avowed the "principle" that a day's wage should be a
"reasonable wage for ten hours at that particular a;or 1: for a 
competent workmaui, not an expert." Ascertaini ng "by 
experience" the amount of work a "faithful, competent" 
worker could perform in one day, the company used its piece 
rate system to penalize "less industrious" workers with 
payment of "less than the reasonable day's wage." Likewise, 
the piece rate system rewarded the "expert and more 
industrious" with the "just benefit of his superior energy 
and skill."58 The company automatically adjusted piece 
rates downward when "experience" discovered that the 
undeserving regularly made an "unreasonable day's wage."
Piece rates never needed downwa.rd adjustment because the 
most competent workmen were making excessive wages, Pullman 
officials explained, for such workers limited their output 
on a piece "excessively priced" so as not to attract company 
attention. Despite company adherence to what it termed
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economic law, Wickes testified that shop foremen could 
further cut piecework rates arbitrarily. He claimed an 
average wage reduction of 19 per cent between April 1893 and 
April 1894, but the Strike Commission found wages reduced an 
average of 25 per cent.59 During the depression, the 
company abandoned its "principle" of paying a reasonable 
day's wage and decided upon piece rates based on the going 
rate in the shops of other industries.60
Notwithstanding the workers' original complaint that 
they were squeezed between reduced wages and fixed rents, 
company officers never considered reducing rents. Pullman 
maintained that the two issues were separata, that none of 
tne wage reductions he made as an employer could he 
considered in his fixing rents as a landlord. Ownership of 
employee housing had provided the company with a guaranteed 
market for its rental business and with a means to recoup 
monthly almost half the money paid to workers in salary.
Since the two paycheck system guaranteed that the rent due 
was satisfied first, many workers were left during the 
depression with a second check of only a few cents. The 
lesson was that their employer considered rents more 
important than any other obligations. To the company, 
legitimate business practice required that employers hire 
labor as cheaply as the market allowed and that landlords 
keep rents profitable regardless of what wages tenants 
received. In business depressions, the Company maintained.
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good business methods prescribed taking advantage of 
conditions to reduce wages irrespective of rent conditions. 
The company defended itself by claiming both the legal right 
and the power to operate with such procedures.61
Although fixed at a rate to return six percent on 
the original investment, after taxes and repairs, actual 
rental profits were never more than 4.5 per cent, and 
reached only 3.8 per cent in 1893. Rents could not be too 
high, as workers charged, with rental income low. Pullman 
testified that rental income was so low in fact "that there 
was no room for reducing the rent and bringing any income 
froiTi it. "62 Although workers owed 670,, 000 in back rent by 
the time of the strike. Pul 1 ms,n had not attempted to collect 
it, intending to recoup back rents by the two paycheck 
method when good times returned.
Pullman's insistence on business control of property 
governed his refusal to treat with the Union or arbitrate 
strikers' grievances. The ARU committee requested 
arbitration on June 15 but Pullman refused to consider it 
représentât!ve of the strikers. Wickes informed a workers’ 
committee the next day "that we did not consider that there 
was any proper subject for arbi trati on ."63 Pullman stated 
that it would be "business folly" to operate the shops at a 
loss just because it happened to be the opinion of a third 
party that he do so.64
The amount of loss did not determine his view toward
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arbitration, Pullman declared, but rather the "principle 
involved," the principle that such matters should be decided
by the company, not submitted to a third party. Matters of
opinion, he conceded, were proper subjects for arbitration, 
but not "whether a fact that I know to be true is true or 
not." Such truths "could not be made otherwise by the 
opinion of any third party."65 In a press statement he 
warned the public of the dangers of arbitration:
The public should not permit the real 
question which has been before it to be
obscured. That question was as to the
possibility of the creation and duration of a 
dictatorship which could make all the 
industries...and the daily comfort of millions 
dependent upon them, hostages for the granting 
of any fantastic whim of such a dictator. Any 
submission to him would have been a long step in 
that direction.6o
On 22 June, an ARU committee met with Wickes and 
asked him to notify the Pullman company that, unless it 
agreed to arbitration, a boycott against Pullman cars would 
begin in four days. Wickes replied that the company would 
acknowledge no communication from the ARU on the subject.
When the ARU publicly announced the boycott, Pullman 
denounced its action in the Chicago Herald on June 26.
George Pullman's thinking on the question of 
arbitration coincided with that of the railroad owners.
Asked by a Strike Commissioner if he had attended any of the 
meetings of railroad officers or the GMA, he admitted that 
he had not, but that he had held a "casual conversation in 
the [Chicago] club with some railroad men" whose ooinion on
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arbitration "agreed with my own." Like Pullman, the 
presidents of the Lake Shore and the Eastern Illinois 
considered the question of arbitration "an absurd 
proposition."67 After the boycott began, Pullman insisted 
that questions of arbitration "are now entirely under the 
control of the railway companies, and could not be 
influenced...by the Pullman company in any way." The GMA, 
for its part, announced that its members would "act 
unitedly" to resist the boycott.68
On July 3, Chicago Mayor John P. Hopkins advised the 
l-'ui 1 man Company’s manager of the need for "settling the
could not deal wich the strikers because they were 
lawbreakers, not law abiding citizens.69 On July 6, a 
committee composed of ARU officials and Chicago city 
aldermen requested of Mr. John Egan, acting GMA manager, 
that the GMA meet with them. He refused. Two days later, 
thait same committee called at the Pullman Company office to 
air range- for the appointment of a board to "arbitrate the 
question as to whether there was anything to arbitrate or 
not." The committee's purpose was "not to arbitrate the 
differences between the Pullman company and its employees, 
buc to see whether there were any differences." The company 
again rebuffed the committee, reiterating its earlier public 
refusal to arb i trate.70 In response to this last overture, 
Wickes threatened to move the Pullman factory to New Jersey.
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On July 13, Chicago Mayor John P. Hopkins personally 
delivered a communication from Eugene Debs and other ARU 
officials to Everett St. John, President of the Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific and Chairman of the GMA, who 
informed Mayor Hopkins that the Association did not wish to 
receive communication from the union, but that out of 
respect for the Mayor, he would deliver the message 
personally to members of that body. The next morning Hopkins 
received a note from John Egan, of the GMA, stating that the 
managers had "expressed themselves in the most positive 
terms that they will receive no communi cat i on whatever from
found the ARU note offensive, Egan ar.Ex.jered that any party 
that attacked railway companies, and found itself “whipped", 
as did the ARU, displayed "considerable cheek to dictate the 
terms of their surrender." Egan explained that the General 
Managers rebuffed the ARU offer because their employment of 
stri kebreakers had beaten the union and settled the 
strike.72 Egan admitted that the GMA's objective of 
breaking the strike required that it refuse arbitration:
Commissioner Wright. Was there no time you cared 
to negotiate?
Ans. Mo, I don't think so.
Commissioner Wright. Was it or not the policy of 
the managers' association at all times 
during the pendency of this difficulty 
to crush the strike as a matter o f
poli Cy?
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Ans. They considered it necessary to crush the 
strike; yes, sir.
During the strike, employers determined the status 
of striking workers, and after the strike, they refused or 
accepted workers' reemployment. The Pullman Company did not 
recognize the right of strikers to remain employees while on 
strike. Wickes regarded the men on the workers' committees 
who visited him after May 11 as "former employees." When the 
shops reopened, the Company signed up former workmen only 
when they handed over their ARU cards.73 Most of the 
railroads oursued an equal 1v firm oolicy. The General 
Manaqer5 Association announced puoliclv on June 50 that it 
considered strikers "as employes [sic] who have resigned 
their positions and who are not anxious for work."74 
Illinois Central Superintendant Albert Sullivan reported 
that he endeavored by "every effort" to induce workers to 
"see the errors of their ways" and return to work "before 
the opportunity for obtaining reemployment was lost to 
them."75 He gave an ultimatum to the 3,599 Illinois Central 
workers to return to work or lose their jobs, and he set a 
deadline. Although railroads maintained that strikers could 
be reemploved without giving up the ARU, most striking 
workers quit the Union before being rehired. An Illinois 
Central worker stated that the blacklist against ARU leaders 
was so effective that they did not attempt reinstatement,76 
Debs and other ARU officials perceived that crushing
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the ARU was the object of the federal government as well.77 
Debs charged that Attorney General Qlney planned to use 
Sherman Antitrust legislation to break up every labor unic 
in the country.78 The strike raised the question of the 
creation of a private army of deputized U.S. marshals under 
employer control whose members acted at once as police and 
as railroad employees, exercising federal authority for 
private ends. Although Attorney General Qlney ordered 
General Nelson Miles, commander of the U.S. troops, to 
Chicago to protect the mail and keep order, both the Regular 
Army and the deputy marshals cleared tracks and ran trains. 
Upon his ari'ival in Chicago,, General Miles reported directly
with the rail owner s. The following clay, newspapers quoted 
him as saying that he had broken the back of the strike.79
The important issue of railroad employers’ attitudes 
toward labor organizations and activities arose during the 
strike. In general, the owners did not believe in labor’s 
right to organize to protect its interests. They 
acknowledged union presence only when it served their 
interests, tolerating the railroad brotherhoods but moving 
to crush an industry-wide union. Although Debs maintained 
that the ARU did not seek railroad owners’ recognition and 
insisted that union recognition had no part in the 
controversy, the GMA questioned the ARU’s very existence.30 
Both Pullman and the GMA refused to recognize or communicate
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with the ARU. The Pullman Company, explained Wickes, "would 
not treat with our men as members of the American Railway 
Union, and we would not treat with them as members of any 
union. We treat with them as individuals and as men."81 
John Egan publicly rebuked Mayor Hopkins for acting as the 
ARU's "messenger boy."
A Pullman employee testified before the Strike
Commission that Company policy forbade unions to trespass on
company property, and that workers had to go outside the
company grounds to organize. Even though there was no open
order against unions, the worker explained,
when a men goes to the company for a job
they ask him, "Are you a member of the American
Raiiwav Union?" "Yes sir." "Have you got a 
card?" "Yes, sir." "Give us that card." The card 
is handed to them and then the applicant signs a 
paper that he will have nothing to do with the 
CARU]... for five years if he wants a place in 
the Pullman shops.82
After the boycott ended, the company rehired workers
only on the condition that they surrender their ARU
membership card. "We never discriminated against any labor
union," Pullman said, "except the American Railway Union."83
A Strike Commissioner questioned Vice President Wickes
concerning the rights of organized labor;
Q. Don't you think that the fact that you
represent a vast concentration of 
capital...entitles [the worker! if he 
pleases to unite with all of the men 
of his craft and select the ablest 
one...to represent the cause?
Ans. As a union?
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Commissioner. As a union.
Ans. They have the right, yes sir. We have the 
right to say whether we will receive 
them or not.
Commissioner. Do you think you have any right to
refuse to recognize that right in 
treating with the men?
Ans. Yes, sir; if we chose to.
Commissioner. If you chose to. Is it your policy 
to do that?
Ans. Yes, sir.
Asked if he thought the preponderance of capital’s power
over labor '-las subject to abuse, Wickes answered "it is a 
marr's privilege to go to work somewhere else. "34
Exp 1 ai n i ng to the Strike Commission the SNA’s 
refusal to accept the ARU’s note carried by Mayor Hopkins, 
Everett St. John stated that "in our j udgment, there was no 
room for an organization of that kind."85 The Commissioner 
questioned St John further on the refusal:
0. Was it based on a determination not to 
recognize any union of all railway 
employees?
Ans. It might have been upon a determination 
not to recognize this one of all 
others.
Q„ Did [the GMA believe] that an association 
of all railway employees would not 
be recognized?
A. I think the general feeling was that the
parties who had been instrumental ... in 
destroying our property, decreasing 
our earnings, not permitting us to 
operate our trains, setting fire to
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our buildings, were not worthy of very 
much consideration at that time, when 
it was plainly evident to all that 
their power was limited.86
When asked pointedly by the Strike Commission, "Do 
you believe in the principle of organized labor in 
general ?", John Egan of the GMA gave a curiously vague 
answer: "There is no doubt but what organized labor at times 
has done good to some classes of labor, but in many cases 
they have paid dearly for it." A labor union, however, does 
not help workers "to any great extent," except providing 
well paid jobs for grievance committee .members.87 While 
denying the legitimacy of labor comb i natione, Everett 3t. 
John held that it was "perfectly natural" and "perfectly 
right" for railroads to organize, "where an assault is upon 
all, for all to protect themselves...."88
To Pullman and the railroad managers, the 
"unjustifiable and unwarranted" boycott amounted to a labor 
conspiracy against the railroad companies.89 In the owners' 
view, the ARU itself constituted a national combination 
against the railroads. "It is my belief," charged George 
Pullman in a statement released to the press July 14, "that 
the controversy excited, at Pullman was merely a move in the 
greater scheme...for a simultaneous and causeless attack 
upon the railways of the country."90 Railroad managers such 
as Albert Sullivan of the Illinois Central pointed out the 
"utterly helpless conditi on... of the railroad to protect
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itself" against the irresponsibility and arbitrariness of 
the conspiracy to stop traffic. A more vehement indictment 
of the ARU's conspiratorial actions came from Harry P. 
Robinson, editor of Railway Age , the major trade 
publication in the rail industry. In August, 1984, he 
analyzed "modern labor doctrine" in the North American 
Review . The editor accused the laboring population of 
conspiring to cause a "general industrial rebellion," 
through which organized labor sought t_, control the entire 
U.S. government.91 The ARU, he charged, constiuted the 
first attempt to organize enough of the great mass of 
unskillec, previously Linorqanized railroad labor into a 
national power. The ARU planned to join with parallel 
organizec movements in other industries in "one grand army" 
whose object was to mount an armed insurrection of "the wage 
earning class against constituted society." To the editor, 
this rebellion naturally began with the ARU’s strike at the 
most vital part of society, the nation's commercial 
arteries. He cited as further evidence of the conspiracy the 
AF of L's threat to call out all organized labor in support 
of the ARU.92 Robinson ended the article with the warning 
that labor disturbances in previous years were but "sporadic 
outbreaks," but the strike of 1984 represented
a deep-seated malady, a cancerous 
growth, which has been deliberately planted in 
the social system of the country, and has been 
fostered there till it struck roots, which will 
not be torn out without the rending of tissue 
and the spilling of blood. Its ex i stence is a
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menace to the nation.93
Charges that the ARU threatened the very ex i stence
of U.S. society were echoed in the same North American
Review issue by General Nelson Miles and by Wade Hampton,
United States Commissioner of Railroads.94 Both men
defended Pullman’s actions, characterized labor as
anarchistic and revolutionary, condemned it for usurping
power, and characterized the situation as a national crisis.
Both Miles and Hampton enjoined patriotic citizens to hope
for the establishment of the supremacy of law but to fear
the consequences of a general conflict between capital and
labor. When this war conflict began. Miles warned,
i'lsn must take sides either for anarchy, 
secret conclaves, unwritten lai'j, mob violence, 
and universal chaos under the red or white flag 
of socialism on the one hand? or on the side of 
established government, the supremacy of law, 
the maintenance of good order, universal peace, 
absolute security of life and property, the 
rights of personal liberty, all under the shadow 
and folds of 01d Glory on the other.95
During the strike, Pullman and the General Managers 
publicly expressed opinions on the general nature of members 
of the working class. Workers were easily influenced, 
emotional, irresponsible and generally immoral, especially 
when they repudiated what Albert Sullivan, General Manager 
of the Illinois Central termed the "moral obligation of the 
contract."96 Owners distinguished the workers that Pullman 
called the "best men [who] don’t give us any trouble with 
unions or anything else" from the "inferior men... the least
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competent, that give us the trouble as a general thing." 
Pullman nevertheless added that if the best men "allow 
themselves to be led by incompetent men, that is their 
misfortune."97 Pullman believed that workers had rights as 
individuals, mainly the right to quit if dissatisfied. When 
they conspired in groups, workers forfeited their rights, 
lost their individuality to the control of leaders, and 
became lawbreakers.
S.C. Wade, a Rock Island Railroad attorney who 
became a captain of the U.S. marshals during the strike, 
blamed working class disorder on the influence of liquor. He 
tasti-i-ied to tna Commission that ha observed "persons who 
ware pointed out to ma as dangerous strikers" frequenting 
"low-class" saloons during she strike. He kept lists of 
persons entering these establishments, for he believed that 
saloons served as strikers’ headquarters. Had city officials 
taken the precaution to close them, Wade argued, the city 
would have escaped destruction of property during the 
strike.98
Pullman’s official doctor for the previous ten 
years, John McLean, characterized Pullman City as a "regular 
Utopia for workers," but blamed "profligate habits" and 
"extensive intemperance" on high wages paid in 1893. He had 
known workers who earned as much as $150 a month. Many of 
these engaged in "constant drinking," which the doctor held 
to be the indirect cause of "all labor troubles." High wages
1 1 6
discouraged personal discipline and made economizing 
di-f-ficult in hard times. McLean grumbled that workers paid 
saloon keepers before they paid doctor bills. Along with 
alcohol, the abrupt change from prosperity to depression, 
"prepared the minds" of the highly paid workers "for the 
destructive influences of the labor agitators."99 Workers 
earning small wages, however, displayed more temperate and 
frugal habits.
Owners blamed the strike on what they termed labor 
agitators. Both Pullman and spokesmen for the General 
Managers charged the "leaders of disorder" with transforming 
a minor dispute into a major con-f rontati on. Pullman claimed 
that his model town had produced workers of nigh calibre who 
were immune to union organizers.100 He felt certain that in 
meeting with the original workers’ committee and agreeing to 
consider their grievances, he had defused the wage-rent 
dispute at his shops. At that point, the intrusion of 
outside union officials interfered with his employees’ 
ordinary perceptions and understandings. Had the union not 
interfered, Pullman believed, he would have succeeded in 
convincing his workers that "their interests lay In the 
direction of working with me," despite reduction of shop 
wages. Yet in the excitement of the ARU meeting the night of 
the committeemen’s firing, workers lost their heads and 
allowed themselves to be influenced by "persons almost 
unknown to them." The ARU, in Pullman’s view, took unfair
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advantage of workers laid off by the depression, for "if our 
men had been left free from outside influences there would 
have been no trouble."101 John Egan of the GMA also blamed 
the strike on "labor agitators." The very nature of their 
jobs, he explained, requires them constantly to agitate for 
increased wages and to cause employers trouble.102
Owners and their spokesmen characterized labor 
leaders as "dirty" and "vermin-ridden." In answering ARU 
Vice President George Howard's accusation that the General 
Managers hired men to burn rail cars, John Egan replied that 
"considering the source," the charge was "the vilest rot." 
Egan considered it on the level of other statements Debs a n d  
Hcward made "to bolster the spirits of the poor -fellows who 
llsicj they had so successful 1 y duped. "103 Pullman and the 
General Managers agreed with Railroad Commissioner Hampton 
that "no condemnation can be too emphatic, no punishment too 
severe" for the unscrupulous labor leaders who duped the 
rank and file.104
In searching for a long term solution to the problem 
of arbitrary strikes, Albert Sullivan of the Illinois 
Central called for restrictions to prevent the formation of 
other unions capable of causing similar damage. He had no 
objection to unions, finding it easy to deal with 
representatives of the Brotherhoods, but he thought there 
must be "checks on the wrongful use of [union! power."105 
Devastating strikes such as the present one could happen all
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over again, he charged, if the easily aroused labor force 
continued to be led by
organization men who can bring about 
such an emotional wave that will carry with it 
the same degree of ardur and eliminate entirely 
all the elements of conservatism, all the 
obligations of agreement of contract, all the 
moral obligations that exist between an employee 
and employer, simply because the organizations 
themselves have no responsibility.106
Sullivan’s solution to union abuse of power required
unions to assume legal responsibility for their acts to
ensure that they were led only by men of "intelligence and
conservatism."107 In keeping with other employer ideology of
its age, the GMA emphasized the need to force labor unions 
into a more easily control1able, corporate existence. In 
making their case for union incorporation, the general 
iTianagers cited court i nter pr etati ons of unions as illegal 
combinations in restraint of trade. Incorporation would 
compel unions to forego strikes and behave responsibly, to 
honor their contracts, and most importantly, to be sued in 
court. Pullman’s solution to union disruptions was simply 
one of education: those who wish to be employed must realize 
the "rule of business," namely that "cost of a piece of work 
must not exceed its selling price."108
Throughout the struggle, Pullman and the GMA used 
the press as a forum in an attempt to convince the public of 
the rightness of their actions and viewpoints. Pullman 
insisted that the Company can "do no more than explain its 
situation to the public."109 The Managers issued public
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statements which cited the importance of public 
understanding of the railroads-' position. 110 In the early 
period of the strike, the Chicago press and public reacted 
favorably to the plight of the Pullman strikers. But with 
the initiation of the boycott, rail stoppages, and 
especially after the intervention of the army, violence 
increased and press and public opinion swung to the side 
advocating law and order. In the opinion of many people, the 
ARU meddled in the Pullman Company’s internal affairs and 
unfairly attacked the innocent rai1 roads.Ill By July, a 
contemporarv historian, W.F. Burns reported that "everv 
nei-ispaper in Chicago accapt the Timaa stood by the 
rai 1 roads. " Ha further chargad that “'whole columns 
of ...faisehoods were pubished and circulated broadcast 
through the 1 and.“112 In July, for example, false reports 
of the strike being called off greatly interfered with its 
conduct. Personal attacks against Debs came from employers 
who attempted make an example of him.113 Burns observed 
that the "slanders” directed against Debs "simply baffled 
recountal because of their numbers." As an observer of 
Chicago opinion. Burns described press treatment of Debs:
He has been called crazy, drunken, 
revolutionary, criminal, incompetent. Newspapers 
have at once declared his conduct of the strike 
impotent and denounced him for having made it so 
effective. Labor has been entreated to throw him 
over as a puerile leader and capital has been 
warned that he is a dangerous man because of his 
surpassing abi1ity.114
The subsidized press," Burns concluded, was "the most
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dangerous enemy of labor and, next to the courts the most 
effective weapon in the hands of the railroad corporations 
in destroying the rights of labor and defeating the 
stri kers."115
In his testimony before the Strike Commission, Debs 
recognised the ideological nature of the struggle and 
acknowledged public acceptance of the owners’ point of view. 
In a press statement on July 6, he cited the "many 
misleading reports that have been given currency" in the 
press and charged that the ARU had been "deliberately and 
mali ci ously misrepresented."116 He cited the erroneous but 
widely accepted charge that labor leaders and union 
aqitators had induced Pullman's workers to strike. "The 
charge is wholly untrue," Debs said. He further asserted 
that General Miles circulated the false story that ninety 
percent of Chicago’s citizens sympathized with the Pullman 
Company and the rai1 roads.116 "The railway managers took 
advantage of this report," Debs continued, "and spread and 
distorted it in order to discourage the stri kers."118 
As Pullman and the General Managers defended 
protection of railroad property and justified their actions 
during the strike, they played upon public indignation and 
fear. In his press statement of June 26, Pullman deplored 
"annoyance to the public by the threats of irresponsible 
organizati ons" bent on causing discomfort to rail
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travelers.119 Rail owners pointed out that whatever 
stoppages inconvenienced the railroads also inconvenienced 
the public and whatever violence threatened the railroads’ 
control or destroyed property, rail owners argued, in turn 
endangered the public interest. Owners pictured themselves 
as helpless in the face of union power and the strike 
situation as totally out of their hands. The GMA charged 
that the object of the boycott was to "embarrass the 
railroads" in the public eye by inconveniencing the 
traveling public.120 The Association indignantly denied 
charges that it fomented violence to justify the owners' 
private usa of force.
As a model town for the future, Pullman city's 
"model" aspects and control policies did not long survive 
Pullman, who died in 1897. Technological changes in industry 
after 1900 coupled with demographic changes in the Chicago 
boom area caused the town to lose its former community 
identity. Housing deteriorated and many homes and buildings 
stood vacant or were occupied by Pullman's new unskilled 
workforce from southern and eastern Europe. By 1915, the 
town contained fifteen saloons; by 1918, one third of the 
Arcade was unrented. The Pullman Company, although 
continuing to resist unions in its plant, experienced 
increasing unionisation and a succession of strikes after 
1902, culminating in a major union busting lockout in 1904. 
Thereafter it rehired only those who would "act toward the
12:
company as individuals."121 Although Pullman town was 
■famous as an experiment in corporate social engineering, few 
U.S. industries followed Pullman’s example of creating 
company planned and owned residential areas.
As a demonstration of employer power, an exercise in 
employer strikebreaking tactics, and a message to railroad 
workers who would organize and pit a national industrial 
union against the combined power of railroad capital, the 
strike and boycott constituted a victory. The GMA attained 
its goal of outlasting the strikers, crushing the ARU and 
discrediting both the leadership and methods of strikers.
ARU membership declined drastically, and the union 
disappeared after 1900. i'lo national industry-wide rail 
workers’ union took its place. Nor did labor organize on a 
large, industry-wide scale until the formation of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizati ons in 1935. Debs himself 
abandoned labor organization in favor of direct political 
action as a method of dealing with the capitalist system.
The demise of the ARU forced railroad workers into the AF of 
L ’s craft union structure and more conservative leadership 
which favored arbitration. Samuel Gompers all along objected 
to tne militancy of the ARU and refused to call a 
sympathetic strike in its support.
In 1894, the bituminous coal strike and the Pullman 
boycott constituted broadly based, national sympathetic 
strikes in which striking unions gained support from other
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unions with no direct stake in the outcome of the strike.
The loss of the Pullman boycott demonstrated that the 
strongest union could not prevail against a stronger 
combination of organized capital backed by federal judicial 
and military force. The defeat brought into question the 
efficacy of sympathetic strikes. Under the leadership of the 
AF of L, unions increasingly preferred to honor contracts 
with employers rather than express solidarity with fellow 
workers. After strong activity in the early 1890s, 
sympathetic strikes declined in number.122 From then on, 
they were more limited in scope, and rarely had union 
sanction.123 Sympathetic strikes represented a 
consolidation of working class opinion and ccntributed to 
class consciousness. The defeat in practice of a national 
sympathetic strike meant also its defeat in principle, and a 
corresponding solidification of the owners' point of view.
The demise of the sympathetic strike was a victory for 
capital.
The violence and disruption associated with the 
strike fueled several growing national movements. Newspapers 
reported that many readers believed the railroads' and 
Pullman's refusal to arbitrate exacerbated the crisis. The 
move toward state and national legislation requiring 
arbitration and mediation grew with platforms of both 
political parties endorsing arbitration in 1896. Federal 
legislation requiring railroad mediation passed in 1898. But
124
this did not guarantee to organized labor tne right to 
recognition. Much of the business community expressed 
outrage when in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt forced 
coal company owners to arbitrate with the union on strike.
The strike was an excercise in tactics pitting labor 
weapons of collective action in the strike, picket and 
boycott against employer power in their own plants, and in 
the media, the courts and government. The efficient use of 
employer stri kebreaki ng tactics called into question labor's 
notions of its right to organize and strike, its demands for 
arbitration, its need to have free communication during the 
strike, its right to union recognition as a bargaining 
agent, and the right to be considered employees while on 
strike. In addition to the GMA's refusal to communicate with 
the ARU, the federal injunction effected an information 
blackout and communi cati on crisis between leaders at strike 
headquarters and the ARU locals. Owners involved in the 
strike created a public opinion adverse to the striking 
workers, charging them publicly with a range of unpatriotic, 
immoral and heinous acts. The strike demonstrated to labor 
the quickness with which the federal government was willing 
to use military power against labor disturbances, and showed 
the utility of court injunctions as strikebreaking tools. 
These set precedents of intervention and use of injunction 
that Governor John P. Altgeld and others were to term 
"government by injunction."
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A question of ideology becomes a question of 
consciousness. It is difficult, however, to assess the 
impact of the events of 1894 on rank and file union members. 
Various railroad employees testified to the Strike 
Commission. Some, like George Lovejoy, a Chicago, Rock 
Island and Pacific yardmaster, maintained that strikers 
learned the importance of organization when they found 
themselved confronted with the united press, clergy, 
judiciary and office holders of the nation.124 Others, like 
Charles Naylor, fireman on the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and 
Chicago, testified that when workers see government support 
thrown in with the corporati ons in any emergency, "they 
begin to lose con-f i dence. " 125 ARU leaders expressed their 
reactions clearly. Debs surmised, that "when all the 
organized orders of society are against a strike," there is 
nothing which can defend labor in times of trouble. Against 
labor's powerlessness,
the corporations are in perfect 
alliance; they have all of the things money can 
command, and that means a subsidized press, that 
they are able to control the newspapers, and 
means a false or vitiated public opinion. The 
clergy almost steadily united in thundering 
their denunciations, then the courts, then the 
State militia, then the Federal troops; 
everything and all things on the side of 
corporations.126
The courts defeated the strike. Debs continued, by 
destroying the ARU leadership network. The "moneyed power is 
potential enough to control all this machinery," he charged. 
Asked by a Commissioner, "Do you believe there is no
126
solution of any of these troubles under the present 
industrial system," Debs answered, "No sir; that is my 
candid conviction."127
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CHAPTER V
LABOR IDEOLOGY
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
"We stand not for capital against labor, 
but for order against chaos."
James W. Van Cleave,
Presi dent 
National Association 
of Manufacturersl
National employers’ organisations first appeared in 
1886 as trade associations formed to promote common
interests in labor matters to the end of guaranteeing 
production at the mini mum cost per unit of labor. The 
organization of employers, their annual meetings, the 
publication of trade journals, the discussion of labor 
matters together represented the first concerted attempts of 
employers to assess and codify their thinking on the 
relationship of capital and labor. Through the negotiation 
of trade agreements with unions, trade associations 
attempted to counter or reduce the power of organized labor. 
The first trade agreement was negotiated in 1891 and 
contract activity reached a peak in the years 1898-1902.
Soon afterward, however, many of the early negotiatory and 
bargaining employers’ associations developed a militant, 
anti-union stance as their exper i ences led them to blame the 
unions for subverting the trade agreements. As attitudes 
hardened after 1900, many of the nation’s largest trade
134
associations eliminated the closed shop or entirely 
abolished unions within their trades.2
Qcganizatign and Policy 
The example of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the NAM, is central to the study of 
employers' labor ideology because it best represents the 
large scale, non-trade organizations that joined the general 
assault on unions after 1900 and developed into combative 
associations with the express purpose of fighting unions on 
the level of legislation, litigation, propaganda and public 
opinion. In pursuing its major activities, the NAM 
functioned as the nation's most important and prominent 
iTioutlipi ece for organized capital, generating a 
pro-capitalist ideology and various national platforms for 
its propagation, and in doing so, furnishing a significant 
body of ideas to the dominant ideological universe in U.S. 
society in this period.3
Begun in 1895, the NAM comprised manufacturers 
largely from the industrial states of the northeast and 
north central regions. Its wide influence in business 
circles coupled with an ideology resting on extremely bitter 
opposition to unionism and avowed dedication to "impress the 
working masses and entire body politic with the merits 
embodied in its principles" combined to render the NAM a 
formidable propaganda force. Association influence, strength
1 3 5
and financial power rested upon the nation’s industrial 
structure. Its membership represented the influence and 
power of manufacturing concerns representing over 22 billion 
dollars of invested capital, one million stockholders, six: 
million employees and 75 to 80 percent of the total 
manufacturing output of the U.S. In 1909, an Association 
official deemed the NAM "the most powerful body of 
businessmen ever organized in any land, or in any age."4
According to the 1896 Constitution, the 
Association’s purpose was the "promotion of the industrial 
interests of the United States, the fostering of the 
domestic commerce of the United States, the betterment of 
the relations between employer and employee, the education 
of the public in the principles of individual liberty and 
the ownership of property, the support of legislation in 
furtherance of those principles and opposition to 
legislation in derogation thereof."5 From its birth until 
1903, the Association expressed no definite labor policy, 
devoting the greater part of its energy to reforming the 
tariff and promoting international trade.
In 1903, however, the NAM abandoned its "former 
conservative policy respecting labor," and adopted a self 
proclaimed "belligerent" offensive toward "class 
legislation" and ideas promoted by organized labor.6 
Alluding to the new and more hostile anti-unionism in 
industry, as the large manufacturers moved to terminate
136
trade agreements and destroy affiliated unions, Association 
leaders declared that "conciliation is a myth" and 
"arbitration a failure."? In addition to following the 
leadership of the nation's largest trade associations, the 
NAM identified a second reason for the abrupt change in the 
focus of its activity: the rapid increase in membership of 
its "chief opponent," the American Federation of Labor, 
which between 1899 and 1904 had grown from less than 360,000 
to over 1 1/2 million. The Federation accompanied such 
membership gains with increased activity supporting a 
legislative slate of labor benefits, promoting closed shop 
unionism, and by increased strikes, often to force union 
recognition. Alarmed by this activity, owners of large 
manuf acturi ng firms flocked to the NAM, increasing its 
membership correspondingly in the five years after 1903 from 
938 to almost 5,000.8
The new hostility toward labor reflected class fears 
on the part of manufacturers that capital was undefended 
against the increasing level of organization by those who 
would revolutionize the social order.9 Speeches of 
Association leaders at the 1903 and 1904 annual conventions 
outlined the problem: organized labor, and its solution: 
organized capital. "Labor," said a prominent manufaccurer, 
"was already united, labor was moving as one man; labor in 
splendid phalanx like precision was moving like an army..." 
to achieve its purpose. By contrast, capital was
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disorganized with no coherent force or definite, united 
policy to "interpose against the aggressions that might be 
made upon its interests." The speaker resolved that "the 
time had come when to be disorganized was to be demoralized, 
and to be demoralized was to be damned. 1 0
President David M. Parry’s annual addresses in 1903 
and 1904 rallied his fellow members to mount a concerted 
attack upon labor. These two convention speeches served as 
the points of departure for the subsequent anti-labor 
campaign of the NAM and were often cited in later years by 
Association officials as the first, most vehement, most 
-rrecessar-y atrrd apiürujçrrdraire crarHrs fzjr cap i tal to or g a m  z e and
coll activ = ly resist labor power. President Parry set the 
stage for the concerted struggle. "Heretofore organized 
labor has had only the individual employer to combat," he 
maintained, "but its growing power now demands a 
counter-organization strong enough to resist its 
encroachments."11 Too long has "lawless and socialistic 
unionism" preoccupied manufacturers and employers generally, 
so the Association must focus its first attention on this, 
the "paramount question."12 "We have been intimidated by a 
handful of anarchists and so-called labor leaders, and it is 
now time...to settle this issue once and for all."13 In a 
castigating critique of organized labor. Parry referred to 
labor’s introduction in Congress of bills supporting eight 
hour days on federal jobs and opposing injunctions, and to
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the -favorable reception of such bills by the press and the 
public, as "ominous manifestations of the deep seated power 
of an organisation which in late years has had such an 
insidious growth that we find it dominating to a dangerous 
degree the whole social, political and governmental systems 
of the nation."14
With this call to arms, the NAM embarked on an 
ideological onslaught against labor, "an open and square 
fight to the finish with the unions". 15 Because "public 
opinion is the guiding force in this nation today," and 
because “organised labor owed its present power mainly to 
the support of public opinion," it was on this front, -the 
arena of ideas, that organised business interests must 
struggle. Designating the NAM the "most efficient 
mouthpiece of capital," President Parry identified its chief 
work as "an educational one - the moulding of public 
opinion" to the point where labor's efforts "will be bound 
down in their infancy, so that they will not come to so 
dangerous a head."16 Through the press and the platform, the 
Association must "educate the mass of the people to right 
thinking and doing in all matters industrial and social, and 
it must "arouse the great middle class to a realiztion of 
what trade unionism really means."17 And organizaton was a 
recognized element in the struggle: "We know from experience
in industry and politics," said an Association official,
"that an organized eight or ten percent of a community can
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sway a whole commuity."18
But more important than 'the people' was the 
consciousness of the individual worker. On this most crucial 
level, the Association sought to counter the teachings of 
labor leaders with what they deemed a simple and sane 
treatment of economic questions. Clearly, the new emphasis 
focused on organization, creation of an anti-labor ideology 
and its aggressive promotion in society at large and among 
labor groups.
Association leaders recognized that modern society 
offered new opportunities for the use of ideology as social
control ;
While the industrial era has brought new 
problems of social government, it has also 
fortunately supplied the means for their 
solution. There has been a remarkable 
development on educational lines and the 
dissemination of knowledge is one of the wonders 
of the age. The minds of men are being 
constantly broadened, and in this fact lies the 
hope for the correct solution of industrial 
questions and the application of proper remedies 
to evils that threaten progress.
In 1904, the Association revised its constitution, 
codifying its new objectives with respect to labor in a 
Declaration of Principles;
The maintenance of individualism. The 
social and material welfare of all classes of 
people is dependent upon the full exercise of 
individual freedom consistent with the equal 
rights of all and upon the perpetuation of the 
principle of personal ownership which furnished 
the necessary incentive to individual effort and 
best promotes the conservation of capital, the 
great assistant of labor.
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The Associ ati on...is opposed to 
boycotts, blacklists, and all interference with 
the constitutional rights of employer and 
employee. It is opposed to restriction of 
individual output, to limitation of the number 
of apprentices, and to all means and policies 
that tend to reduce the efficiency of the 
individual and productive capacity of the 
nati o n .
Employees have the right to contract for 
their services in a collective capacity, but any 
contract that contains a stipulation that 
employment should be denied to men not parties 
to the contract is an invasion of the 
constitutional rights of the American workman, 
is against public policy, and is in violation of 
the conspiracy laws. This Association declares 
its unalterable antagonism to the closed shop 
and insists that the doors of no industry be 
closed against American workmen because of their 
membership or non-membership in any labor 
organ 1z at ion.19
II jl and Methods
From its immense power base in industry, the 
Association promoted its principles through various 
institutions: public schools and universities, churches, the 
press, and state and national government agencies. It 
maintained an extensive network of communication with these 
institutions with a wide circulation of its official organ, 
BdgCiGëD lodustries , among manufacturers, statesmen and 
educators, by means of government lobbies, and through the 
dissemination of official reports, literature and public 
speakers. In addition, the Association utilized direct 
channels of communication to industrial and commercial 
Interests through trade and non-trade employers’ 
associations, bankers’ associ ati ons, chambers of commerce,
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citizens industrial associations, farmers 
organizations, the National Conservation Congress and the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science. The same 
year. President Kirby delivered speeches in ten major cities 
where local newspapers printed his address in full. Kirby 
claimed that together he and other Association leaders had 
in one year's time addressed 250,000 persons, reached 
another 750,000 through Association publications and 
ultimately contacted fifteen million if one counted press 
notices and newspaper articles. "Never before in the history 
of the Association," said Kirby summing up the 1910 
propaganda effort, "has Lits] work been more fully presented 
or its influence more widelv extended." The use of such 
methods, he claimed, "spread the gospel of industrial truth 
in a way that leaves no room for complaint."21
Focusing on the schools, the Association furnished 
copies of its Principles, year books, American Industries , 
and material from its Educational Literature series to 
public and leading college libraries throughout the nation.
In addition, it provided speakers to educational 
institutions which, in its view, treated the principles of 
individual liberty, private property, and methods of 
industrial peace in a manner in keeping with the philosophy 
of the manufacturers. Recognizing the current importance and 
popularity of debate in the educational process, the 
Association generated and then capitalized upon the "great
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public interest" in the open shop debate, providing 
materials to college and university teams defending the open 
shop position.22 In 1904, President Parry reported that he 
had yet to learn of the loss of a single debate for the 
Association position. Through the remainder of the decade, 
the Association continued to receive numerous requests for 
material from debating teams, always making "prompt and 
liberal" deliveries of printed information. In one month, 
the Association sent 42 sets of debating materials to 
educational institutions in Nebraska alone.
In the period 1900-1910, the founding and promotion 
of industrial trade schools illuminated a 1abor-capital 
dispute centering around two questions: Who was to control 
the supply of labor and to what end? And, who was to control 
the ideology imposed upon workmen new to the workplace? The 
AF of L addressed the trade school issue on precisely the 
same grounds. Its member unions, where they had the power 
to do so, enforced an apprentice system which governed both 
the number and on-the-job training of apprentices. To lose 
such control to employer dominated institutions meant that 
unions would face a deluge of skilled labor in numbers 
sufficient to glut the market, lower wages, and ultimately 
to destroy unions. To the Federation, the trade school issue 
addressed the heart of the question of labor supply and wage 
levels, representing a struggle between those who would 
cheapen labor by increasing its numbers, and those who would
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create what the NAM termed an "artificial scarcity." More 
importantly, the Federation recognized the crucial necessity 
of controlling ideology at the very point when young 
apprentice workmen entered the workplace itself. The AF of L 
knew that trade school education would effectively eliminate 
labor control of job-acquired ideology and force upon 
apprentices a pro-employer sentiment making them willingly 
serve as strike breakers. To such "scab hatcheries" said 
U.S. Labor Commissioner Carroll Wright "labor unions declare 
themselves totally and unalterably opposed."23
To the NAM, employer operated trade schools provided 
a favorable solution to both the ideological and supply 
problems of worker control, and thus constituted vital 
element in its general assault on worker consciousness. in 
1905 the NAM began a propaganda assault challenging 
organized labor's limitation of apprentices and its 
governance of their ideological training. It exhorted its 
members to found employer controlled trade schools for the 
"economic necessity" of guaranteeing cheap labor, and the 
ideological necessity of righting a "great wrong committed 
by labor against its own class", that of biasing it against 
its "true benefactors" and denying the individual freedom to 
work.24
The NAM insisted that the interests of manufacturers 
required a "new education" for workers, one which would not 
only guarantee secure, skilled, intelligent, willing labor.
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but labor that was "properly protected from the domination 
and withering blight of organized labor, and thus loyal to 
the interests which [employers] represent." Thus, trade 
schools were made necessary by "the un-American and 
arbitrary methods of labor unions."25 The apprentice is the 
creature of the union," said Association President Van 
Cleave, "and not of the employer. He must observe union 
rules and walk out when the union strikes. As a consequence, 
the apprentice is not as loyal and serviceable to his 
employer as he would of necessity be had he no relation to 
the union."26
Clearly, the Association recognized a vital element 
in the ideologicai struggle, the i nterrelati on shi p between 
workers' loyalty and "serviceability" and "right education." 
It also understood that the removal of apprenticeships from 
union control would eliminate the main source of pro-labor 
input from the most crucial site of ideological input: the 
workplace. Through the formation of employer or state 
operated industrial trade schools, capital sought to prevent 
organized labor from obstructing the free employment of 
apprentices, increase the number of apprentices and thus the 
supply of skilled labor, insulate them from union ideology, 
and control and standardize the technical content of worker 
education.
Clearly, the Association recognized a vital element 
in the ideological struggle, the interrelationship between
14:
workers' loyalty and "serviceability" and "right education." 
It also understood that the removal of apprenticeships from 
union control effectively eliminated the main source of 
pro-labor input from the most crucial site of ideological 
input: the workplace. Through the formation of employer or 
state operated industrial trade schools, capital sought to 
prevent organized labor from obstructing the free employment 
of apprentices, increase the number of apprentices and thus 
the supply of skilled labor, insulate them from union 
ideology, and control and standardize the technical content 
of worker education.
The Association couched the whole question of union 
restriction of labor supply through controlled 
apprenticeships within the larger question of the free 
operation of the "natural law" of supply and demand and the 
moral law of freedom of the individual. Against labor's 
"great moral wrong" of "artificially" limiting the number of 
apprentices, the NAM pictured its efforts to open trade 
schools to all comers as guaranteeing to the individual 
freedom to work, to learn a trade, to develop himself, a 
"God given birthright, further vouchsafed to him by the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution...."27 This 
divine and legal right to learn a trade, said one 
Association official,
should be as free as air and sunlight, 
and all artificial and arbitrary hindrances or 
barriers from whatever source must sooner or 
later be removed. This is the law and the gospel
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as embodied and enunciated in the immutable and 
everlasting principle of the "Fatherhood of God 
and the universal brotherhood of man," - Samuel 
Gompers and his cohorts, and a few stray closed 
shop ministers of the Gospel, with closed shop 
union cards in their pockets, 
notwithstanding....28
Thus the power of the cult of economic individualism 
backed by the law of the land and the moral law of god was 
employed to legitimate capital’s demand for the right to 
learn a trade free from 'unnatural' limitation, and to 
condemn those who would interfere. Anyone robbing a worker 
of this right by restricting freedom of the individual "is a 
thief of the deepest dyes, no less heinous than he who seeks 
to door i vs him of light, s.ir, water, aye even life 
itself."29 The Associ ati o n’s insistence upon freedom of 
choice for workers and its desire to implement the 
missionary and educational potential of trade schools were 
based upon its own self interested economic reasons; the 
trade school was "essentially a business proposition of the 
first water."30 But its justification for this method of 
assuring plentiful labor rested upon the ideological plane 
of moral, legal and natural laws and rights.
The Association’s answer to the question of the 
control of labor supply was also bound up with its interest 
in controlling worker ideology. As it saw the relationship 
between job training and supply, so it recognised the 
inseparability of job training and ideology. The 
Association was convinced that "there will never be any
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permanent improvement in labor conditions" until those who 
would compose the future labor force "are trained in their 
youth...to receive correct ideas on their relations to 
capital and of capital to them."31 The Association 
recognized the inseparability of ideology and job training. 
Employer operated schools, capitalizing on the economic 
power of shop based training and education, implanted a 
"shop spirit" in workers that formed the basis of their 
behavior, creating an "industrial mental discipline" along 
with "practical knowledge and general culture" to guarantee 
a docile and servile workforce. Training in employer 
controlled schools was designed to "nip diseased ideas in 
the bud," and instill in labor the "spirit of the 
undertaking that renders possible its practical use and 
employment, coupled with respect for and obedience to the 
laws of our country, recognizing fully the rights of all 
men...."32 Thus educated with anti-labor and pro-capital 
teachings, labor began to understand who best served its 
interests and where its true loyalties lay.
After 1905, Association meetings devoted large 
blocks of time to affirming the ideological control provided 
by industrial schools, hearing reports from sponsoring 
manufacturers and administrators of existing schools.
Reports cited favorable gains made in "imprinting and 
impressing...upon the plastic minds and lives of these 
youth...that loyalty and honesty and integrity are greater
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even than a union label...."33 The schools instilled common 
sense, docility, and a willingness to work hard, along with 
"correct" ideas on the relative obligations between capital 
and labor. Employers of the NAM placed great store in the 
power of trade school implanted ideology as social control. 
Had such trade schools been founded throughout the country 
fifty years ago, remarked one administrator, “teaching men 
to work in harmony with employers and recognize that his 
interest is theirs, then the strikes and labor troubles 
which have so greatly vexed us since the War would have been 
largely averted...."34
In the period 1905-1910, employer sponsored trade 
schools began to produce labor that did in fact consider the 
interests of labor and capital identical, avoid the open 
shop and union organizers and serve as scab labor. To 
manufacturers, the term ’industrial education' came to 
signify easily controlled, non-union labor. By 1908, the 
Association president could claim that "new and immensely 
larger conquests for the 'open shop' are coming through the 
growth of industrial education." And to further guarantee 
plentiful and obedient labor, he advocated beginning such 
education not at age fourteen, as in most trade schools, but 
at seven, an even more opportune time to "impress upon the 
boy the things we want him to know.”35
The Association confined its efforts to generating 
interest in trade education, urging its members to give them
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generous financial assistance, but left the actual 
establishment of schools to manufacturers and the public. 
Given labor's “well known" objections, employers 
acknowledged that "it is too early at this stage of the game 
to expect that the mass of the people will accept without a 
murmer public trade schools supported by public taxation." 
"Nevertheless," said the Special Supervisor of Industrial 
Education in Boston, the se.ling of the idea is paramount, 
but once sold, it will encounter no further opposition? we 
want, and are going to have (trade) schools...."36 The NAM 
initiated a publicity campaign conducted by each of the 
member manufacturers in his own plant to convince workers 
that such schools served the interests of labor. The 
campaign sought first to “clear the horizon of discussion 
from the clouds of smoke which arise from the firing line of 
the pedagogue and the labor leader," and then "practically 
answer the statement... that trade schools are a benefit to 
the workingman." The workers "need but a few object lessons 
to find out that [trade] education simply relieves them of 
hardships and that it is in line with social and industrial 
advancement."37 And through trade schools, employers of the 
NAM rose to the challenge of providing those lessons.
In 1905, the Association formed a Committee on 
Industrial Education to stress the importance of industrial 
education to the American people. Serving as a clearing 
house for information, this committee linked other similar
150
employer movements throughout the country, encouraging 
public and private institutions to found trade schools. In 
1906, the Committee circulated propaganda material 
advocating the establishment of trade schools to the 
superintendent of public education in every city in the U.S. 
over 30,000. The fallowing year, it sponsored a national 
bill providing for taxpayer financing of national and state 
trade schools. By 1907, it reported that, instead of 
waiting for public schools, many manufacturers such as the 
National Metal Trades Association and the National Tile 
Association were "taking matters into their own hands and 
training their own labor," by establishing schools in their 
factori es.38 And national trade associations began to 
support existing private and public trade schools through 
generous gifts of equipment and money: the National Stove 
Founders' Association and the National Metal Trades 
Association financed the constructon of a fully equipped 
foundry at a trade school in Indianapolis; in Cincinnati, 
the populace appropriated, against local opposition,
$1,000,000 for the estabishment of a technical school; and 
in Pittsburgh, the Carnegie Technical School neared 
completion at a cost of $12,000,000. By 1909, the Committee 
reported four consistent years of "great progress" in the 
proliferation of trade schools.39
Education? Yes, but education that had its impetus 
in the same desires for social control that informed the
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Victorian middle class, especially its business elements 
beset by labor unrest. Thus, education was siezed upon to 
serve as a tool of indoctrination away from ideas that the 
employers of the NAM considered subversive of the best 
elements in society, toward ideas that would enhance an 
allegiance to that society and its precepts. They were 
sincere in their belief that trade schools would "in the 
end...be one of the greatest blessings socially, 
economically and industrially, that could ever come to the 
American people...."40
One hardly need recount the immense political power 
of the busi ness-domi nated Republican party or its role in 
shaping government economic policy in this period. Within 
that structure, the NAM functioned as an element, albeit a 
powerful one, in the exercise of business power. In 
promoting the interests of employers, the NAM considered the 
direct influence of legislation one of its chief functions, 
a more practical method of achieving its goals than the 
"often slow and less direct" process of influencing public 
opinion.41 Although Association officials acknowledged that, 
ideally law should reflect public will, they approached the 
question of controlling legislation knowing that the reverse 
was more often true. "Just as public opinion creates law," 
U.S. District Judge William H. Speer of New Jersey informed 
Association members, "so you will find law creates public 
opinion."42
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The Association’s extensive political activity 
included issuing endorsements and condemnations of 
individual legislators and legislation, conducting 
aggressive warfare against state and federal pro-labor bills 
in its official publications, and influencing party 
platforms. Most important, it maintained a lobby in 
Washington, D.C., to ensure the passage of laws favorable to 
its interests.
To maintain direct communication between the 
business community and events in the nation’s capital, the 
Association published a bimonthly newsletter, the 
Wgsbiogtgn Service Bulletin . This served to keep employers 
advised on pending legislation, cases in the federal courts, 
and activities of various administrative commissions and 
bureaus. It encouraged members to meet personally with 
public officials, and conducted telegram campaigns as 
crucial votes approached. In this manner, the Association 
mobilized the "collective judgement" of a large and 
influential block of businessmen on industrial questions, to 
guarantee the expression of their will in legislative 
policy.
The NAM first began active campaigns against labor 
bills in 1902, successfully opposing the national eight hour 
bill for workers employed in government work and various 
anti-injunction bills, all sponsored by the AF of L. The 
Association attacked the "vicious class legislation"
promoted by organized labor in Congress on the grounds that 
it would "make lawful for one class of citizens to do that 
which remains unlawful for - • other class to do." The
Association denounced the eight hour bill as "an act to 
repeal the bill of rights guaranteeing the freedom of the 
individual," and the anti-injunction bill as an attempt "to 
legalize strikes and boycotts."43 Because it challenged 
business power in one of its most sacred bastions, the 
courts, the anti-injunction battle clearly touched a nerve 
for the NAM. To remove the power of injunction from the 
courts, said President Kirby, is to remove the only 
protection employers have against the "lawless" methods of 
labor unions. Emphasi z i ng the importance of this "first 
contest," the Association brought to bear the great range of 
its power in "aggressively" opposing these bills, "not only 
because [they would bel extremely injurious to the 
industrial welfare, but also because a test of strength 
between individualism and socialism is being made on the 
proposed legislation."44 The Association directed a 
resolution to Congress opposing the eight hour bill as an 
unwarranted interference with business of manufacturers 
holding government contracts and generated a flood of 
telegrams from members, efforts which resulted in the defeat 
of the bill in Congress in 1902. Until its passage in 1912, 
the eight hour bill met similar active NAM opposition in 
every session of Congress.
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In 1907 the NAM created, underwrote and governed a 
subsidiary organization, the National Council for Industrial 
Defense which allied it with other commercial and industrial 
employers' associations to create permanent unification of 
employers’ associations, provide a heavily funded, 
Washington-based lobby for capital interests in "matters 
pertaining to class legislation."45 Represeting, in 1907,
130 national, state and local organizations, the Council 
sponsored a staff of attorneys fully equipped for the 
systematic work of scrutinizing legislation. During its 
first year of work, the NCID legal staff, aided by NAM 
attorneys, anelvzed 29,000 separate House and Senate bills 
identifying "dangerous measures that affect the labor 
relation." It used these analyses to enable Congressmen to 
understand labor’s attempt through legislation "to obtain 
special class privileges or to impair or destroy personal 
property rights." The Council’s chief attorney, James W. 
Emery, reported to the Association that during the 1907-1908 
legislative session, all such bills were "appropriately and 
effectively” resisted.46
The NCID’s success in swaying national legislators 
stemmed partly from the forceful, smooth and knowledgeable 
impression made by members of its lobbying team.
Congressmen themselves described Emery as "quick, alert, 
resourceful, keen as a Damascus blade,... endowed with a 
refinement and a tact that make him a charming companion.
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and with a fluency of speech that suggests lineal descent 
from the great Demosthenes himself." Congressmen 
characterized another NCID attorney, Daniel Davenport, as 
"cool, judicial, calm of speech, a master of logical 
statement." Legislators recognised Mr. Emery’s 
"authoritative knoweldge" on the subject of industrial law, 
admitting that were it not for his "properly organsed 
effort," dangerous class legislation would appear on the 
statute books of the nation.47
The passage of anti-injunction legislation 
reappeared as the chief demand of labor in Congress in the 
years 1906-1903. Charqinq that in j u.ncti ons were 
"improvidently issued and oppressively enforced," the AF of 
L and labor sympathetic legislators in 1906 sponsored a new 
series of anti-injunction bills which the Association dubbed 
the "extreme demands of the American Federation of Labor."48 
Over the next two years, the NAM generated pressure from 
businessmen to defeat these bills. Congress and President 
Theodore Roosevelt were deluged with telegrams and letters 
from the leading citizens of every city and state in the 
Union. In one 48 hour period beginning with a call for 
action on May 8, 1908, the organizational network sent over 
10,000 letters and telegrams against a pending 
anti-injunction bill. That same year, numerous Associaion 
members went to Washington to personally join the fight 
against AF of L leaders. Congressional committeemen
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"received Information gladly" from NAM delegates, 
characterizing them as "patriotic, dignified men who have 
left their business to come and act as ex-officio members of 
their committee." The NAM’s lobby of "scholarly and eloquent 
attorneys and witnesses" Insisted to House Judiciary 
Committee members that "neither the law nor patriotic public 
policy would admit or tolerate" the passage of such bills. 
Senior members of Congres remarked that a "more powerful 
expression of business opinion upon a legislative subject" 
had not been experienced."49
Citing the Association’s "amazing record" in 
defeating labor legislation, President Parry described an 
evolution in tactics. At first, ha said, the Association 
followed anti-injunction and eight hour bills through the 
Senate calendar, and then defeated them in committees. But, 
gradually after 1907, the number of bills presented in 
committee declined "because of the <A F of L ’s) supposition, 
which was quite correct, that it would be useless to send 
them there." The same process worked initially to defeat 
bills in House committees and finally prevent them from 
appearing at all. "It has almost required a separate 
session of Congress...to beat these measures back step by 
step," declared Parry.50 Eventually, Association officials 
in Washington announced that unions were "effectual 1 y 
checkmated in their efforts to secure socialistic and 
semi-socialistic laws." By 1909, President Van Cleave could
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report to the assembled Association on the defeat between 
1906 and 1909 of all pro labor legislation including the 
Hepburn Bill, the death of anti-injunction "agitation," the 
Supreme Court's declaration of an employers’ liability law 
unconstitutional and the AF of L ’s boycott against the 
Danbury hatters a conspiracy in the restraint of trade.51 To 
Association members, this marked the failure of organized 
labor in national politics, demonstrating "what power is in 
the hands of the conservative business elements of this 
country. " "We defeated them in Washington," announced 
President Van Cleave in 1909.52
In the election year of 1908, the ideological 
struggle between caoital and labor extended to the issue of 
the content of national party platforms. In 1904, naithar 
party platform had included AF of L planks. In 1903, the AF 
of L sent delegates to Chicago to, in the opinion of the 
NAM, "frighten the Republican National Committee into 
sanctioning their anti-Democratic, anti-Republican and 
anti-American propaganda."53 To meet this challenge,
President Van Cleave and other officials journeyed to 
Chicago and with great effort, convinced the national 
platform committee to abandon the AF of L resolutions. "We 
defeated them overwhelmingly," gloated Van Cleave; the 
"briars and thistles of Gomperism were cut down," postponing 
their presence as a national political issue for at least 
four years. Instead of enacting pro labor items, the
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Republican convention, partly in response to the current 
legislative battle over anti-injuncton bills in Congress, 
passed a resolution affirming the authority of the courts, 
"ever to insist that their powers shall be preserved 
inviolate."54
As early as 1906, the Association claimed a reward 
for its efforts to mould public opinion over the previous 
four years. "Only a few years ago, said President Parry, 
"trade unionism unrestrained and militant was rapidly 
forcing the industries of this country to a closed shop 
basis." Public favor and press sympathy had made it "almost 
a crime" to criticize the unions. Strikes, assaults on 
scabs, violence and even murder '.-lere generally condoned. 
Lawmaikers feared political death unless they supported 
"semi-SDcialistic" Isgislaton. Labor denounced judges who 
sought to uphold the law. But the NAM "rendered a service to 
the nation of the first magnitude" through its efforts to 
reverse labor power in these areas. In the years since 1900, 
labor, although winning certain "reforms," had clearly lost 
footing in both the ideological and material struggle as it 
faced an increasingly organized business community. Labor's 
"propaganda of evil" had been neutralized by a "propaganda 
of good." President Parry claimed that four years of effort 
had widely extended the open shop, and supported legislators 
in "resisting organized coercion" to compel them to enact 
labor legislation. Strikes were no longer popular, the press
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no longer biased toward unions, and police do their duty in 
tracking down criminals. "What has brought about these 
changes," asked the President? Organization. "The results 
achieved through organization during the past years are 
proofs of the power of organizaton."55
By 1910, its efforts of the previous seven years 
convinced much of the public and many of its elected 
officials to offer major opposition to labor's efforts. "The 
Courts, the newspapers and enlightened public sentiment all 
over the country," said Van Cleave, dealt "hard blows" to 
the AF of L. Its autocracy has been curbed. The arrogance 
a n d  ignorance of its leaders are not displayed so freely or 
s o  openly a s  they were before the law reached out for 
(them). Today the life of the AF of L is hanging by a 
thread."56
Certainly, the Association's claims were too broad 
and difficult to measure, and its control over labor 
ideology less secure than it boasted, but these claims serve 
to indicate the goals of its organized struggle on the 
material and ideological level. And they indicate the 
victory it could at least partly claim, based on destruction 
of unions and of the open shop, defeat of labor legislation, 
increasing control over trade education, a growing national 
worker acquiescence to employer-led reforms, and a national 
mood, that, while accepting Progressive reforms designed in 
part to defuse class radicalism and preserve property
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rights, also acquiesced in the use of state power to deny 
labor any control over social change in the period.
lli^ Ibe Ideological Struggle 
The ideological issues that the Association raised 
centered around asking and answering four basic questions: 
What is labor? Do labor organizations have the right to 
exist, and if so, under what conditions? Which best serves 
the interests of society, capital or labor? And, what are 
the respective social consequences of labor and 
businessmens' organizations?
NAM definitions of labor fell into two general 
categories: assertions about the nature of the class of
working people, and definitions of labor organizati ons. The 
NAM saw the labor question as combat between the forces of 
reason, law, liberty and individualism, on one hand, and the 
forces of anarchy, tyranny and mob rule. Organized labor was 
at best pathetic, requiring mature leadership, unaware of 
its true interests or natural leaders. At worst, it 
represented violence, evil and the destruction of society.
In his initial call to arms in 1903, President Parry 
outlined the Association's definition of unions:
Organized labor knows but one law and 
that is the law of physical force - the law of 
the Huns and Vandals, the law of the savage. All 
its purposes are accomplished either by actual 
force or by the threat of force. It does not 
place its reliance upon reason and justice, but 
in strikes, boycotts, and coercion. It is...a 
mob power knowing no master except its own will.
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Its history is stained with blood and ruin.... 
It extends its tactics of coercion and 
intimidation over all classes, dictating to the 
press and to the politicians and strangling 
independence of thought....57
The Association discredited labor by linking it to 
uncivilized and savage behavior; labor was a primitive mob 
gone wild, to be feared for its indiscriminate use of force. 
Labor was not reasonable, deliberate or given to mature 
debate; in short, not civilized. Lacking reason, labor 
employed the methods of unreason: threatening social peace, 
denying individual ism challenging the rule of reason and 
law. To NAM leaders, this situation demanded that, in the 
interests of society, employers embodying the opposing 
forces actively meet labor's influence.
In the Association's view, labor did not ascribe to 
ordinary moral norms, rather, it demanded exemption from 
commonly accepted moral and civil standards. It was 
motivated instead by expediency and the perpetuation of its 
own interests which were contrary to those of the social 
whole. "I stand here and say - because it is true," 
explained one official, "that labor stands today without a 
soul, without an ideal, without an ambition, without an 
incentive, without a motive other than 'self and the needs 
of the hour."53 The essence of the definition of labor was 
the very antithesis of social desirability.
In the period 1900-1910, NAM ideology expressed 
growing class fears apropos the manner that modern capital
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viewed labor; paranoia and the fear of appropriation. In the 
NAM view, labor expressed an attitude toward property that 
belied a si ml ul taneous coveting and resentment of wealth.
This caused labor to mistake the source of its misery in 
other’s ownership of wealth and be blind to its true source, 
labor’s not deserving wealth in the first place. Thus, 
labor’s attack on property found its source in the baser 
human impulses: hate, envy and jealousy. Workers "oftentimes 
strike out blindly against capital as though it were a 
public enemy, attempting to destroy that which they 
themselves are greedy to possess, because it happens to be 
in the hands of others." Labor leaders generated a hatred of 
wealth and ability among those who possessed neither. Their 
"incendiary speeches attempt to stir up men to seize by 
physical force that which their merit cannot obtain for 
them." AF of L sponsored anti-injunction bills, said James 
Emery, were "an attempt to obliterate the property rights 
they cannot deny."59
The Reverend Maurice Wilson incited class anxiety in 
the assembled Association as he described labor’s anger:
[they] sting themselves into a rage 
against the educated classes since they could 
not be educated themselves; they cannot endure 
what seems like superiority on the part of 
others. So in every department of life men are 
seeking to destroy that which they cannot enjoy 
themselves rather than see it enjoyed by 
others.60
So long as popular discontent was a "rational and
163
manly attempt" to bring reform, continued Reverend Wilson,
"it is acceptable." But when popular discontent turns to 
"bitterness, envy and jealousy, it...becomes manifestly evil 
and a menace to social order. It retards growth and social 
betterment."61
NAM ideology consistently divorced moral and 
economic spheres, claiming the existence of essential 
differences in the requirements of economic law and moral 
law. Within this context, that business is business and 
moral considérât!ons something else, the NAM sought to 
reduce the element of labor to its basic economic function 
and deny its human qualities, reserving these to itself.
Labor, to the N AM , was a commodity to be bought in the 
cheapest market without further obligation, as one would 
acquire any other item necessary for production. As a 
material commodity, each of labor's individual parts 
functioned equally in the market; each had an equal chance 
to share its benefits. The only obligation to labor owners 
incurred was an economic one, discharged fully by the 
payment of a wage, determined by the "inevitable operation" 
of the law of supply and demand. NAM officials insisted that 
if labor could be forced to deal with capital on such a 
naked economic plane, without resort to its old tricks, then 
they could easily manipulate the labor issue to their own 
ends, reducing social or political questions to ones of 
"pure" economics. If labor was a commodity, the education of
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labor had a commercial value, and, as noted earlier, it was 
on this level - the reduction of production costs - that the 
NAM approached the trade school question. But although labor 
was a commodity, the stimulus to work performance, until the 
advent of Scientific Management, was largely a matter of 
moral exhortation.
Unions were a special enemy for which the bitterest 
venom was reserved. Employers had regarded early unions such 
as the Knights of labor as criminal offenses, even before 
the Supreme Court specified their status as combinations in 
restraint of trade. In countering union influence, most 
employers were certain that they fulfilled a civil duty by 
protecting and upholding the law. Although the Association 
acknowledged and approved of "true" union principles and 
practices, these had been perverted by "anarchistic and 
socialistic tendencies" through which labor had engineered 
its own difficulties.62 Repeatedly claiming that it did not 
oppose organized labor per se, the Association nevertheless 
centered the debate over unions around condiions for their 
very existence, branding almost all union activity as 
extralegal and justifying its attack on these grounds. Union 
activity was largely "lawless and socialistic", and many 
union regulations "contrary to the law and rights of man." 
For these reasons, the employer should take his stand 
against them. The message was clear. Theoretically unions 
were legitimate; in reality, socially harmful and inviting
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repression. "It is manifestly to the interests of the people 
at large," advised President Kirby at the 1903 convention, 
"that organized labor be denied recognition everywhere until 
its past blackened record is blotted out."63 Thus employers 
of the NAM met union presence with dismissals, removal of 
leaders, blacklists and lockouts. Labor unions deserved the 
right to exist only when thy did not threaten capital.
The Association detailed "just causes" for its 
denunciation of labor: unions were guilty of demanding the 
privilege of violating laws forbidding property destruction 
and violence; maintaining power through terrorism, 
intimidating other classes, and dictating to employers, the 
press and the politicians; destroying individual rights, 
especailly due process; coercing unwilling labor into their 
ranks; demanding an arbitrary division of wealth; causing 
depressions by curtailing production; and forming the 
grandest trust of the times, the muscle trust.64
To the NAM, one of the most insidious threats to 
social peace the AF of L posed was its existence as an alien 
entity, not loyal to the United States. "There has grown up 
in our midst," said Counsel Emery, "imperium in imperio, a 
state within a state, appealing and nourishing that peculiar 
thing... cl ass consciousness." The AF of L "sets the decrees 
of its leaders above the laws of the land," representing an 
"absolutism which violates the orders of its courts, 
denounces its judges and repudiates the authority of the
166
nation." And even Holy Writ “tells us that a house divided 
against itself cannot stand." Citing the example of the Five 
Civilized Tribes as "a government within a government,"
Emery recounted their abolition as separate nations and 
forced merging "into the mass of the citizenship." The U.S. 
government, he said, should deal with the AF of L threat 
just as it dealt with the Indian, overpowering leaders and 
forcing them to adhere to "accepted" legal and social 
norms.65
The Association took no more absolute position than 
that of its "unalterable antagonism" to the closed shop.
After 1903, it joined trade associations in the attack on 
closed shop.66 The NAM always claimed to promote peace 
between labor and capital, but a closer examination reveals 
it to be the peace of the open shop. Industrial peace was 
contingent on liberty, which in turn depended on the 
critical freedom of the individual to work: in short, the 
open shop. For this reason, the Association billed the open 
shop as the "fundamental, basic principle of American 
liberty," for it was synonymous with individual freedom. "As 
American independence was to our forefathers," declared a 
member, "so the open shop is to the employer to today."67 
And it interlocked notions of individual liberty and open 
shop with reward according to merit, ascribing to them the 
energy which generated progress, individual and national.
Only the open shop provided the opportunity for free
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Individuals to demonstrate their superior merit. The free 
individual was compelled to think out hi s own problems and 
rely on his own ability and industry, and it was by these 
skills that he was rightly hired and justly paid by 
busi nessmen:
The efficient produce more than the 
inefficient and reap a higher reward. This is 
only common justice. A man is entitled to what 
he earns, no more, no less, and no manner how 
much a hewer of wood or drawer of water he may 
be, he must constantly feel the prod or 
incentive to make himself more proficient and 
intel1i gent.68
Conversely, the closed shop was an invasion of the
constitutional rights of the U.S. workman and thus the 
manhood of the individual, and would destroy the "most 
sacred national ideals" if not reversed.
To the Association, the irresponsibility and 
violence unions manifested could be curbed by forcing their 
incorporation. If unions incorporated, courts could compel 
them to respect their contracts. "They should be legally 
responsible," said Van Cleave, "so that the law can reach 
them," just as incorporated capital is punishable when it 
violates its agreements. Citing the arbitrariness of union 
leaders and their disregard of pledges, and noting the 
diligence and good intentions of employers in fulfilling 
theirs, Van Cleave insisted that the law step in and force 
the duties and responsibilities of both sides to be 
"reciprocal and equal."69
Overtly and by implication, much of NAM ideology
168
branded labor as unintelligent and ignorant. The Association 
insulted the intelligence of labor and attacked its leaders. 
The ignorance of labor, Association leaders explained, meant 
that it was destined to follow, not lead, said C.W. Post in 
an address to his fellow members. "Physical labor cannot 
create; it can only execute." he continued; "mind is the 
only creator and it uses physical and material tools to 
carry out and express in material, its creations."70 Chief 
Counsel James Emery, in an address to the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science which followed one by Samuel 
Gompers, ridiculed the labor leader to the assemblage. 
Gompers' discussion y;as an "ill ustrsiti on of the confusions" 
which arise from failure to clearly grasp the facts; Mr. 
Gompers defended "that which he but half-apprehended." He 
proved none of his contentions, but rather violated 
fundamental principles of justice in attacking court 
i n j unctions.71
Association pronouncements held that laborers 
constituted a "thoughtless mob full of ignorant men," and 
this, coupled with their savagery, would eventually spell 
the downfall of the Republic if uncontrolled by "mind." 
Labor's willingness to use violence indicated a more serious 
problem rooted in an ignorance of economic laws. Although 
sound economic principles had been established with the 
"clear and coherent propositions laid down by the fathers of 
the Republic," labor paid no attention. Rather, it deferred
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to the "evil influence" of the AF of L ’s "specious theories 
and meaningless platitudes on the subject of economics," the 
"exploded theories of Carl Marx" and the ingenuous 
sophistries of Samuel Gompers."72 To the Association, this 
basic lack of understanding led to erroneous theories that 
labor’s condition could be improved by "checking production 
and making life and property insecure," i.e., the use of 
strikes. Ignorant men generate ignorant theories, observed 
Mr. Post:
There is a misleading theory put forth 
by some socialistic labor theorists that ’labor 
creates all wealth and therefore all wealth 
belongs to labor.’ This false theory sometimes 
produces...an inference that the workman created 
the factory, and why not take it and run it.
That idea is the underlying cause of some labor 
disturbances that never would occur if every 
workman had a clean cut knowledge of the facts 
and rights of the citizen.73
To the NAM, the unsuccessful strikes of 1903 put 
labor’s economic doctrines to an extreme test, and they were 
found wanting. The failure of the strikes offered organized 
labor a "valuable lesson in economics and law observance," 
declared President Parry.74 As capital increasigly won in 
labor disputes after 1900, unions lost footing, open shops 
proli ferated, and strikes were increasingly broken or 
negotiated. These events, Parry held, at once vindicated 
capital’s economic theories and preached to labor the 
falsity of theirs.
To NAM officials, labor’s lack of intelligence
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created three additional problems: labor did not recognize 
its own true interests or see its situation clearly; it did 
not follow its natural leaders or recognize its true 
benefactors, and it fell prey to demagogues who, for their 
own evil ends, manipulated it against the owning class.
Given the baneful influence of labor leaders, the issue of 
industrial leadership could be settled by labor’s rightful, 
natural leaders, their bosses who held in their hands 
labor’s very livelihood. If labor officials were not true 
leaders, but only "so-called labor leaders, a ravenous band 
of pretenders," then, apart from its ignorance, why did 
labor not recognize owners as its rightful leaders? NAM 
officials evinced a historical understanding of the problem:
Our greatest troubles have been brought 
upon us due to the fact that we have allowed 
ourselves to drift away from our men, and 
permitted the walking delegate and others 
antagonistic or indifferent to the interests of 
the employer to mold the opinions of those who 
work for us with their hands.75
NAM officials recognized the paternalism and social 
harmony of an age gone by when ideological control by owners 
seemingly guaranteed an identity of interests between 
capital and labor. But the socioeconomic transformations 
after 1370 precipitated a crisis in labor leadership.
Unable to lead itself efficiently, labor fell prey to 
demagogues. To the NAM, the problem was to regain paternal 
control, to wrest labor from the hands of its "unnatural" 
leaders and it was partly from this perspective that after
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1910 it began to support employer sponsored "reforms" in the 
workplace.76
By its refusal to accept the leadership of capital, 
labor suffered from the "corrupt and malicious rule of the 
least intelligent portion of labor," the "socialist 
agitators and demagogues," the "rampant labor men" who, 
armed with the knowledge of labor's lack of understanding, 
"appealed to prejudice and envy" and "filled [labor's] 
collective mind with evil thoughts and successfully 
encouraged them to defy the very source of their daily 
bread."77 The Associaton reserved special attacks for
Gompers and Eugene Debs, branding them as ignoramuses,
bloodless criminals, featherbeds and mountebanks. Union 
leaders were agents who forced the intellectual tone of 
unionism down to the lowest level by fomenting class hatred 
and violence. Rational, thinking men, NAM leaders believed,
do not fall prey to such sophistry, as do the thoughtless
and ignorant.
Labor leadership was identified as the dangerous 
element behind strikes, an element that represented an 
anarchic force since it instigated labor violence and defied 
the state. "There are no such dangerous anarchists in our 
midst," warned President Kirby "as those labor leaders who 
instigate strikes and then aid and abet the thugs who 
perpetrate the murderous assaults on men who see fit to go 
to work when the strike is on."78 President Van Cleave cited
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the alien source of labor radicalism, criminals and outcasts 
from other nations, all the more dangerous because 
unrestrained by nationalist loyalty, the "spiritual kinsman 
of persons who, in Russia, Turkey or other semi-civilized 
communities, throw bombs into churches, public halls or 
crowded streets and murder innocent people."79
The laboring population’s portrait emerged as that 
of a mindless mob which followed any agitator who could 
inflame its class passions. Labor could not reason, could 
not evaluate leadership, but only followed. By themselves, 
laborers would not hatch dangerous schemes or violate 
property; it took the catalyst of leadership to spur them to 
ac ti on.
Underlying all its accusations, the MAM consistently 
pressed the idea that there was something inherently 
conspiratorial in labor. The Reverend Maurice Wilson 
admitted to the membership that unionism constituted a 
"conspiracy against both the individual and the state." It 
exercises a "despotism that is without mercy," he charged, 
and even worse, it is "violent and virulent in its methods, 
defiant of the laws of the land and contemptuous of its 
courts." Directed at the heart of the nation, the 
conspiracy was carried out by the use of the un-American 
boycott and picket, the "methods not of strikers but of 
highwaymen."SO
Officials branded all labor activity as conspiracy
17:
and subversion: "organized labor is teaching
principles...that are subversive of government. Strikes are 
criminal conspiracies, boycotts are crimes; limitation of 
apprentices is murder to the nation; the eight hour law is 
socialism; and anti-injunction is anarchy."81 The spectre of 
anarchy engendered a vehement response from the Reverend 
Wilson, addressing the 1909 convention on the forthcoming 
moral and economic battles between labor and capital in the 
twentieth century. Labor anarchy abounded in the land, he 
warned, constituting a "treason still to be put down." In 
the U.S., the "poisonous doctrines of the red flag [must] 
receive no quarter in the land of the Stars and Stripes."32 
Anarchy, treason, conspiracv, despotism, amorali ty, 
ignorance, corr Lipti on . In contrast to this picture of labor 
demagoguery, NAM rhetoric offered a definition of capital 
and its social function, portraying manufacturers and 
businessmen as broad minded and public spirited, a 
civilizing and even divinely inspired force, the very 
embodiment of the Victorian social ideal. The directors of 
capital represented a "body of men who are attempting upon 
sound principles and with right motives, and through 
kindness, courtesy and self sacrifice...to establish 
permanently peaceable and sound relations between master and 
man."83 Annually, the assembled membership heard a 
ministerial exhortation affirming the rightness and social 
beneficience of their efforts; businessmen were "righteous
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people" and, by contrast, labor loved unrighteousness and 
therefore was evil. God himself, the Reverend S. Edward 
Young told the Association, was the "Great Manufacturer"; 
lesser manufacturers carried out his work on earth. "We 
take thy material in our hands and make it more marketable," 
he assured the Association.84 Frequent use of the phrase 
"the gospel of industrial truth" further suggested divine 
origin of the tenets of capital.
Second only to the divine was patriotic legitimacy 
for the power of capital, which, to Association members, 
preserved "Americanism": the liberty and property rights 
which were the "cornerstone of modern civilization." The 
chief aim of the N AM, said President Parry was
the purely patriotic one of defending 
human liberty. Business and patriotism go hand 
in hand. Industrialism is bénéficient, 
civilizing and uplifting. It is the enemy of 
war, of despotism, of ignorance and poverty. In 
truth, its foes are the foes of mankind.85
Finally, Association leaders offered historical 
justification for their cause and its principles, asserting 
that "all history proves that progress is the universal law 
of nature and that the truth ever comes uppermost, and ever 
is justice done."86
The NAM promoted the rigidity and rightness of 
natural law upon which much of their ideology was based. To 
curb labor’s "improper theories and unsound principles", it 
offered "unrepealed and unrepealable," economically sound
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and just theories which "cannot be assailed on any sensible 
grounds." In contrast to labor which believed that "every 
question is susceptible of arbitration," that there are "no 
fundamental verities upon which human life is based," that 
it would be possible by legislation to "repeal the law of 
gravity", the NAM promoted the existence of "elementary 
theories which cannot be sacrificed," for if they were 
surrendered or compromised, then "all is gone and truth 
itself becomes a shadow."87
The "soundness" of Association economic principles 
derived from their adherance to the rigidities of natural 
law and classical economi cs, than.selves ensconced in a 
constitution written by and for men of property. In the 
words of one Association official, "the principles for which 
we stand are determined and fixed principles," they are "not 
your ideas or mine," but rather the "heritage we have 
received from others, the wisdom of all the past."
Determined ever since the "foundations of English and 
American law began," these great and eternal principles were 
passed on through the "immortal document that announced our 
freedom," through the U.S. Constitution, to the "decisions 
of our courts in modern days...." The economic guidelines 
of the NAM were nothing more than the "same old principles 
of American government applied once and forever to the 
solution of the industrial question." And it was upon those 
principles that the NAM sought to establish in industry
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those economic policies for which "the country" stood. 
Asserting these principles, NAM labor policy held that no 
person should be "discriminated against" by union practices, 
but that the worker "should work where he pleases and for 
what he pi eases."88 These were not privileges for working 
men, but "natural rights born of God and guaranteed by the 
government." And it was upon these ironclad guarantees that 
the Association, conscious of the "correctness and justness 
of its position," decided labor policy. And there would 
never be a "permanent and satisfactory and complete 
industrial peace," warned James Emery, "except it be a peace 
founded upon sound economics and fundamental American 
pr i ncip1 es."39
Although the NAM itself actively promo led class 
interests in its propaganda appeal, it concealed such 
interests under those of society as a whole. President 
Parry explained the identity of industrial interests and the 
common good:
The Association does not exist for 
political power, for aggression of the rights of 
others or for the individual profit of its 
members. It stands solely for the common good -
not the common good of its members alone, but
the common good of the whole people constituting 
the nation. Its one platform is that whatever 
advances American industry advances the material 
prosperity of the entire American people, and 
whatever is detrimental to American industry 
reduces the wages, the profits, and the material 
comforts of the entire people. This platform 
breathes the spirit of true patriotism. It also
breathes the spirit of good will to all. It is
the highest form of altruism.
Since the development of industry is for
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the highest good of the entire people, it 
follows that every industrial question must be 
considered from the standpoint of its bearing 
upon industrial development."90
To the NAM, anything which brings benefit to
industry automatically guarantees prosperity and progress
for the social whole. Whatever does this is patriotic, well
meaning and free of selfishness. The social and political
function of capital was to guarantee the industrial
interests against losses which would perforce be fatal both
to them and, by extension, to the working people and the
whole country. Capital must consider all issues, especially
labor questions, from the standpoint of what will benefit
industry=the peopj.e=the nati on . Any other viewpoint,
particularly labor’s viewpoint, is based upon "prejudice,
class hatred, misplaced sympathy or visionary ideas." As
stated in the Declaration of Principles, "all forms of class
legislation are un-American and detrimental to our common
goal." "We ask for no class privileges,” said an Association
leader, "and only insist that none be granted to others."91
Thus, while maintaining that its goals and methods
remained untainted by self interest, capital castigated
labor for promoting the narrow interests of class. Since
capital best understood and embodied social interests, by
implication it served all its components, including labor.
Therefore capital must oppose attempts to force a narrow
range of conditions favorable only to labor on the larger
social body. The NAM declared that it used "every single
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force that [it] could possibly exert," to protect the 
"fundamental rights" of citizens against either coiiibinations 
that attempted to "monopolize any market in material.., or 
any market in its labor."92 And it rendered an essential 
service to society in protecting it from the range of evils 
personified by unions and their leaders. Capital 
representatives of the NAM pictured themselves as offering 
an inspiring example to the lower orders. A speaker at the 
1908 annual meeting in the banquet room of New York City’s 
Waldorf Astoria surveyed the floor with its dining tables 
and well dressed gentlemen and observed :
that the wage earner of the present dav 
(ehoLild) lock on this picture and be inspired 
wit.h determination to work upward to your 1 evsi 
instead of imbibing the spirit of anarchy and 
socialism, which aims downward toward 
equi1i z ati on with the lowest.93
Officials encouraged members to stand as examples 
which would enforce military forms of obedience, to "create 
in the hearts of your employes (sic) the feeling of pride 
and devotion that a faithful soldiery has for a noble, true 
captain."94
In contrast to the disruptive presence of labor, 
capital embodied the only force which attempted to preserve 
social peace. It lent the power of its efficiency, 
organization and influence to "control and quiet the 
national situation." Capital, the rational, natural leader 
of labor would rather avoid strife; capital used nonviolent 
methods. "It seems repugnant to our ideas of twentieth
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century civilization to fight out this question in the 
gladiatorial arena. [We] do not desire strife and labor 
should not seek it."95 Association leaders deni grated labor 
gains achieved through the use of force "because those 
things which are gained by violence are half lost in the 
gaining;" preferring instead to employ reason, for "those 
things which are gained by reason are gained forever."96
Through its major activities, the NAM, representing 
a powerful and prominent capitalist elite, injected a 
significant body of ideas into the ideological universe of 
the Gilded Age, a package of ideas that proclaimed and 
legitimated the status and power of capital and its 
representati ves. Because power was unequalIv divided, so was 
advantage, and the greatest advantage is social authority. 
Authority implies authorship; those with the power to define 
the truths largely determine the truths and rights by which 
socety operates. The social control inherent in the power to 
DEFINE some people and ideas as embodying desirable norms 
and other ideas or people as opposite the desirable norm is 
immense. By virtue of such negations, undesirable groups can 
be repressed, their ideas censored, their organizations 
condemned, their spokesmen silenced. Such is the essence of 
ni hi 1 ati on .
NAM ideology functioned to disguise the nature if 
its intentions behind democracy and patriotism. It sought to 
confine the debate between labor and capital to a few ideas
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rather than let it expose the contradictions of society, and 
within this to assign individual blame for failure, avoiding 
larger questions about the fundamental working of the 
system. NAM ideology sought to abstract labor, fitting it
into the larger, formally abstract isms of the age and their
economic absolutism. It sought to prevent the formation of 
an anti-capitalist collective will, and to deny the counter 
arguments, communism, radical unionism, that posed 
alternatives. It prescribed labor docility and exhorted hard 
work and deference. And it insisted that economics was an 
independent activity which could not be circumscribed by 
moral i t y . This acticude itself established a morsilitv5 to 
say that economic activity owed nothing to morality was a
distinct moral proposition in itself.
Propagated in a highly emotional pitch, often 
reflecting hatred of certain manifestations of the working 
class and fear of being overrun, NAM propaganda heightened 
the class consciousness of its members. As they formulated 
and articulated their ideology and created national 
platforms for its propagation, they generated a mood of 
solidarity and affirmed a sense of rightness among 
themselves which, coupled with previously existing 
legitimations of right, gave them a moral, legal, ethical 
and scientific mandate for their actions.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LABOR IDEOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
All employes should bear in mind that each shop 
exists, first and last, and all the time, for the purpose of 
paying dividends to its owners.
Scientific Management will mean, for the employers 
and the workmen who adopt it...the elimination of almost all 
causes for dispute and disagreement among them.
Frederick Taylor 1
The trend toward rationalization of production after 
1890 produced a great transformation in U.S. manufacturing 
which included the financial reorganization and the 
consolidation of competing firms, the formation of 
manuf acturers-' trade associations and the 1 ncorporati on of 
most of the nation's largest firms. The very scale and 
complexity of industrial production necessitated the 
increase in control of all its elements, especially the 
human factor. In the late 1890s, this necessity gave rise to 
management theory in industry, an effort more efficiently to 
utilize materiel and workers. The system known as scientific 
management, or Taylorism, after its founder Frederick 
Taylor, quickly gained acceptance in industry where it 
produced a structural reorganization of the productive 
process using "scientific" techniques. Not surprisingly, 
modern management arose from a new breed of engineers who 
provided a direct link between the technological advances of 
the age and its social development. Engineers had been those 
who used science to analyze and control production, and it
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was in his capacity as an engineer that Taylor devised his 
system of scientific management, a system which ultimately 
restructured the labor force and promoted the work and 
social habits demanded by corporate captialism.
At the outbreak of World War I, more than 30 
factories had adopted one form or another of scientific 
management, but it was the war itself which spurred interest 
in efficient production. By the 1920s, an overwhelming 
majority of U.S. industries had adopted the main elments of 
scientific management : some form of incentive pay, 
standardisation of tasks, direct supervision under a formal 
hierarchical admi ni strati ve authority, cost accounting and 
general planning and coord i nati an of all factor'/ operations. 
In 1933, economist John R. Commons reported that the 
essential ideas of scientific management had been so widely 
accepted that they had become "commonplaces of American 
industrial practice."2
To Taylor, as with many first generation 
professional managers, increased productivity rested on 
employer control of the material labor process. More fully 
than the owners and managers of his day, however, Taylor 
understood the ideological nature of their labor problems 
and the relationship between ideology on one hand and 
technology and material objects on the other. He was the 
first management theorist to recognize the necessity of 
effecting total ideological control over the workforce and
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the possibility of achieving this through material changes 
in the work process. He also apparently understood that the 
workplace was the primary site where workers defined 
themselves and their relations to capital and thus the place 
where those definitions could more easily be controlled by 
employers.
For these reasons, Taylor's method was originally 
conceived as a means of stopping the industrial warfare of 
the age through an ideological transformation of the worker, 
what he called a mental revolution. His first paper, "A 
Piece Rate System", read before the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers in 1905, prescribed in its subtitle "A 
Step Toward Partial Solution of the Labor Problem".
Throughout his career, Taylor sold his management techniques 
to employers as a method of controlling labor and breaking 
unions. He especially attacked craft unions’ power to 
determine and enforce standard work rates and rules and, in 
so doing, to resist individual rates of pay. In the late 
nineteenth century, the strength of organized labor rested 
in part on the enforcement of rules that protected the 
skilled craftsman. Craft union standards were not estaiished 
in formal agreements between unions and employers, but were 
adopted by unions and enforced at the shop level by 
individual workmen and committees of the union local.3 Union 
enforcement of work standards was already under attack by 
employers’ trade associations when those committed to
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scientific management took up the fight. In dealing with 
skilled workers on an individual basis, they sought to 
destroy collective enforcement of craft union rules by 
individually determining such factors as wage rates, work 
classfication, daily output, and by individually settling 
workers' grievances. The ultimate effect of Scientific 
Managemnt, David Montgomery explained, "undermined the very 
foundation of craftsmens’ functional autono..iy" by disrupting 
their "styles of work, their union rules and standard rates, 
and their mutualistic ethic...."4 After the widespread 
application of scientific management, Montgomery found,
"some degree of worker restriction remained, but on a 
guerilla basis.... "5 But concertée!, union directed, 
collectively enforced work restriction had disappeared. By 
the decade of the 1920s, the combination of scientific 
management and welfare activity had "succeeded in excluding 
unions from most industries and persuading union leaders to 
oppose their members’ restrictive practices in others."6 
The adoption of scientific management by U.S. 
industry resulted in greater control of labor consciousness. 
Taylorism prescribed various methods of governing worker 
ideology through a) shifting control of the entire work 
process from workers to employers; b) by destroying unions 
and replacing workplace solidarity and collectivism with an 
atomized individualism which generated worker loyalty to the 
supposed common interests of capital and labor; and, c )
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through tying worker self Image to employer determined 
criteria, self image that rose and fell with the indiviual 
worker’s degree of fulfillment of daily task assignments.
Taylorism itself was an ideology that in its widest 
application defended industrialisation and the machine 
process while at the same time justified an extension of 
employer authority over large masses of workers. This 
justification, couched in the prevailing language of class 
legitimacy, held sway in the name of individualism, 
self-advancement, efficiency and order, the work ethic, 
progress and social beneficence, in particular the 
well-being and advancement of the individual worker. It 
masked the creation of a more rigid and authoritarian 
management structure which effectively eliminated labor’s 
control of the work process and formation of worker 
ideology, replacing it with management control and 
management ideas about work and workers.
In addition to the material requirements of 
production, the legitimacy of natural law and and the 
prestige of scientific technology also shaped the ideology 
of Taylorism. In addition. Taylorism adopted the legitimacy 
of natural law doctrine. Taylor’s insistence on his "one 
best method" of performing every work task presupposed that 
there existed an absolute, numerically verifiable, perfectly 
exact way of executing that task.7 "Under Scientific 
Management," Taylor explained, "every single subject, large
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and small, becomes the question for scientific 
investigation, for reduction to law...."8 The best 
management was a "true science, resting upon clearly defined 
laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation."9 Once 
discovered through scientific inquiry, Taylor’s "one best 
way" was defended in the same manner that scientists 
defended what they took to be the undeniable certainty of 
the laws of physics or mathematics - in an age which stood 
in awe of the power of science to produce wonders. This 
defense was made easier, in Samuel Haber’s words, "for 
Science had a lustre all its own.... For a generation in 
which most people believed that progress was written into 
the laws of the universe, true and good seemed 
indistinguishable." 10 To an age which had begun to 
question absolutes, science rose in prestige, becoming the 
primary vehicle by which truth was established. As one of 
the laws of nature, the law of scientific managemen drew its 
authority and legitimacy from its formal scientific 
application of that law.
Along with belief in the authority and certainty of 
natural law, nineteenth century ideology held the notion of 
the absolute impartiality and objectivity of scientific 
data, and by extension, of Taylor’s methods. Applied to 
industry, scientific management replaced the arbitrary, 
controversi al and competing authority of skilled workers and 
floor bosses with the uncontestable, class neutral authority
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of science. "Science, claimed one Taylorite, "plays no 
favorites."11 Basing its legitimacy on the application of 
science to social good, Taylorism impersonalized and 
legitimated owner interest. However, the supposed scientific 
basis twisted this legitimation, for the class interest of 
capital was redefined as not only class neutral and 
beneficial to society, but as a matter of incontrovertible, 
cosmic, natural principle. The 'legitimate' authority of 
science furnished the facade for the exercise of the class 
power of employers. Taylor's system was less a science than 
an ideology which, under the guise of scientific neutrality, 
functioned to obscure and conceal capital's attempt to 
conrol labor.12
Taylor's offer of scientific rationalisation of 
industry and efficient labor control dovetailed with the 
general Progressive urge of the age, itself part of the 
larger struggle of capitalist interests to protect 
themselves from the social and economic disruptions of rapid 
industrialization. As with other instruments of social 
control developed in the nineteenth century, scientific 
management was necessary to the creation of a worker who fit 
into the mechanistic order of rationalized mass production, 
assembly lines, and, above all, into a "scientifically" 
managed work environment. Taylor intended for the social 
benefits that scientific control brought to industry to be 
applied on a wide scale. More than a provision for
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industrial effici ency, his system promised an entire social 
transformati o n . The ideological or "mental revolution" 
inherent in Taylorism was designed to alleviate the social 
problems of industrial society, problems arising largely 
from a grossly unequal distribution of wealth, and from 
on-the-job disputes between management and labor. Taylor’s 
solution was to control industrial society by a neutral, 
scientific law, which served neither capital nor labor, but 
the rigid standards of work performance and shop management. 
When followed exactly, his methods promised to increase 
production, decrease its costs, raise wages and profits, 
remove the source of social tension in industry, reduce 
consumer prices, raise the material standard of living, and 
thereby promote civilization and progress. Taylor envisioned 
a general social revolution through the appli caton of his 
techniques for industrial efficiency and ideological control 
to "all social activities," in homes, farms, churches, 
philanthropic institutions, universities and government.13 
The idea of social perfection through adherence to 
scientific law formed part of the larger impulse of the 
Progressive Era toward systematization, rationalization, 
centralization, bureaucratization and control. An age 
enamored with material efficiency in machine output and in 
business enterprise saw the possibility of resolving 
questions of social control with machine-like eff i ci ency.14 
And Taylor’s prescription fit the diagnosis of the age:
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eliminate irrational, violent, anti-social, nonconformist, 
unproductive behavior and one would achieve a predictable, 
controlled, orderly social whole that operated according to 
the dictates of science.
Taylor's system grew out of his on-the-job 
experience as an engineer and shop foreman at the Midvale 
Steel Company between 1878 and 1890. In an attempt to 
increase production in the machine shop, he conducted 
experiments which led him to assess prevailing shop 
management practices, and, eventually, to scrutinize the 
entire factory system. Conditions he analyzed at Midvale 
represented practices that pervaded most factory 
organization in the late nineteenth century. Lire many 
contemporary observers, Taylor saw the shop floor as the 
site of a struggle over productivity theretofore won by 
workers because of inefficient management, but potentially 
winnable by owners if they could control the work process 
and secure worker loyalty. His analysis of this struggle 
resulted in a call for an entirely new and revolutionary 
management system designed to effect total control over 
production, eliminating elements in the factory system that 
both inhibited production and furnished grounds for dispute 
between owners and workers.
To Taylor, the faults of the factory system of his 
day fell into two categories: the tyranny it allowed 
managers and bosses and the autonomy it gave workers. As
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factories grew larger and more complex in the late 
nineteenth century, and the delegated power of managers 
increased, so did their use of arbitrary power, a condition 
which, to Taylor, produced the most visible form of the 
struggle between capital and labor. The unhappy and almost 
impossible task, given the large degree of worker autonomy, 
of forcing work efficiency and productivity fell to managers 
whose methods of coercion ranged all the way from merely 
accounting for each worker's presence and diligence during 
the day to summary firings. The managerial hierarchy, which 
led from worker through foreman to floor boss, allowed 
considerable individual discretion at every level.15 And it 
was understood that aach managar usad this discrationarv 
power to force the greatest amount of work from those under 
his supervision.
The most glaring faults Taylor identified in the 
factory system lay with the degree of autonomy allowed 
workers. Although the factory system had assembled large 
numbers of workers in one spot into various kinds of 
individual and group work situations, it had not 
internalized labor discipline, nor had it completely removed 
workers' discretion in the control of their own work 
productivity. Skilled workers' expertise was the basis of 
this control. In the course of a work day, Midvale 
machinists not only worked at their machines cutting and 
shaping metal, but largely controlled the production manner
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and rate of their tasks, procured their own tools or 
supplies, and governed their rest periods and their informal 
social interaction. Because workers understood that it did 
not serve their interests to work hard, they also practiced 
many forms of deliberate output restriction from soldiering, 
the deliberate restriction of work, to outright sabotage.
At least to his own satisfaction, Taylor recognized 
and explained the reasons for such behavior. In most shops 
which utilized a range of labor skills, a hierarchy of labor 
existed in which the skilled craftsman enjoyed the highest 
wages and the greatest degree of workplace autonomy. Not by 
coincidence, skilled workers were the most scarce and formed 
the only viable labor organizations in Taylor's day. 
Furthermore, the apprentice system placed the skilled 
craftsman at the top of a labor controlled ideological and 
technological hierarchy, within which apprentices absorbed 
craft know-how and labor ideology from mentors on the same 
side in the capital-1abor struggle. This hierarchy of 
exclusiveness, high pay, leadership, and relative autonomy 
furnished skilled labor an authority and untouchabi1ity that 
had to be broken if owners were to control worker activity 
and ideology.
In Taylor’s day, the most telling manifestation of 
worker autonomy was deliberate restriction of work output.
He devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of 
soldiering, a practice which he found "almost universal in
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industrial establishments" and which "constitute(d) tht 
greatest evil with which the working-people of both England 
and America are now afflicted."16 Workers deliberately 
practiced soldiering, Taylor surmised, to keep employers 
ignorant of the work process and thus of how much time any 
task would actually take to be performed. In doing so, they 
reserved to themselves control of the actual amount and 
exclusive knowledge of the potential amount of production.
Taylor identified three causes for overt, systematic 
soldiering.17 First, workers believed that it was against 
their best interests to work at maximum output because the 
increase in production reduced the total number of jobs.
Thus, both individual workers and trade union policy 
enforced restriction of output. Second, because employers 
had no idea how much work constituted a full day's work, 
they had to defer to the workers' knowledge of the work 
process. Employers, Taylor explained,
derive their knowledge of how much of a 
given class of work can be done in a day from 
either their own experience, which has 
frequently grown hazy with age, from casual and 
unsystematic observation of their men, or at 
best from records which are kept, showing the 
quickest time in which each job has been done.
In many cases the employer will feel almost 
certain that a given job can be done faster than 
it has been, but he rarely cares to take the 
drastic measures necessary to force men to do it 
in the quickest time.... It evidently becomes 
■for each man's interest then, to see that no job 
is done faster than it has been in the past.IB
Third, the work and payment system of piece work 
spurred workers to develop soldiering to a fine art. Under
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the piece rate system, employers determined a maximum amount 
which workers "should" be paid for each piece of work, and 
restricted wages accordingly. Workers realized that when 
employers became convinced that they could produce more than 
that amount, they forced that increase in production without 
a corresponding increase in pay.19 Or, workers found that 
when they themselves speeded up piece production to increase 
their earnings, employers reduced the rate accordingly.
Thus, Taylor reasoned that
after a workman has had the price per 
piece of the work he is doing lowered two or 
three times as a result of his having worked 
harder and increased his output, he is likely to
lose sight of his employer's side of the case 
and become imbued with a grim dstarmination to 
have no mors cuts if soldiering can prevent it.
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Because it involved a struggle over control of the 
basic elements in the labor process, Taylor explained, 
soldiering led to the root of the dispute between capital 
and labor. Workers' "deliberate attempt to mislead and 
deceive" employers as to their true work capacities caused 
them to view the employer as "an antagonist, if not an 
enemy."21 Taylor explained further.
The feeling of antagonism under the 
ordinary piece-work system becomes in many cases 
so marked on the part of the men that any 
proposition made by their employers, however 
reasonable, is looked upon with suspicion, and 
soldiering becomes such a fixed habit that men 
will frequently take pains to restrict the 
product of machines which they are running when 
even a large increase in output would involve no 
more work on their part.22
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Thus, to a great degree, workers were able to 
control the work process - speeding it up or slowing it down 
at will - because of employer's lack of knowledge about that 
very process.23 Two factors determined worker monopoly of 
knowledge in the work process. First, Taylor observed 
workers "had their knowledge handed down to them by word of 
mouth," or they learned by observation or experience.
Workmen learned from other workmen to restrict output.
The younger and less experienced men are 
taught this by their elders, and all possible 
persuasion and social pressure is brought to 
bear upon the greedy and selfish men to keep 
them from making new records which result in 
temporarily increasing their wages, while all 
those who come after them are made to 'work 
harder for the same old par/....24
Lessons in output restriction demonstrated to young or
immigrant workers new to the factory that their own
interests conflicted with those of their employers and could
be served only by subverting those of the latter.
The second factor in workers' monopoly was what 
Taylor called traditional or “rule-of-thumb" knowledge, "the 
principal asset or possession of every tradesman, and a 
monopoly because it remained largely unknown to employers.
25 Taylor discovered that even managers, almost all of whom 
had risen from the ranks of skilled labor, knew "better than 
any one else that their knowledge and personal skills fall 
far short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the 
workmen under them."26 Thus employers and their managers
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were forced to drive workers to obtain the greatest amount 
of work. Thus, the "greatest obstacle to harmonious 
cooperation between the workmen and the management..."
Taylor identified as "the ignorance of the management as to 
what really constitutes a proper d a y ’s work...."27 To 
Taylor, voluntary cooperation between management and labor 
remained impossible as long as workers had more knowledge 
than managers, workers distrusted giving their best effort, 
and workers controlled work.
Taylor characterized his system of scientific 
management as a solution to the management problems inherent 
in the work process as it was practiced in the factory 
systems of his era. To eliminate soldiering, Taylor made 
fundamental changes in the material elements of the work 
process itself: a) shifting worker technological control of 
and judgement in the work process from workers to managers, 
and b) destroying the power 'f skilled craftsmen.
Ibe Material Objectives
In the factory, Taylor realized the material goals 
of his system through governing, standardizing, 
systematizing and rationalizing all facets of the 
utilization of labor, raw materials, tools and time. In 
doing this, he caused a revolution in both the work process 
and its management. In the machine tool industry, as in many 
industries in the late nineteenth century, this revolution
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was made possible by rapid advances in technology which 
forced the faster and more efficient utilisation of economic 
inputs. During his investigations of machine speeds for 
metal cutting at Midvale Steel, Taylor himself invented high 
speed steel for cutting tools and drills, which, because it 
retained its edge at high temperatures, tripled the speed of 
metal cutting and finishing.28 As machine operators 
produced more quickly, the flow of materials to and from 
their machines had to speed up correspondingly, 
necessitating both the speed up of the entire production 
process and a more efficient use of machine operators' time. 
In Taylor's judgment, "the one element...most vital to both 
employer and workman [was]...the speed at which work was 
done...." Human speed must be increased to equal machine 
capacity. Thus the "essence of task management lay in 
effecting total management control of factors governing work 
speed.29
Control over the speed of the work process involved 
a dramatic intensification of the division of labor.
Industrialization had caused a division of labor which 
destroyed skilled worker control of the work process from 
raw material to finished product. It also eliminated 
workers’ conceptual knowledge of the entire work process. 
After 1880, most skilled craftsmen fashioned parts for 
larger constructions over which they had little knowledge 
and even less control. Their knowledge, skill and control of
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individual tasks was real, but limited to the piece they 
made or a portion of a larger project.
To accomplish the speed-up, Taylor analyzed each 
work task, subdividing it into separate components and 
assigning each to an individual worker. For example, he 
turned a single job for the lathe work on steel locomotive 
wheels into a series of 22 different operations, each with 
seven separate specifications.30 He then scrutinized these 
duly specialized and subdivided work tasks to determine how 
workers' movements could be speeded up and made more 
efficient by using less motion, time, and fewer materials, 
thus lowering production costs per unit. Since, under the 
old factory system, skilled workers performed many tasks 
besides the primary one to which they were assigned, this 
subdi vi son of tasks had the effect of delegating the 
unskilled portions of a job to ordinary laborers, limiting 
skilled workers to more highly paid, “important" tasks, and 
increasing the need for management control. In the metal 
working industries. Taylorism so subdivided and governed 
machinists' jobs that it turned many jobs held by skilled 
craftsmen into tasks for machine tenders. His system 
converted untrained laborers into specialized machine 
operatives using prefabricated jigs, subdivided jobs with 
easily learned segments which were repeated over and over, 
and increased supervision. This greatly reduced the number 
of skilled craftsmen and increased that of less skilled and
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costly machine tenders and of supervisory personnel.31
Taylor often stated that he had reduced and 
subdivided work operations to the point where automatons or 
gorillas could perform them. "Of the men in the machine shop 
of the Bethlehem Steel Company," he said of workers who 
first experienced the differential piece rate plan, "engaged 
in running the roughing machines...about 95 per cent, were 
handymen trained up from laborers. And on the finishing 
machine, working on bonus, about 25 per cent, were handy 
men."32 Even when a task such as lathe operation could not 
be subdivided and had to be left in the care of a skilled 
workman, it was planned in advance, described in written 
instructions, closely governed by a new standardised time 
rate, observed by scientific managers, recorded in the 
planning office, and otherwise circumscribed by managerial 
control. Taylor's system, driven by the logic of the 
division of labor, achieved the final destructon of worker 
authority over even the divided labor processes of the day.
It replaced the relative autonomy of the skilled craftsman 
with mindless, repetitive and further subdivided tasks.
Under Taylorism, the worker became less an individual than a 
reproducible, standardized, interchangeable, controllable, 
machine-like cog in the factory wheel.
Taylor attacked the problem of job speed and worker 
efficiency with a skilled system of wage bonuses called the 
differential piece rate which generated worker incentive to
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follow instructions and increase output.33 This system tied 
output speed and incentive factors together with coercive 
measures designed to destroy both workers’ desire and 
ability to govern output. The differential piece rate system 
exhorted an individual worker to utmost exertion by scaling 
wage rates to individual piece work performance, paying 
bonuses of 30 to 60 per cent more when a worker achieved a 
predetermined "fair" day’s work. Taylor usually introduced 
the piece rate system in a ununi oni zed shop, placing one 
worker under his guidance and allowing him to earn 30 per 
cent or more than his previous earnings "until he wants the 
new system badly." Then "almost invaribly" other men in the 
shop also asked for the new system.34
Taylor’s argument with the old piece work or day 
wage system was that all workmen were paid the same rate or 
wage regardless of efficiency.35 In his system, piece rate 
bonus payment increased with all output over a certain 
amount. However, the piece rate system "not only pulls the 
man up from the top but pushed him equally hard from the 
bottom."36 In cases where a worker failed to do a task 
correctly in the allotted time, he not only forfeited the 
bonus, but suffered the "direct loss of the piece price for 
each piece by which he falls short."37 These bonuses were 
always tied to management discretion and control: in 
choosing the "right" worker for the job, in determining the 
nature of the tasks, in doling out incentive bonuses, in
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calculating, timing, charting and otherwise quantifying all 
elements of the work process. Control of work filtered one 
way down from the management "brains" to the operatives.
Another factor in the elimination of skilled labor 
control on the shop floor involved overturning old labor 
hierarchies which led from skilled workers to common 
laborers. In his experience as a gang boss at Midvale Steel, 
Taylor engaged in a three year long "piece work fight," 
doing everything in his power to prevent soldiering and 
increase shop production. Machinists at the top of the shop 
hierarchy, meanwhile, remained "absolutely determined that 
output should not be increased," and they deliberately kept 
■work' performance at levels they knew were lower than 
possible.3S Only by working in concert could workers 
enforce these restrictions. Taylor's urging and 
demonstrations to no avail, he dismissed several workers, 
replacing them with new machinists who "turned right around 
and joined the other fellows and refused to do any more work 
than the rest."39 In order to break the informal authority 
of the machinists, he took an admittedly "durned mean" step, 
a step "contrary t o . ..[the] interest of machinists":
When I had trained enough of these 
laborers so that they could run the lathes, I 
went to them and said, 'Now, you men to whom I 
have taught a trade are in a totally different 
position from the machinists who were running 
these lathes before you came here. Every one of 
you agreed to do a certain thing for me if I 
taught you a trade, and now not one of you will 
keep his word. I did not break my word with you, 
but every one of you has broken his word with
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me. Now, I have not any mercy on you; I have not 
the slightest hesitation in treating you 
entirely differently from the machinists.' I 
said, 'I know that very heavy social pressure 
has been put upon you outside the works to keep 
you from carrying out your agreement with me, 
and it is very difficult for you to stand out 
against this pressure, but you ought not to have 
made your bargain with me if you did not intend 
to keep your end of it. Now, I am going to cut 
your rate in two tomorrow and you are going to 
work for half price from now on. But all you 
will have to do is to turn out a fair day's work 
and you can earn better wages than you have been 
earning.'
These men, of course, went to the 
management, and protested I was a tyrant, and a 
nigger driver, and for a long time they stood 
right by the rest of the men in the shop and 
refused to increase their output a particle. 
Finally, they all of a sudden gave right in and 
did a fair dav's work.40
At this point the older machinists began 
deliberately to break their machines "as an object lesson to 
demonstrate to the management that a fool foreman was 
driving the men...."41 Taylor then resorted to a system of 
fines to prevent overt sabotage, and when these men "got 
sick and tired of being fined, their opposition broke down, 
and they promised to do a fair day’s work."42
This struggle took three years of "hard fighting" to 
resolve and taught Taylor that an increase in worker output 
could be had only when management directly controlled the 
pace and method of work, eliminated the control of skilled 
over apprentice labor, prevented group coercion of new 
workers, and diluted loyalty to working class interests. In 
bringing in ordinary laborers to perform formerly skilled
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jobs, instilling loyalty to the new instructor and desire 
•for the new bonus, Taylor's system broke the informal worker 
imposed work rates and eliminated worker discretion in job 
control. This process often replaced workers at the top of 
the labor hierarchy with those at the bottom, removing the 
old authority of the skilled mechanics over new workers and 
over unskilled workers, and instituting new lines of 
authority over work speed that ran from management to worker 
rather than from worker to worker.
Abolishing the traditional forms of foreman and 
manager control, the Taylor system created a new class of 
•Bciantific or "functional" managers who achieved a 
scientific work process by gathering "all of the traditional 
knowledge which in the past had been possessed b'/ the 
workmen and then...classifying, tabulating, and reducing 
this knowledge to rules, laws, and formul a e ...."43 Armed 
with scientific expertise, functional managers occupied a 
separate planning room with the tools of their trade, books, 
charts, records, desks. Ideally, the planning room was 
situated in the center of the factory work area, visible but 
physically separated from the workmen. The planning 
deptartment eliminated the need for the floor bosses and 
foremen of the old management system, replacing them with 
the daily task description and a network of functional 
managers.44
The most visible material characteristic of
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scientific management, Taylor explained, was that "each 
workman, instead of coming in direct contact with the 
management at one point only, namely, through his gang boss, 
receives his daily orders and help directly from eight 
different bosses."45 The four planning bosses were the 
order of work and route clerk, the instruction card clerk, 
the time and cost clerk, and the shop disciplinarian. The 
four shop bosses governed execution: the gang boss, the 
speed boss, the inspector and the repair boss.
By acquiring workers’ knowledge and transforming it 
into a "science", Taylor’s system replaced workers’ informal 
application of knowledge with new rules and prsscriptions 
■for its use. "The development of a science," argued Taylor, 
"involves the establishment of many rules, laws and formulae 
which replace the judgment of the individual workman.... "46
Thus all of the planning which under the 
old system was done by the workman, as a result 
of his personal experience, must of necessity 
under the new system be done by the management 
in accordance with the laws of science; because 
even if the workman was well suited to the 
development and use of scientific data, it would 
be physically impossible for him to work at his 
machine and at a desk at the same time. It is 
also clear that in most cases one type of man is 
needed to plan ahead and an entirely different 
type to execute the work.47
The removal of "brain work" from the shop floor to 
the planning department placed control over the speed, 
nature and planning of work in the hands of scientific 
managers. In place of workers choosing their own work and 
acquiring training from their fellow workers, the new
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managers assumed the power to "scientifically select and 
then train, teach and develop the workman...."48 Under the 
old system, management was "looked upon as a question of 
m en...."49 Now, the new rules and formulae were boss, 
administered by men from behind glass walls, legitimated by 
the irrefutable sovereignty of numbers. Indeed, control of 
task management constituted the essence of Taylor's entire 
system - a system, which through tighter and more integrated 
management control of work, effectively eliminated worker 
control.
Once management acquired workers' formal knowledge, 
it assumed the burden of planning and control of the entire 
shop floor and its human and material elements.. The need for 
"complets standardi zati on of all details and methods, for 
keeping elaborate records, providing written work 
instructions, governing the storage and movement of tools 
and parts, and increased the percentage of scientific 
managers over that of the old number of foremen and gang 
bosses. The old management philosophy, Taylor explained, had 
kept low the proportion of non-producers to producers in a 
factory, non-producers being "all the general officers, the 
clerks,the foremen, gang bosses, watchmen, messenger boys, 
draftsmen [and] salesmen," and producers, "only those who 
a c L i t a l l y  work with their hands. "50 In factories Taylor 
investigated, the proportion of non-producers to producers 
varied from 1-6 to 1-11 or more. His system involved an
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admittedly large increase in the number of non-producers to 
producers, to a proportion of 1 to 4. But he defended these 
changes by pointing to increased production and reduced 
costs under his system.51
Although scientific management increased the number 
of managers relative to the old system, it allowed them less 
authority. Taylor often insisted that his system could not 
function without the same principles being applied to 
management as to workers. Functional management involved 
similar automatization and subdivision of management as of 
workers' tasks, "so dividing the work of management that 
each man from the assistant superintendant down will have as 
few -functicins as possible to perform. "52 This had the same 
effect on management linkage to the task orders as did the 
subdivision of labor among workmen, necessitating the same 
replacement of personal authority and discretion with 
deference to scientifically determined work rules. Each 
functional manager had to perform a prearranged, carefully 
described, hierarchically controlled function within an 
integrated management system. And, for a manager to reject 
his role implied rejection of the entire order.
Taken together, the material changes effected by 
Taylor's method of organizing production revolutionized the 
factory workplace, achieving a dramatic speed-up of 
production. Taylorism geared incentive to speed-up, 
increased the ratio of control personnel to workers, removed
21:
brain work from workers, subdivided labor and relegated 
workmens' status to that of objects, sliced away the human 
and autonomous elements of the work process, and insisted on 
absolute obedience to the authority of planners. In 
accomplishing these changes. Taylorism effectively removed 
the individual judgment and technological knowledge of 
ordinary craftsmen and the workplace authority and autonomy 
this carried, and replaced these with the rules of 
scientific management. By forcing the rationality of 
machine production on the labor process, Taylorism extended 
owner control over all previously worker controlled or 
uncontrolled factors.
lag igciai and Ideglggicai Objectives 
The result of this radical transformation in the 
material work process was not just speed and efficiency. The 
material changes wrought social and ideological changes - a 
reorganisation of workers' interests and loyalties, an 
internalization of work discipline, a new orientation toward 
authority, and a drastic curtailment of union power. The 
material subordination of the worker to a method was, in 
fact, his social and ideological subordination to the 
supposedly class neutral demands of machine production in a 
capitalist context. The grounds of the argument for this 
subordination formed the bulk of the ideological content of 
Taylor's system. However, the ideological changes resulted
21:
less from the rhetoric of Taylor and his followers or the 
new group of scientific managers than by integral, systemic, 
ideological factors inherent in the material objects and 
processes of Taylorism. Thus scientific management 
demonstrated the ideological power of technology and 
material objects, what Alvin Gouldner termed the dialectic 
of ideology and technology, what Marx called the 
"intellectual potencies of the material process of 
production", and what Taylor himself recognized as the 
dependence of the "mental" revolution upon the material 
lessons.53 "Let no one imagine," Taylor cautioned, "that 
this great change in the mental attitude of the men and the 
increase in their activitv can be brought about by merely 
talking to theiii. Their real instruction. . .must come through 
a series of object lessons. It is only with these object 
lessons in plain sight that the new theories can be made to 
stick."54
Taylor’s method prodded workers into accepting 
owners definitions and thinking about almost every human and 
material aspect of the productive process. The key to that 
acceptance involved internalizing work discipline and 
redirecting workers’ interests and loyalties away from 
themselves and the working class, toward those of capital. 
Taylor did not attempt to accomplish these changes nakedly 
by insisting that workers should adopt capital’s interests, 
or crudely, by repeating the National Association of
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Manufacturers' assertion that workers were ignorant of their 
own interests. He knew the futility of such attempts given 
the social reality of his times. There was no question, he 
often said,
that, throughout the industrial world, a 
large part of the organization of employers, as 
well as employes, is for war rather than for 
peace, and that perhaps the majority on either 
side do not believe that it is possible to so 
arrange their mutual relations that their 
interests become identical.The majority of these 
men believe that the fundamental interests of 
employes and employers are necessarily 
antagoni sti c .55
Almost alone among the spokesmen for capital in his
age, Taylor acknowledged the rational basis for both 
workers' hostility toward employsrs and far soldiarinq.
Given "generations of bitter experiences" within an 
antagonistic social setting, he said, workers behaved in a 
reasonable, purposeful manner, entirely consistent with 
their immediate individual and class interests.56 What 
Taylor saw as rational behavior, members of the NAM, for 
instance, condemned as irrational and contrary to the real 
interests of workers. When Midvale workers asked Taylor 
whether "for their own best interest", they should turn out 
more work, he answered that were he in their place, he would 
"fight against turning out any more work, just as they were 
doing." And his reason reflected theirs: "because under the
piece work system ths.’y would be allowed to earn no more 
wages than they had been earning, and yet they would be made 
to work harder."57
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Taylor's "firm conviction that the true interests of 
the two are one and the same...," meant, ultimately, that 
the interests of labor had to be secured for the service of 
capital. To Taylor, the fact that workers acted rationally 
in their own self interest was the central element of worker 
consciousness which had to be transformed into what amounted 
to loyalty to employer interests. Their initiative followed 
their interest. Their interest must be changed. The task of 
managers, then, lay in "inducing each workman to use his 
best endeavors, his hardest work, all his traditional 
knowledge, his skill, his ingenuity, and his good-will - in 
a word, his 'initiative,'" so as to "do everything that he 
can to further his employer's interest."58 In other words, 
he sought to internalise work discipline which had been 
external 1 y imposed by managerial authority under the old 
factory system. The worker must drive himself.
Given worker antagonism toward employers, however, 
this transformation of loyalty and internalisation of work 
discipline had to occur indirectly. Labor must serve the 
interests of capital without realising it. To accomplish 
this, scientific management redirected the self interest of 
both capital smd labor to a new "unity of interests"- to the 
class neutral interests of "science." Taylorism redefined 
worker interests by convincing them of the legitimacy and 
value of scientific goals. In place of the divergence of 
interests and class warfare, and in lieu of shifting
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workers' interests directly to those of capital, the new 
unity of interests created an ideology which geared worker 
loyalty to the more acceptable goal of scientifically 
increasing production for mutual benefit. Taylor understood 
that the struggle between capital and labor was over the 
division of surplus profits known to both sides. Rather than 
deny the existence of these profits, he used the goal of 
scientifically controlled production to shift the focus of 
both capital and labor, to "take their eyes off the division 
of the surplus as the important matter, and together turn 
their attention toward increasing the size of the 
surpi us... ."59
By and large, Tavlori so sought to achieve the "unity 
of interests" through the ideology inherent in a system of 
individual wage incentives, in this case, the differential 
piece rate system. It was at this point that technology and 
its material expression as ideglggy informed worker 
ideology. The piece rate system generated worker initiative 
by gearing their interests not directly to those of capital, 
but to a higher set of long range interests, scientifically 
determined and ostensibly free from class bias. This 
redirection of interests effectively replaced workers’ 
desire to soldier with a desire to achieve maximum output 
for individual gain through compliance not with employer 
demands, but with a scientific prescription for higher 
productivity. The system spoke to workers in terms of these
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higher interests, legitimating its demands by offering 
immediate, individual material reward to those giving 100 
per cent allegiance to the rules for task performance. 
Offering bonuses as incentive aimed at individual effort, 
the system made individual desire and ability constitute the 
difference between success and failure. The piece rate 
system created an extra spur to productivity in the form of 
fear of losing the entire piece payment or even being 
discharged if one could not work at Taylor's extreme speeds.
To affix workers' initiative and interest to the 
getting of money within a system, to gear his individual 
reward to his individual producti vi ty was to give him a 
greater stake in the efficient working of that system. 
Monetary incentive provided worker compliance more easily 
than did coercion. A worker who believed he was working for 
himself in both an immediate and long range sense did not 
need to be coerced, but he welcomed any method which 
increased his own productivity. "The feeling that 
substantial justice is being done," Taylor explained,
renders them, on the whole, much more 
manly, straightforward and truthful. They work 
more cheerfully and are more obliging to one 
another and their employers. They are not 
soured, as under the old system, by brooding 
over the injustice done them; and their spare 
minutes are not spent to the same extent in 
criticising their employers and their bosses,60
Thus the system of individualized wages and bonuses 
subverted collective governance of output and deflected
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antagonism toward the system and erased notions of changing 
the system as a whole. In this manner, technology provided 
the grounds whereby the interests of labor in maximum labor 
utilization became one with those of capital. The shift in 
worker loyalty constituted a revolutionary transformation of 
worker consciousness. Taylor claimed that scientific 
management "in its essence",
involves a complete mental revolution on 
the part of the workingman engaged in any 
particular establishment or industry - a 
complete mental revolution on the part of these 
men as to their duties toward their work, toward 
their fellow man, and toward their employers.61
Tavlor's svstem worked to defuse the issue of the 
surplus by redirecting the interests of both sides toward 
the goal of higher productivity governed by scientific 
rationality. With the deference of both capital and labor to 
the demands of scientific managers, the ideology of the 
latter assumed large proportions. Through a total control 
of work, scientific managers could impart a "scientific" 
ideology - directed toward achieving more efficient 
production. But this goal was, in effect, capital's goal, 
the reconciliation of interests achieved under owners' 
terms, directed by managers whose deference to science 
masked their allegiance to the ever increasing demands of 
capitalist producti on.62 The process of shifting allegiance 
to a scientific process impersonalized owner interests under 
the legitimacy of machine rationality and scientific law. By 
delivering allegiance of both capital an labor to functional
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managers, the smoothly run, con-flict free, highly productive 
factory could be made real.
In its myriad of control techniques, Taylorism 
created a new orientation toward authority which destroyed 
old labor and management hierarchies, reduced worker to 
worker input and interaction and strengthened communication 
with owners. The most obvious elements of control inherent 
in Taylorism were a) demands for 100 per cent compliance, b) 
the proliferation of direct authority figures over workmen; 
c) the uniformity demanded by the subdivision, 
standardization ritualization and habituation of each job; 
and d ) the mystification of the technological basis of the 
work process.
Ail the techniqes of management and control in 
Taylorism were forced upon the worker in a manner that made 
it impossible for him to refuse. Taylor structured 
scientific management so that workers had to participate 
fully in all aspects of the work plan or refuse the system 
in toto. "Anything short of complete utilization of the 
whole system," he insisted, "leaves such a large part of the 
game in the hands of the workmen that it becomes largely a 
matter of whim or caprice on their part as to whether they 
will allow you to have any results or not."63 Scientific 
managers planned each work task in advance, so integrating 
it into the master work plan of the entire plant that 
refusing, or soldiering affected the flow of work within the
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larger process. This integration demanded a degree of 
cooperation, coupled with management leadership, which made 
"entirely impossible...the independent individualism which 
characterizes the old type of management."64 Each worker 
received detailed written instructions describing "not only 
what is to be done but how it is to be done and the exact 
time allowed for doing it."65 In any shop under scientfic 
management, Taylor explained, "there is hardly a single act 
or piece of work done by any workman in the shop which is 
not preceded and followed by some act on the part of...the 
management."66 Worker discretion was removed, 100 per cent 
compliance forced, and no one allowed to work without 
manager directives.
Under the old factory system, the authority 
structure contained both formal and informal elements. As 
noted, other workers, in particular skilled craftsmen, 
constituted the informal network, and management, usually 
the shop or yard foremen, constituted the workers' only 
contact with a formal representative of the owner. Having 
abolished the informal structure of worker control, 
scientific management greatly expanded the number of bosses 
having direct control over workers. Under the new system, 
the close, daily contact and the integration of workers and 
managers into one system was designed to preclude arguments 
and compel cooperation. "All day long, every workman’s acts 
are dovetailed in between correspond!ng acts of the
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management. First the workman does something, and then a man 
on the management's side does something..., and under this 
intimate, close, personal cooperation between the two it 
becomes practically impossible to have a serious guarrel."67 
Taylor recognized the importance of avoiding arguments, or 
even an exchange of ideas between management and labor. The 
manager should particularly "avoid matching his wits with 
the workmen. Make dogmatic statements an let it go at that. 
Argument is the beginning of mental opposition...."68
Although Taylor often claimed that the new authority 
structure allowed for worker participation in decision 
making, this was not the case. Taylor and most of his 
followers did not ascribe to the philosophy of industrial 
democracy, which pretended to labor participation in 
management, promoted by the National Civic Federation. On 
the contrary, Taylorism demanded " enforced standardization 
of methods, enforced adoption of the best implements and 
working conditions, and enforced cooperation.... And the 
duty of enforcing the adoption of standards and of enforcing 
this cooperation rests with the management alone."69 
Scientific management was still management. Despite claims 
to the contrary, it could "in the hands of a grasping 
employer," as James Mapes Dodge cautioned, "be made as much 
an instrument of oppression as any other method of handling 
labor now in force."70
Under Taylor’s system, work was "deliberatey taken
out of the workman's hands" for control purposes. When 
knowledge and control of work were removed, workers also 
lost the knowledge of how to control work to their 
advantage, making workers' control more difficult and 
cooperation much easier. And if work was controlled by 
management, and the goal of managment to increase 
production, then, ultimately, all decisions were guided by 
that goal. Workers had to leave decisions they once made to 
the inevitably prejudiced judgment of the bosses.
Taylor compared the expanded authority structure of 
functional management to the management of a "large, 
up-to-date school" wherein children are daily “taken in 
hand" and given individualized training by specialists, 
rather than the old style of one teacher to a class.71 This 
analogy demonstrated the didactic, paternalistic, 
discipiinary, intimidating value in the increase in ratio of 
control personnel to workers. It also suggests the degree to 
which managers assumed a more authoritarian attitude, a 
condition Hugh Ati ken discovered in scientific managers at 
the Watertown arsenal :
To an appreciable degree one of the side 
effects of Taylorism was to make persons of 
executive and supervisory rank regard themselves 
as more important people, with greater control 
over what happened in the plant than before.72
Yet another factor in the expansion of managerial 
authority under scientific management was the dramatic 
increase in the uniformity of action which necessarily
accompanied the subdivision and ritualization of work tasks. 
The habituation of work guaranteed the mindless repetition 
of management prescribed tasks. Factors which divide and 
atomize the members of a group dilute its cohesiveness and 
increase the hegemonic power of those who govern. As Harry 
Braverman rightly noted, the division of labor not only 
cheapens its parts but adds to the control possibi1ities.73 
Taylor lamented the " great unevenness " and the "lack of 
uniformity" of worker behavior in even the best run shops of 
his day.74 Under scientific management, standard!zing, 
subdividing and ritualizing work elements throughout a shop 
were prslimi nary to specifying the amount of time allotted 
for each task, to insisting that the job be done in that 
time, preventing worker discretion in the use of tools and 
time, and in habituating the worker to new work rituals 
which accustomed the worker to "contintually and habitually 
[work] in accordance with scientific laws which have been 
developed by someone else."75 The worker acquired the habit 
of learning what managment taught. "The lives of men,"
Taylor argued, "are more affected by the habits which they 
form than by any other one influence."76 And these habits 
govern behavior in and out of the shop:
When men spend the greater part of their 
active working hours in regulating their every 
movement in accordance with clear-cut formulated 
laws, they form habits which inevitably affect 
and in many cases control them in their family 
life, and in all of their acts outside of
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working hours. With almost certainty they begin 
to guide the rest of their lives according to 
the principles and laws, and to try to insist 
upon those around them doing the same.77
The mystification and specialization of the 
scientific rationale underlying the work process furnished 
yet another element in the authority structure of scientific 
management. "Scientific" law replaced worker knowledge and 
control, but law become so complicated that without the help 
of college trained scientific managers the ordinary workman 
could not fully understand it.78 And the same was true with 
skilled mechanics, "men who are more capable of 
generalization, and who would be more likely...to choose the 
more scientific and better methods."79 But even the 
scientific laws governing skilled jobs "are so intricate 
that the high priced mechanic needs (even more than the 
cheap laborer) the cooperation of men better educated than 
himself in finding the laws...."80 While this may not have 
been the case, transferring technological expertise and 
legitimacy to the planning department guaranteed the result.
Taken together, the direct control management 
techniques, the subdivision of labor, the uniformity 
demanded by standardization, habituation and ri tualization 
of work and the deliberate obscuring of technological data 
under scientific management, all prevented the exercise of 
workers’ will and greatly increased the direct authority of
owners.
Although the most potent input came from factors
2 2 5
within its material operation, scientific management offered 
a heavy dose of verbal pronouncements on the nature of 
laborers and their organizations. As with most employer 
ideology in the late nineteenth century, contemporary 
assumptions about natural law and human nature conditioned 
Taylor's image of the worker.
In assessing the nature of men, scientific 
management drew many distinctions: first between the 
laboring population and everyone else, and second, within 
the laboring population itself. In an address to the faculty 
and students of the Harvard Business School in 1909, for 
instance, Tavlor explained the difference between the class 
of men represented by his audience and the class of workmen. 
He referred to these groups as "us" and "the.m. " Although 
claiming that "both classes of men are essentially the 
same," he cited environmental forces which "temporarily 
accentuate and intensify certain qualities," creating 
"actual differences between the two classes." Thus, rightly, 
each class perceived the other as "a different kind of 
animal," the academic group seeing workers "slouciiing along 
the street on their way back from work, with dirty clothes, 
chewing tobacco, in many cases hardly looking up as they 
pass by, stolid and indifferent-1ooking...," and the workers 
seeing "in men of our class merely the outward signs of 
prosperity— good clothes, and the possession of carriages 
and automobiles— the careless holiday look, accompanied by
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short working hours...."81
Such class differences enabled Taylor to make clear 
certain characteristics of each class. Since workmen have 
"spent their lives in obeying other people's orders," while 
"they see men of our class frequently in our capacity of 
giving orders," they therefore "occupy the position of 
apparent inferiority to us." Although they regard themsleves 
as "just as good and just as important as you and I," the 
appearance of inferiority makes them eternally supicious 
that "many of us, at least, look upon them as our 
inferiors."82 Since pretensions to superiority were "fatal" 
to scietific management, college trained managers should 
cultivate an unassuming manner, dress plainly, speak to 
workers "on their own level," "carefully avoid the slightest 
semblance of snobbery," and otherwise obscure class 
differences with workers.83
In this vein, Taylor separated types of men who 
worked with their brains from those with limited mental 
capacities who worked with their hands. "In most cases," 
Taylor explained, "one type of man is needed to plan ahead 
and an entirely different type to execute the work."84 
Because of the complicated nature of the scientifically 
controlled work process, the person "best suited to actually 
doing the work is incapable of fully understanding this 
science...."85 Conversely, those best able to understand 
science do brain work, not physical labor. Unlike workers.
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these "intelligent and educated men" had acquired the "habit 
of generalising and everywhere looking for laws" and 
therefore assumed the responsibility of "mak(ing) a science 
out of work."86 Even if a workman were given the necessary 
education and habits of generalisation, the demands of his 
work would leave neither time nor opportunity for developing 
scientific laws. This hierarchy of types cemented 
intellectual with class characteristics and explained to men 
of Taylor’s class why workers could not comprehend the 
entire productive process.
Within the laboring class, Taylor’s distinctions 
implied a degree of desirability and undesirability 
ultimately predicated on workers’ capacity and willingness 
to fulfill the demands of employers. Taylorism 
differentiated a range of mental and physical competence, 
from "first class" men such as machinists down to "very 
ordinary" workers such as shovelers and pig iron handlers. 
This physical description often used analogies with animal 
labor such as that of horses or oxen, pointing to the ideas 
of an unmechanized age which utilized human labor for heavy 
moving. The difference between "first class men and the poor 
ones is quite as great as between fine dray horses and 
donkeys."87 "There are big powerful men," he often said, 
"suited to heavy work just as dray horses are suited to the 
coal wagon." And he used these distinctions to belittle and 
discredit the "absurdity" of the trade union position that
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all workmen on a particular job should be paid the same wage 
or rate. This injures the better workman, he argued, and 
drives the work performance of all workers down to the level 
of the slowest, poorest worker, which was "quite as absurd 
as limiting the work of a fine dray house to that of a 
donkey."88 "Men are not born equal", he insisted, "and any 
attempt to make them so is contrary to nature’s laws and 
will fail."89
Taylor identified the "enormous differences between 
the amount of work which a first class man can do under 
favorable circumstances and the work which is actually done 
by the average man."90 Claiming that a "definite clear cut 
law ex i stsd as to what consti tutea a full day’s work for a 
first class laborer," Taylorism scientifically ascertained 
this law and then extracted a full day’s work from 
workers.91 A work task should "purposely” be made so 
difficult. He advised, that it can only be accomplished by a 
first class man.92 Taylor admitted that this amount of work 
was often four times or more greater than the worker had 
performed under ordinary management and that "not more than 
one out of 5 laborers could keep up."93
Given these extreme work demands, and the vast 
differences in physical abilities among working men, 
scientific management selected from this range of ability 
the strongest and most able, for only these were capable of 
working under great strain at an accelerated pace. In his
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famous experiments with pig iron handlers in the Bethlehem 
Steel yard in the spring of 1899, Taylor, through selecting 
the most fit worker and utilizing scientific techniques, 
increased the average daily weight of iron each man handled 
from 12 1/2 to 47 tons. In these experiments, only one man 
in eight selected had the physical capacity to sustain a 
"fair day's work."94 But, he added, when first class men 
applied themselves to pig iron loading, "none of them were 
(sic) overworked."95
Between these "first class men" and the "losers," 
Taylorism drew a harsh line. Although the system guaranteed 
high wages for the few who successfully accomplished work 
tasks, it also demanded that workers suffer "less in case of 
failure." When a worker failed, Taylor explained, "he should 
be sure that sooner or later he will be the loser by i t ."96 
Since failure was the worker's fault in the moral universe 
of Taylor’s day, he rightly suffered the consequences. 
Ignoring the notion that he might be asking, by his own 
definitions, a donkey to do draft horse work, Taylor blamed 
failure to perform on workers' shortcomings, in particular 
their laziness. Any worker in any job, he maintained, could 
become a first class man if he put forth the effort. Taylor 
insisted that the accelerated pace was not injurious over a 
long period of time, but on the contrary, made the worker 
"stronger, happier and more contented in doing it. "97 Thus, 
"the only man who does not come under 'first class' is the
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man who can work and won't work."98 Such men were analogous 
to otherwise -first class dray horses who balk, who
"are so absolutely lazy that they won't 
haul a coal wagon. And in the same way...we have 
some balky workmen...who, physically well able 
to work, are simply lazy, and who through no 
amount o-f teachi n g ... Cor ] kindly treatment can 
be brought into the 'first-class'."99
Although first class clearly implied the existence 
of other classes, no place existed in Taylorism for any but 
first class workers. And this pointed up the critical 
importance of scientific selection of workers in order to 
separate those who are "willing and able to adopt the new 
methods" from the others.100
The material conditions of labor surplus in a period 
of widespread unemployment also shaped Taylor's image of 
workers. Workers in a factory who "failed to rise to certain 
standards are discharged," he explained, "and a fresh supply 
of carefully selected men are given work in their 
places."101 This notion was born in the atmosphere of a 
buyer's market for labor which said, in effect, sift through 
the pack until you get what you want. The pack is always 
there outside the factory gate. Given the workers' even 
present fear of being replaced, this condition enabled 
Taylorism to demand high levels of extreme exertion from 
“first class men." Taylor often admitted the extreme pace 
and exertion, but the odds of securing a "fresh supply" were 
in his favor.
Tavlorism described workers' mental as well as
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physical attributes. Their inability to understand the 
scientific complexities of the work process within a modern 
factory resulted from either a "lack of education" or an 
"insufficient mental capacity."102 They were either stupid 
or ignorant. The degree to which Taylor actually believed 
this is questionable, since he had personal acquaintance 
with many skilled and unskilled workers, and he clearly 
respected the technological expertise of the former. But 
such distinctions made legitimate the exploitative nature of 
labor utilization, particularly of the unskilled. As 
Braverman put it, "a belief in the original stupidity of the 
worker is a nececssity for management", otnsrwise it would 
have to admit that it is engaged in a wholesale e.ntsror i se 
of prizing and fostering atupidity."103
While deploring what he considered the mental 
incapacity of many workers, Taylor based increased 
production, in part, on the "scientific" utilization of 
their labor. Scientific managers selected workers whose 
mental abilities, they thought, best fit the requirements of 
the job, assigning skilled mechanics to the best jobs and 
dull men to dull jobs. A pig iron handler, for instance,
"must be so stupid and phlegmatic that he more nearly 
resembles in his mental makeup an ox...." 104 "A man of the 
type of the ox" was "no rare specimen of humanity," and 
therefore was neither rare nor "highly prized." On the 
contrary, Taylor explained.
"he was a man so stupid that he was 
unfitted to do most kinds of laboring work..., 
so stupid that the word 'percentage' has no 
meaning to him, and he must consequently be 
trained by a man more intelligent than
himself...." "A man with only the intelligence
of an average laborer can be taught to do the
most difficult and delicate work if it is
repeated enough times; and his lower mental 
caliber renders him more fit than the mechanic 
to stand the monotony of repetition."105
Workers had moral as well as physical and
intellectual differences. To Taylor, workers by nature
ascribed to ordinary goals of getting ahead, and were
motivated primarily by money. Most men aspired to betterment
and would work hard if assured a permanent liberal wage
increase. However, Taylor cautioned against much of an
increase over 30 to 60 per cent of the usual amount of pay.
If "overpaid, many will vjork irregularly and tend to become
more or less shiftless, extravagant and dissipated."106
Thus, all workers, even first class men were potentially,
perhaps fundamentally, lazy, and therefore required
external 1 y applied control and incentive. Taylor often
insisted that any worker who so wished could secure a job,
and that those without work were merely lazy and
irresponsible. He discounted evidence which demonstrated
annual unemployment of one to four million.107
Morally shocked by men who failed to perform at
their best, Taylor used the moral implications of the work
ethic in differentiating between hardworking and therefore
moral, and lazy and thus immoral workers.108 He often
emphasized the virtues of first class men who possessed 
"character and special ability of a high order"; they were 
pracically all sober men (a steady drinker could not keep up 
the pace), they saved money and, as a consequence, they 
lived better. But the workman who produced less than first 
class men did not and ought not live as well. Otherwise 
"that would imply that all those in the world were entitled 
to live equally well whether they worked or whether they 
were idle, and that is certainly not the case."109
To Taylor, the most telling distinction was first 
class workers' willingness to defer to employers' interests. 
The "most notable différence" between these and ordinary 
workers "1 ay in their changed mental attitude toward thsir 
employers and their work, and in the total absence of 
soldiering on their part."110 Furthermore, a subtle 
distinction divided even those willing to serve employers:
Quite a large proportion of young men 
set out deliberately to do barely enough to 
satisfy their employer - in fact, many of them 
would feel happy to do as little as they can and 
still satisfy their employer. Another set of men 
propose to do just what their (sic) employer 
wants. They, however, are at all times 
exceedingly careful to guard their own rights 
and not to give a single thing in the way of 
service that they are not paid for. About one 
man, however, in twenty takes the real, quick 
road to success. He makes up his mind 
deliberately that in all cases he will not only 
give his employer all that he wants, but that he 
will surprise him with something unexpected, 
something beyond what his employer has any right 
to ask or expect, and it is astonishing how fast 
this line of action leads to success.ill
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The preface to the first French edition of 
EciDGlBlgs of Scientific Management reflected the general 
opinion of the day on the working class perception of its 
own interests. "The ignorance of man on the subject of his 
real interests is prodigious," the preface maintained. 
"Especially is this true in the case of the working man," 
largely because "they do not as yet have the smallest 
knowledge of the economic sciences."112 Taylor, as noted, 
deferred to workers' assessment of their immediate, personal 
and class interests, but despaired of their failure to 
understand "the broad principles which affect their best 
interests."113 And a poor perception of interests, clouded 
by that working class bane, immediate gratification, 
inevitably lad to false assumptions on the part of workers 
such as restriction of output, antagonism toward capital, 
and the choice of the wrong methods for redress, such as 
unions.
False assumptions led workers to "begrudge a fair 
and even a large profit to their employers," and worse, to 
"feel that all the fruits of their labor should belong to 
them." 114 Since limited perceptions precluded correct 
knowledge, false assumptions derived less from "wrong 
motives" than from being "ignorant of the underlying truths 
of political economy."115 This placed the burden not on the 
ignorant, but on the middle class, the "literary class," 
whose "duty" was to "see that the community is properly
educated."116
Taylor’s notorious hostility toward the "dangers" of 
trade unions was formed in the context of extracting the 
maximum effort from each worker. Since unions were at the 
center of maintaining class solidarity in the skilled 
trades, "one of the most...difficult problems with the art 
of management," he lamented, "is how to persuade union men 
to do a full day’s work if the union does not wish them to 
do it."117 Citing their "serious delusions" and "cant 
phrases", he castigated unions for formally enforcing 
standard day wages and piece rates and for encouraging 
worl:ers informallv to maincain craft traditions and rules. 
All these practices he lumped under the label "soldiering." 
Craft union rules limiting the amount of work, to Taylor, 
made workers "1azy, demoralized and uncompetitive.“118 The 
existence of employer recognized unions and their insistence 
upon the use of official representatives precluded the 
individual treatment of workers so necessary in scientific 
management. "Therefore," Taylor cautioned.
all precautions should be taken which
prevent the formation of a union. Workmen
should... never be addressed collectively, either 
in a meeting or through printed notices, because 
if they are talked to in a body, or through
notices and circulars the logical answer is for
them to appoint a committee or a spokesman to 
represent them, and this is the starting point 
for a combination or union.119
Scientific management broke union enforcement with
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individualism. The offer of individual bonus incentives had 
a "moral suasion on the workman which is powerful," and thus 
the differential piece rate drove a wedge between union 
members advocating a uniform daily rate for all workers, and 
those aspiring to individual advancement. It was not in the 
interests of highly paid men to join a union with "cheap 
men."120 That Midvale Steel escaped the steel strikes of 
the decade after 1881, he attributed to all the "best men" 
recognizing that the "success of a labor organization meant 
the lowering of their wages in order that the inferior men 
might earn more; and of course, could not be persuaded to 
join."121 Again, he drew the distinction between the "best 
man" who correct 1v identified union subversion of their real 
interests in the name of group solidarity, and the "inferior 
men" who joined unions.
Taylor’s view of unions was also formed in the 
context of achieving scientific control over all elements of 
production, especially the human element. To him, unions 
subverted this control on various levels. The quest for 
control and predictability in production effectively 
eliminated the desirability of bargaining over any of its 
elements. In this light, he saw unions as a separate power 
bloc within the factory which purposely undermined the 
process of rationalizing industry, and in so doing violated 
the natural laws governing the work process.122 Ultimately, 
unions constituted disruptive forces; their formation "is
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almost invaribly followed by strikes and almost open war 
between the management and the men."123
Aside from their intervention in the process of 
production, unions exerted baneful social influences. "The 
boycott, the use of force or intimidation, and the 
oppression of non-union workmen by labor unions are 
damnable; these acts of tyranny are thoroughly un-American 
and will not be tolerated by the American people."124 In 
this vein, restriction of output was "deliberate robbery of 
the poor of the fruits of industrial production."125 Taylor 
reserved special ire for labor leaders who agitate only to 
give men a good return on their union dues, "scaring up 
grievances whether they exist or not."126 Opportun i sm 
motivated some union leaders such as the "blatant demagogue" 
Samuel Gompers, while others "out of ignorance...misdirected 
their followers, teaching them "wrong doctrines."127
In conclusion, scientific management created for 
employers new ways of looking at labor utilization. As a 
managerial revolution, it achieved a despotic organization 
of work oriented around discipline, docility, obedience and 
the work ethic. It established the social legitimacy of the 
scientific managerial class, on the shop floor and in 
society at large, a class which evolved into a full scale 
technocratic bureaucracy which regarded human workers in the 
same terms that they used in discussing the material 
organization of work. Workers were seen simply as a source
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of work unattainable by machines, and the scientific 
managers' aim was to make the most efficient use of them.
The model of the scientific treatment of workers is time and 
motion study, an efficiency cult in Taylor's day and the 
norm of ours.
As an ideology based on technology, Taylorism 
promoted the unity of interests of capital and labor while 
obscuring the class bias inherent in the rationalization of 
capitalist-owned production. The problems it identified were 
those of employers, and likewise, its solutions. As it 
instructed the worker in the rationality of industry and in 
the authority of that rationality', it redefined the role of 
employer and emo1 eyes, their relationship to one another, to 
industrial production, to society.
Against organized labor's commitment to collective 
bargaining, Taylorism urged the individual contract. Blaming 
the victims, it absolved rationalized monopoly capital. 
Identifying workers as obstacles to production and progress, 
it discredited craft union practices and the labor movement 
itself. Presenting a mechanism for eliminating undesirable 
human traits, it required obedience and efficiency which 
promoted rationalized social behavior In and outside the 
factory. And, finally, Taylorism reshaped and reoriented 
previously held values and assumptions.
It is not the purpose of this essay to advance a 
theory of technological determinism. Behavior of owners and
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workers was and is conditioned by culture and history as 
well as technological demands in the industrial context. Its 
purpose is, rather, to isolate those technological factors 
in scientific management and show how that influenced/guided 
capital's notions of what material, social and ideological 
changes should and could be achieved by its application. And 
the degree to which it informed the dominant ideological 
universe indicates the degree to which efficiency standards 
pervaded the general culture, and in particular, labor 
consciousness. The importance of this lies in the centrality 
of the value system which continues to be the ethos of 
modern industrial organisation.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
This study has focused on one aspect of the rise of 
monopoly corporate capitalism, the labor ideology of 
employers. In the critical years between 1880 and 1910, a 
prominent capitalist elite exercised increasingly greater 
material and ideological power over the remainder of society 
in a period when American social thought was consciously 
reformulated. The development of a skillfully articulated 
and forcefully promoted labor ideologv provided an important 
tool for labor control and thua formed an integral part of 
the maturing process of capitalism. Through three case 
studies, this work demonstrated the historical development 
and social role of ideology as a mechanism of class rule in 
the U.S. It examined the class bias in the legitimating 
rhetoric of capitalist elites and the means by which that 
bias was pressed upon the laboring population and the larger 
society.
This study asked the question of how certain ideas 
become accepted as given in a society. It answered by using 
hegemonic theory and the sociology of knowledge to show that 
the social basis of knowledge reflects social hierarchies. 
Social authority and legitimacy placed dominant elites in a 
position to achieve a near ideological monopoly. For these
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reasons, employer labor ideology formed a great part of the 
social body of knowledge which served as an objective 
description of the institution of labor. This body of 
knowledge provided the vocabulary, circumscribed the debate 
and determined, at least in part, the consciousness of all 
members of society.
Between 1380 and 1910, owners increasingly 
controlled a great amount of the machinery of information in 
this period and utilized various institutions as 
transmitters and legitimators of their beliefs: schools, 
churches, the mass media, political parties, and, after 
1900,. the trade unions. Into these institutions, owners 
injected their labor ideology, and as those i .nst i tut i ans and 
their leaders influenced behavior and thought, they moved 
their members toward acceptance of capitalist ideas.
In all three case studies, capitalist ideology 
developed and was prosletyzed under the pressure of labor's 
ideological challenge. During a time of highly polarized 
class conflict, the debate over relations between capital 
and labor and the nature of the economic system occupied the 
center of the social stage. The stress of labor disruptions 
and challenges forced capital to confront labor ideologies 
critical or subversive of capitalism, to promote and justify 
a radical new management system, and to confront a material 
challenge by a strong union. Thus employers geared their 
arguments to those of labor, the open against the closed
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shop, social service against social disruption, hard work 
against soldiering, scientific management against low 
productivity, order against chaos. On a larger scale, 
business labor ideology arose from social contradictions 
which required elites to justify economic reality in terms 
of class or national ideals.
Responding to these pressures, the ideologues of the 
National Association of Manufacturers. Scientific 
Management, the Pullman Company and the railroads formulated 
a body of propaganda which served as a rationalization for 
their actions. The rhetoric of capitalist elites furnished 
the means to ideologically bind workers to the new 
industrial system bv legitimating e:: i sting soci ceconomi c 
realities: the distribution of wealth, patterns of property 
ownership and labor utilization, and state and private 
methods of social control. This legitimation was 
accomplished, in part, by portraying the pevailing system as 
logical, valid, natural and reasonable. Elite ideology 
sought to stabilize and maintain the industrial order 
through the creation of a docile and diligent labor force, 
and through the subordination of workers to a rationalized, 
owner controlled labor process.
Businessmen directed their ideas toward two specific 
audiences; the working class and the public. Their labor 
ideology portrayed capital as the very embodiment of values 
the society held dear. It pitted class neutral entities such
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as "public opinion" or “society," which implied the well 
being and survival of the social whole, against labor’s 
social subversiveness. In this vein, it utilized a selective 
historical tradition to rest the power of employers on the 
supposed universal moral values and historical experience of 
the "nation" against the unpatriotic historical experience 
and social needs of the working class. Employer ideology 
took liberal republican notions such as freedom, equal 
opportunity and individual rights, and made them into their 
own class arguments, tenets of the capitalist market.
At the same time it was directed at convincing the 
public of the inherent wrongness of workers’ ideas and 
activities. It salac ted definitions of labor and 
descriptions of labor activities and goals which discredited 
or nihilated that institution. Except for certain leaders 
who were villifisd, labor appeared in owners’ rhetoric as a 
faceless generalizacion which reflected owners’ stereotypes 
and prejudices. This generalization relied upon the 
traditions, conventions and agreed-upon codes of 
understanding among employers rather than on direct 
observation of the working class. Employers’ labor ideology 
readied the public consciousness for new ways of thinking 
about the relationship of capital and labor. It attempted to 
disrupt labor’s activities, discredit its leaders and 
realign its allegiances.
Through the exercise of hegemony in the period
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1880-1910, businessmen sought to prescribe the limits of the 
debate, confining it to fine tuning or adjusting the 
existing system, but discrediting or eliminating its 
criticism. Their ideology attempted to prevent any 
examination of its own ideas or of the material 
relationships upon which they rested. Elite ideology sought 
to prevent the working class from generating competing ideas 
or popularising an alternative economic system. Employer 
ideology sought to avoid the real conflict of interests that 
militant labor ideology offered, and preserve, instead, a 
status quo in which a small group owned and most of the 
remainder worked for them. It sought to diffuse or 
redistribute direet conflict between capital and labor or 
between workers and managers by obscuring the elements of 
the debate. Thus employer propaganda disguised the 
increasing subordination of workers to an employer 
controlled, despotically organized work process in a 
rhetorical cloak of a supposed unity of capital and labor's 
interests. Where the avowed effects of the market worked to 
capital’s advantage, in wage policy for example, elite 
ideology asserted the naked power of the market. Where it 
likewise was advantageous, it constituted workers as 
individuals rather than members of a class, factors rather 
than humans. Employer rhetoric hid its actions behind the 
facade of classical economics, justifying its behavior by 
insisting that it was governed by economic laws and owed
nothing to morality. But its exhortations to work and 
obedience were moral.
In a period when business consolidation pointed 
toward less inter-elite strife and more cooperation, the 
crystallization of an effective labor ideology reinforced 
owners' determination to unite against what they perceived 
as a common enemy. In one sense, employers directed their 
labor ideology toward each other and gained in strength and 
identity by juxtaposing themselves against labor. The 
articulation, exchange and propagation of their ideas 
provided coherence to the ruling class and furnished a 
social solidarity necessary to maintain class bonds.
Employsr ideology avinced little ambivalence and much 
certainty. It provided a motivation for action, a 
coordination of tactics, and fostered a favorable public 
opinion for a more free and legitimate exercise of owners' 
power.1 The propagandists in the three studies, although 
apparently having no direct communication with one another, 
shared similar and often identical patterns of analysis and 
belief indicating common definitions of the problem and 
shared practical solutions to the dispute between capital 
and labor.
The radical labor ideology of U.S. workmen declined 
in force in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Although radical labor organizations continued to challenge 
business ideology, labor's mainstream leadership emerged
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from this period having adopted many of employers ideas 
concerning the relations between capital and labor. With the 
growth of arbitration in the period 1900-1920, workers 
achieved a voice in determining wages and work conditions. 
Arbitration took place, however, under the employer's terms, 
within a context which sustained the essential economic 
relationships of the status quo. This context narrowed the 
debate to a question of obtaining benefits within the 
system. Organized labor in the U.S. turned away from its 
early radical position and began to cast its lot with 
employers. The result was that, between 1880 and 1910, trade 
unions increasinqlv acted as legitimators of the ideology of 
another class.
The process of subordinating oppositional working 
class ideas under the dominant employer ideology was not 
entirely due to the hegemonic power of employers. Their 
ideology did not unilaterally determine what was thought 
about labor, but brought to bear a network of ideas and 
interests that profoundly influenced any discussion about 
workers, unions or strikes. In short, their power was not 
absolute or monolithic, but it was systemic and 
legitimating. It rested, ultimately, on the coercive power 
of the state. It did not instantly drive out working class 
ideology, but in the long run, it prevailed. Radical ideas 
exist today among members of the U.S. workforce, but they 
are so discredited and penalized that they cannot be
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considered part of any mainstream challenge. Today, most 
U.S. citizens and unionized labor support capitalist 
political economy for reasons that repeat many of the ideas 
expressed by owners in this period, ideas about work, 
workers, unions, rights, and the social function of 
capital.2 The dominant national consciousness has been and 
is biased against unions.
The outcome of the dialogue between capital and 
labor in this period was the result, in part, of systematic, 
ideological control on the part of capital. It did not 
result in the triumph of the better argument about how 
society should be constituted or how capital and labor 
should relate to each other. It resulted, instead, in the 
triumph of the force of the "better argument" as society 
came to perceive it. Better, not because it provided for 
society a greater degree of freedom or justice, but better 
merely because it prevailed.
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